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INTRODUCTION

When the United States Congress passed a new mental
health parity law in 2008, then Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi announced that henceforth, “illness of the brain must be
1
treated just like illness anywhere else in the body.” Such sentiment is becoming more common, as policymakers and the
public increasingly recognize the biological basis for, and the
2
gravity of, “mental” and “emotional” disabilities.
In insurance and personal injury litigation, the definition
3
of bodily injury is already being challenged. For instance, a
court in 2008 reasoned that because the brain is a part of the
body, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) alone, with no
other physical manifestations, constituted bodily injury under a
4
Michigan statute. Similarly, in 2011, a court found that emotional injury sustained from witnessing a car accident consti5
tuted bodily injury under an insurance contract. And in the
United Kingdom, an increasing number of insurance claims
“seek to stretch the boundaries of what constitutes bodily inju6
ry.” These efforts to remove the mind-body distinction as a
barrier to insurance coverage and tort recovery suggest that
neuroscientific understandings of mental injury are already
having legal effect.
Consider also efforts to hold governments accountable for
7
mental as well as physical torture. The definition of physical
pain and suffering was a central issue in legal interpretations

1. Robert Pear, House Approves Bill on Mental Health Parity, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2008, at A14.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Appendix A.
4. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811 (2008). This
case is discussed further in Francis X. Shen, Monetizing Memory Science: Neuroscience and the Future of PTSD Litigation, in MEMORY AND LAW 325 (Lynn
Nadel & Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012) [hereinafter Shen, Monetizing Memory Science].
5. See Lipsky v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 41 A.3d 1288 (Pa. 2012).
6. Phil Bell, The Social Construction of Bodily Injury, 31 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.—ISSUES & PRAC. 340, 350 (2006).
7. See David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 823 (2012).
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8

of the now infamous torture memos. And some scholars have
argued that because the mind is enabled by the brain, and because the brain is physical matter, mental torture is physical
9
torture as well.
Developments such as these, which are revisiting the
mind-brain-body distinction in legally relevant ways, provide
motivation to carefully examine the fundamental role that the
distinction between mind and body plays in the criminal law.
Even a cursory glance at penal codes finds that “bodily injury”
is an element for a vast number of offenses against the per10
son. For instance, simple assault, the most common crime
against the person, is defined under the Model Penal Code in
this way: “a person is guilty of [simple] assault if he attempts to
cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury
11
to another.”
Infliction of bodily injury or serious bodily injury is typically an element in aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary,
resisting arrest, unlawful arrest, and a good number of similar
crimes. Moreover, the concept may also be invoked in civil
commitment hearings when determining whether an individual
is at risk of committing serious bodily injury. The categorization of a crime victim’s harms as bodily or not-bodily thus may
have important consequences because it triggers culpability
and may trigger stiffer criminal sanctions.
For instance, in a 1998 case alleging criminal maltreatment of boys in a group home (who later developed PTSD), the
State of Washington argued that “PTSD is a psychological disorder that has measurable neurobiologic or chemical effects on
the brain . . . [and] that because PTSD alters the sufferer’s
12
brain chemistry, it is the impairment of a physical condition.”
8. See id.
9. See id. at 829 n.22 (“Thus, to think that psychological torture is not an
assault on the body is a conceptual error from the outset. [W]hat all torture
has in common, regardless of physical or mental appearances, is its assault on
the brain. . . . Extreme fear and despair . . . are emotional states that are anchored in brain states.” (quoting Uwe Jacobs, Documenting the Neurobiology of
Psychological Torture: Conceptual and Neuropsychological Observations, in
THE TRAUMA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE 163, 164–65 (Almerindo E. Ojeda
ed., 2008))).
10. As seen in Table A2, the majority of states use the phrase “bodily injury,” but others use “physical injury.” For ease of exposition, I use “bodily injury” throughout this Article. See infra at Table A2 (explaining how bodily injury
is typically defined as physical injury, thus conflating the two).
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (1981).
12. State v. Van Woerden, 967 P.2d 14, 19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
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The court in that case found against the State, and it is a rarity
to see this argument made. But it may become less rare as our
understanding of mental disorders such as PTSD continues to
evolve.
Taken to its logical extreme, parity between mental injury
and physical injury in criminal law could lead to a tremendous
expansion of criminal liability because a large number of (sufficiently severe) emotional injuries could be deemed “bodily” injury given that bodily injury is defined as physical injury, and
emotional distress is produced by physical changes in the cells
13
of the brain.
What is the criminal law’s backstop to prevent such a slippery slope? One solution would be for the criminal law to sufficiently define the concept, as it does with other legal terms of
art, in such a way as to clearly delineate what does and does
not count as bodily injury. But, as the first part of this Article
will show, the criminal law does not at present take this path.
When courts have confronted the question, there is an implicit assumption that the definition of bodily injury is intuitive—a matter of common sense, and clear on its face to the lay
juror. Conventional wisdom thus seems to be that the concept
of “bodily injury” is uncontroversial. One court has asserted
that “[c]learly the term ‘bodily injury’ is not a phrase which re14
quires an elaborate explanation in order to be understood.”
And another writes that “[w]e can think of no phenomenon of
more common experience and understanding than the concepts
15
of ‘bodily injury’ and ‘physical pain.’” Bodily injury, say the
courts, is not a legal term of art but an everyday term of common understanding.
In light of these assumptions, and the challenge that a
neuroscientific perspective on mental injuries presents, this Article revisits bodily injury through a series of original experiments designed to answer three questions. First, do lay citizens
share a common understanding of the term “bodily injury”?
More specifically, is there a common understanding about
whether “mental” injuries are clearly excluded from the bodily
13. Of course a distinction could still be drawn based on the word “injury,”
such as distinguishing injury from “offense.” See infra Part IV.
14. Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985).
15. Rogers v. State, 396 N.E.2d 348, 352 (Ind. 1979); see also Payne v.
State, 484 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. 1985) (citing the conclusion in Rogers and writing that “[d]efendant presents no persuasive reason for us to change these
conclusions in this case”).
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injury category as the criminal law implicitly assumes there is?
Second, if lay understandings of bodily injury are indeed fluid,
can jury instructions (containing different definitions) reliably
demarcate the contours of the bodily injury category? Third,
how might the introduction of neuroscientific evidence affect
lay judgments about what is and is not bodily injury?
The empirical results reported in this Article suggest that
the concept of bodily injury is more malleable than at least
some courts have posited. First, the analysis finds that lay people share a common understanding of bodily injury only when
the injury is akin to a broken leg or cracked ribs. When asked
to categorize injuries such as recurring headaches, memory
loss, PTSD, and depression, lay people exhibit much confusion
and disagreement about whether these are “bodily” injuries.
For example, I find that although 98% of lay subjects agree
that a broken leg probably or definitely constitutes bodily injury, in the case of PTSD, subjects are split: 27% think that
PTSD is probably or definitely bodily injury; 25% choose maybe; 25% say probably not; and 22% choose definitely not.
Second, the analysis suggests that there is a simple, effective tool at the legislature’s disposal for communicating the
16
bodily injury concept: jury instructions. Variance in bodily injury determination is sensitive to the jury instructions provid17
ed, and to the brain-based arguments and evidence presented.
For instance, jury instructions that include the 1990 Black’s
Law Dictionary definition of bodily injury—“pertaining to or
concerning the body; of or belonging to the body or the physical
constitution; not mental, but corporeal”—generate different
subject behavior than do jury instructions that include one of
the definitions utilized in the federal criminal code: “(A) a cut,
abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; (B) physical pain; (C)
illness; (D) impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (E) any other injury to the body, no
18
matter how temporary.”
When asked whether a crime victim’s mental injuries were
“bodily,” those who had been exposed to the Black’s definition
16. These results run counter to some literature on evidentiary instructions which tends to find that such instructions are ineffective. See, e.g., David
Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013). My instructions are of a different type and were not
employed in actual trial settings.
17. I use “subject determination” in this Article to mean whether experimental subjects determined the crime victim’s injuries to be “bodily” or not.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(4) (2006).
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generally were more likely to say no; those exposed to the federal definitions were generally more likely to say yes.
Third, the analysis finds that the effect of neuroscientific
evidence on lay determination of bodily injury is potentially
powerful—but can also readily restricted by jury instructions
that explicitly exclude mental injury. In experimental conditions where prosecutors made explicitly brain-based arguments
and presented brain evidence (to argue that mental injury is
brain injury and thus bodily injury), subjects were more likely
to assess a mental injury as “bodily” when they did not have
the restrictive Black’s Law Dictionary definition.
Taken together, the findings in this Article suggest that if
the criminal law were to one day recognize the biological (and
thus physical) basis for mental injury, then the bodily injury
concept will need to be better defined. How should this be done?
The Article suggests that legislatures have six primary options.
Legislatures can: (1) do nothing (which would then require difficult statutory interpretation by courts); (2) explicitly include
mental injuries within the bodily injury category (as they often
already do in the case of child and elder abuse); (3) explicitly
exclude mental injuries from the bodily injury category (as
many insurance policies now do); (4) eliminate the “bodily” category altogether and focus solely on severity of injury (as the
Iowa criminal code does); (5) develop crime-specific criteria for
bodily injury (as the federal sentencing guidelines do in the
case of forcible rape); or (6) eliminate the bodily injury element
from particular crimes against the person to focus solely on offender conduct (as in stalking or harassment).
Whether and how legislatures choose to criminalize behavior that inflicts purely non-physical injury is a policy question
requiring state-specific and crime-specific analyses beyond the
scope of this paper. Perhaps some legislatures will opt not to
have parity of injuries in the criminal context, and maybe others will choose to carve out exceptions for extremely bad mental
injuries. But whatever a legislature’s intention about the meaning of bodily injury, that intention should be clearly communicated. If society increasingly comes to see mental injuries as
real, biological-based physical injuries, then the criminal law
will have to explain why it differentiates between injuries to
the body and injuries to the mind. There are good reasons to
maintain such dualism within this area of law, but so too are
there good reasons to eliminate it. Now is the moment to have
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that debate, before courts are forced to reconcile old definitions
with new science and societal norms.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the history and scope of the bodily injury element in criminal law.
Part II provides a short summary of the recent and rapid
growth of neurolaw, and also discusses recent civil litigation
concerning the issue of PTSD as a “bodily” injury. Part III describes the design of and results from new experiments on lay
persons’ understanding of bodily injury. Part IV discusses the
implications of these results. Part V concludes.
I. “BODILY INJURY” IN CRIMINAL LAW
In this Part, I discuss the importance of the concept of bod19
ily injury in criminal law. This Part offers a brief history of
the origins of the bodily injury element; illustrates the pervasiveness of the bodily injury element in contemporary offenses
against the person; discusses standard dictionary definitions of
the term; presents a fifty-state review of how state codes define
bodily injury and use it as an element in assault; and reviews
case law in which the definition of bodily injury has been challenged in criminal contexts. I argue that, when faced with the
issue, courts have relied on ad hoc generalizations about a
shared common understanding of what constitutes bodily inju20
ry. Subsequent Parts of the Article test these generalizations.
19. Although this Article focuses on criminal law, the bodily injury issue
is pervasive across law. Appendix A discusses the issue in the tort context.
Mind-body dualism even comes up in the U.S. Tax Code. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 104(A)(2) (2006) (excluding from gross income compensatory damages that a
taxpayer received for physical injuries). Prior to 1996, the word “physical” was
not included, and the allowed injuries “[included] ‘affecting the emotions,’
‘emotional distress,’ ‘mental pain and suffering,’ ‘distress, humiliation, and
mental anguish,’ [and] ‘intentional infliction of emotional distress.’” G. Christopher Wright, Taxation of Personal Injury Awards: Addressing the
Mind/Body Dualism that Plagues § 104(A)(2) of the Tax Code, 60 CATH. U. L.
REV. 211, 212, 220 (2011). In 1996, the Code was amended to include the word
“physical” and to expressly exclude emotional distress from the definition.
However, the terms “physical” and “emotional distress” are not defined, which
often leads to litigation.
20. The empirical approach is a complement to, nor a substitute for, the
philosophical debate over dualism. This Article does not endeavor to engage
the extensive philosophy of mind literature surrounding the “mind-body problem.” Indeed, one of the reasons that the criminal law might abandon the bodily/non-bodily distinction is in part because the ongoing philosophical debates
suggest that it is a seemingly intractable, conceptual problem. For discussion
of different viewpoints on the mind-body problem, see generally WILLIAM
BECHTEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: AN OVERVIEW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE
(1988); MIND AND COGNITION: AN ANTHOLOGY (William G. Lycan & Jesse J.
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A. PERVASIVENESS OF BODILY INJURY IN CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal law draws lines between conduct that can be punished by the state, and conduct that (while perhaps frowned
21
upon) will not incur criminal sanction. In a variety of criminal
and quasi-criminal contexts, this legislative line drawing between criminal and non-criminal behavior invokes the concept
of “bodily” (or “physical”) injury.
The historical roots for this conceptualization can be found
in early English common law, in which the crime of mayhem
required that victim be disfigured or disabled to the extent that
22
it made him less useful in combat. The rationale for criminalPrinz eds., 3d ed. 1999); Howard Robinson, Dualism, in THE BLACKWELL
GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 85 (Stephen S. Stich & Ted A. Warfield eds.,
2003). It is also important to note that the argument I advance here does not
rest on a conflation of mind and brain (and indeed, I have argued elsewhere
that such a conflation is problematic), but it does rely on the presumption that
brain enables mind. In this sense, mind is “physical” (even if we do not know
with precision exactly how). The mind-brain approach of most neuroscientists
is captured in this explanation from the introduction to a popular neuroscience
text: “In neuroscience, there is no need to separate mind from brain; once we
fully understand the individual and concerted actions of brain cells, we will
understand the origins of our mental abilities. The organization of this book
reflects this ‘neurophilosophy.’” MARK F. BEAR ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE: EXPLORING THE BRAIN 23 (2d ed. 2001). For a discussion of the dangers of conflating mind and brain for purposes of law, see Michael S. Pardo & Dennis
Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1211 (2010). I agree with Luban and Shue, who write in the context of
distinguishing mental from physical torture that “[t]hat A causes B, or even
that A invariably causes B, does not imply that A and B are indistinguishable.” Luban & Shue, supra note 7, at 831. But to make the distinction requires,
as they suggest, “intellectual rigor,” and to date such rigor has not been applied to this question in the context of defining bodily injury in the criminal
law. See id.
21. Scholars debate whether harm must actually occur in order to justify
punishment. See Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 857, 857 (1994). In this Article, I focus purely on those instances in which a victim has experienced a setback to interest. For more on the debate over attempts, see Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of
the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679 (1994) (“Whether the harm
doctrine can be justified is, as George Fletcher has said, a ‘deep, unresolved
issue in the theory of criminal liability.’”). For a classic statement of the case
for the irrelevance of resultant harm for culpability, see Michael S. Moore, The
Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
237 (1994).
22. See Louis A. Ambrose, Darrell F. Cook & Van C. Durrer, II, Survey:
Developments in Maryland Law, 1990–91, 51 MD. L. REV. 612, 643 n.270 (“The
punishment of this crime was designed to preserve the King’s right to the usefulness of his subjects in battle. Any injury that rendered a subject of the King
less valuable in battle was considered an offense against the King. The earliest punishment for this crime was therefore severe; the perpetrator was sub-
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izing mayhem was to preserve the usefulness of the King’s sol23
diers in battle. English statutes began to change in 1403 with
the inclusion of some permanent injuries that did not affect the
usefulness of subjects in battle (e.g., severing of the ear, cutting
24
out of the tongue).
Mayhem (maiming) as a distinct crime survives today pri25
marily in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Outside of the
military, however, few jurisdictions recognize mayhem as a
26
crime. But the requirement of physical injury to the victim
has carried down to contemporary statutes.
Bodily injury is a part of many aspects of the criminal and
27
quasi-criminal code, including simple assault; aggravated as28
29
30
31
sault; unlawful arrest; aggravated robbery; menacing; civjected to the same harm he inflicted upon his victim.” (citations omitted)).
23. See id.
24. An assault upon Lord Coventry in the 1660s (in which several people
attacked the Lord for statements made in Parliament) provided the impetus
for disfigurement to be included within the scope of the charge, as well. The
new disfigurement element required that the injury be permanent and created
limits on what injuries would qualify: the loss of a front tooth would qualify as
mayhem because of the effect on appearance, though the loss of a tooth on the
back of the lower jaw would not qualify. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS 121 (“Among these defensive members are reckoned not only arms and legs, but a finger, an eye,
and a fore-tooth and also some others. But the loss of one of the jaw teeth, the
ear or the nose, is no mayhem at common law, as they can be of no use in
fighting.”).
25. See Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 124, 10 U.S.C. § 924 (2006).
The injury required by the UCMJ is set forth as “an injury which—(1) seriously disfigures his person by any mutilation thereof; (2) destroys or disables any
member or organ of his body; or (3) seriously diminishes his physical vigor by
the injury of any member or organ.”
26. In those jurisdictions that do recognize mayhem, emphasis is placed
on preservation of normal appearance and completeness. In keeping with the
history of the offense, the Court of Appeals in D.C. has specifically stated that
“what is important now is not the victim’s capacity for attack or defense, but
the integrity of his person.” United States v. Cook, 462 F.2d 301, 303 (D.C. Cir.
1972); see also State v. Quintana, 748 N.W.2d 447, 463 (Wis. 2008).
27. “A person is guilty of assault if he: (a) attempts to cause or purposely,
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (b) negligently
causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” MODEL
PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (1981) (emphasis added).
28. In the Model Penal Code and in many state codes, aggravated assault
is defined as an assault in which the defendant causes, or attempts to cause,
“serious bodily injury.” See id. § 211.1(2) (emphasis added).
29. “Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,
Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
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32

il commitment; and the burden of proof for release from civil
33
commitment after finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.
This list could go on for some length, and is illustrative of the
many ways in which bodily injury is an element in defining
34
crimes.
ties secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to
different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an
alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment
of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation
of this section . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (emphasis added).
30. In many states, a defendant is guilty of aggravated robbery if, during
the course of robbery, the defendant inflicts or intends to inflict death or serious physical injury. As cited in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 236–37
(1999), see ALA. CODE § 13A-8-41(a)(2) (1994) (robbery in the first degree defined in part by the causing of “serious physical injury”); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.500(a)(3) (1996) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-12-103 (1997) (aggravated
robbery; “[i]nflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury”);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-134(a)(1) (1994) (robbery in the first degree; “[c]auses
serious physical injury”); IOWA CODE § 711.2 (1993) (robbery in the first degree; “purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious injury”); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 515.020(1)(a) (LexisNexis 1990) (robbery in the first degree; “causes
physical injury”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 636:1(III)(c) (1996) (class A felony of
robbery; “[i]nflicted or attempted to inflict death or serious injury”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.15 (1988) (robbery in the first degree; “[c]auses serious physical
injury”); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.415(1)(c) (1990) (robbery in the first degree;
“[c]auses or attempts to cause serious physical injury”); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 29.03(a)(1) (West 1994) (aggravated robbery; “causes serious bodily injury”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302(1)(b) (West 1995) (aggravated robbery;
“causes serious bodily injury”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.200(1)(a)(iii) (1994)
(robbery in the first degree, “[i]nflicts bodily injury”).
31. “A person is guilty of menacing in the third degree when, by physical
menace, he or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in
fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury.” N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.15 (2012). In Alabama, too, one is guilty of menacing “if, by physical
action, he intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of
imminent serious physical injury.” ALA. CODE § 13A-6-23(A) (2012).
32. Courts can commit a person if “the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect
as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person or serious damage to property of another.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
33. If the offense is one “involving bodily injury to, or serious danger to
the property of, another person, or involving a substantial risk of such injury
or damage,” then the person found not guilty by reason of insanity has the
burden of proof of “by clear and convincing evidence” (instead of “by a preponderance of the evidence”). 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
34. The bodily injury distinction also arises in federal statutes in other,
related ways. For instance, the Prison Litigation Reform Act holds that prisoners cannot make claims for mental or emotional injury during their incarceration unless they also suffer physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2006) (“No
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B. STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
Having established that bodily injury is central to defining
many crimes, how is the concept defined in U.S. criminal codes?
I look first at two instances within the federal code, and then
turn my attention to the states.
In federal sentencing guidelines, bodily injury “means any
significant injury; e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, or
is of a type for which medical attention ordinarily would be
35
sought.” On the other hand, the provision of the United States
Code that criminalizes tampering with consumer products defines bodily injury as including “illness,” “impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty,” and
36
“any other injury to the body no matter how temporary.”
We see variation as well in the definition of bodily injury in
37
state statutes. This data is presented in Table A2. The most
common definition of bodily injury, employed by over ten states,
is “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condi38
tion.” Several states also include the word pain in their definition: “‘physical injury’ means a physical pain or an impairment
39
of physical condition.” Arizona is the only state to define phys40
ical injury simply as “impairment of physical condition.”
Several states insert severity language into the definition
when they define bodily injury to mean “substantial physical

Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or
other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”).
35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1(B) (Nov. 1,
2010).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(4) (2006).
37. A number of states provide no definition in their criminal statutes for
bodily injury.
38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-901(c) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700
(2012); MINN. STAT. § 609.02(7) (2012); NEB. REV. ST. § 28-109(4) (2012); N.J.
REV. STAT. 2C:11-1(a) (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(8) (2012); UTAH CODE
§ 76-1-601 (3) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. § 3251(5) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE
9A.04.110(4)(a) (2012); WISC. STAT. 939.22(4) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1104(a)(i) (2012). Maine slightly modifies this language, inserting the word
“physical” in front of “illness.” See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 2 (2012).
39. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.220 (2012); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-3(3)
(2012); IND. CODE § 35-41-1-4 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (2012).
Even when pain is not explicitly included in the definition, it may be allowed
as part of a jury instruction. See State v. Coleman, 709 A.2d 590, 595 (Conn.
1998) (rejecting the defendant’s argument “that the concept of ‘pain’ is separate and distinct from the concept of bodily ‘injury’”).
40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-105(33) (2012).
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pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.” In
Maryland, physical injury “means any impairment of physical
42
condition, excluding minor injuries.” Arkansas includes “infliction of bruising, swelling, or a visible mark associated with
43
physical trauma.” Ohio also varies the standard definition
somewhat, defining bodily injury as “physical harm to persons,”
and “any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, re44
gardless of its gravity or duration.”
Several states recognize some type of “mental” harm within their definition of bodily or physical injury. In Tennessee,
bodily injury “includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, and physical pain or temporary illness or impairment
45
of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”
Montana defines bodily injury to mean “physical pain, illness,
or an impairment of physical condition and includes mental ill46
ness or impairment.”
Taken together, this review of bodily injury definitions
suggests that there is variation across the states, and with only
a few exceptions, mental injury is not explicitly included under
47
the bodily injury umbrella.
C. DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS
To better understand the language used in various stat48
utes, it is useful to consider dictionary definitions. Looking
41. W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(9) (2012); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2301 (2012).
42. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-203(c)(1) (West 2012).
43. ARK. CODE § 5-1-102 (14) (2010).
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(3) (West 2012).
45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106 (2) (2010).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(5) (2011).
47. The variation in definitions also raises a question about the effects of
language used to describe similar harms. For instance, does using the word
“injury” as opposed to an “illness” affect our categorization of harm? Similarly,
how do the words “disease” versus “disorder” affect public (and potentially juror) views? Such questions are ripe for additional analysis in future research.
48. Courts increasingly turn to dictionaries for assistance in statutory interpretation. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary
Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 277 (1998); A. Raymond
Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (1994); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become A Fortress: The United States Supreme
Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 228–29 (1999); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437
(1994). Though as legal scholar William Popkin notes, today’s dictionaries are
better described as “descriptive word-books that do not deal adequately with
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first at the current version of Black’s Law Dictionary, bodily in49
jury is defined simply as “physical damage to a person’s body.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary is similar in defining the term “bodily” as “having a body or a material form:
physical, corporeal.” In both cases, these definitions simply
change the question from “What constitutes bodily injury?” to
“What constitutes physical injury?” Webster’s includes the fol50
lowing definitions for “physical”:
2a: of or belonging to all created existences in nature: relating to or in
accordance with the laws of nature
2b: of or relating to natural or material things as opposed to things
mental, moral, spiritual, or imaginary
3a: of, relating to, concerned with, or devoted to natural science
3b: of or relating to physics: characterized or produced by the forces
and operations of physics: employed in the processes of physics
4a: of or relating to the body—often opposed to mental
51
4b: concerned or preoccupied with the body and its needs

As can be seen in the Webster’s entry, one way to define
bodily/physical is through an exclusionary route—describing
what bodily is not. To the extent that physical is defined as
that which is not mental, it would suggest that “mental” injuries are not physical injuries. But to the extent that physical is
not spiritual, mental injuries might be included. The sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary used a “not mental” approach
when it defined “bodily” as “pertaining to or concerning the
body; of or belonging to the body or the physical constitution;
52
not mental, but corporeal.” Similarly, the Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines bodily as “1. of or per-

statutory interpretation.” WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION xv (2007).
49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009). The entry for “serious
bodily injury” reads: “Serious physical impairment of the human body; esp.,
bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious,
permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any body part or organ. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (1981). Typically, the
fact-finder must decide in any given case whether the injury meets this general standard. Generally, an injury meets this standard if it creates a substantial risk of fatal consequences or, when inflicted, constitutes mayhem. This can
be compared with mayhem, which is also termed serious bodily harm; grievous
bodily harm; great bodily injury. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 857.
50. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (archaic definitions omitted).
51. Id.
52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (6th ed. 1990).
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taining to the body. 2. corporeal or material, as contrasted with
53
spiritual or mental.”
The first, now obsolete, definition of “bodily” in the Oxford
English Dictionary (OED) provides a different sort of contrast:
“Of the nature of body, corporeal, material, physical; as opposed
54
to spiritual.” Here, “physical” has more a sense of nonspiritual as opposed to non-mental. If we then read the OED
entry for “body” we find that body refers, in the first instance,
to “the complete physical form of a person or animal; the assemblage of parts, organs, and tissues that constitutes the
55
whole material organism.” While one way to contrast the body
is with the soul, an alternative is to contrast the body with the
head, as seen in a later OED entry defining the body as “the
main portion of the animal frame, to which the head, neck, extremities, etc., are attached; the trunk. Freq. opposed to the
56
limbs or to the head.”
These definitions are a useful starting point, and suggest
that the body may be contrasted with the soul or with the
mind. But the definitions give little guidance in the way of definitely resolving whether, if recognized as brain-based, mental
57
injuries should be considered bodily injury in criminal law.
Appendix A provides additional discussion, and additional definitions, of bodily injury as the term arises in the insurance and
tort contexts. In those other legal contexts, too, the term is
sometimes ambiguous. Unlike in criminal law, however, there
is now a growing body of civil case law litigating the bodily injury term.
D. CHALLENGES TO BODILY INJURY DEFINITIONS IN CRIMINAL
LAW CASES
We have now seen that bodily injury is pervasive in law,
and that bodily injury is defined in different, and often ambigu53. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 232 (2d ed.
2001).
54. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 962 (1st ed. 1933). The second definition in the OED, “of or belonging to the body or physical nature of man,” is
akin to the entry in Black’s.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. To be sure, the problem of ambiguity is a general one. As William
Eskridge, the leading proponent of dynamic statutory interpretation, has argued, “for any statute of consequence, the legislative drafting process ensures
textual ambiguities, which only multiply over time.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (1994).
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ous, ways. In this sub-Part, I examine cases in which the bodily
injury definition has been challenged. Analysis of the cases
finds first that existing definitions of bodily injury can be difficult to interpret in borderline cases, and second that judicial fiat about the clarity of the term has not been empirically test58
ed.
The inadequacy of traditional bodily injury definitions was
59
evident in the 1997 Iowa Supreme Court case State v. Gordon.
In Gordon, the defendant was convicted by a jury of assault
60
causing bodily injury. The case arose when, with several people present, the defendant Thomas Gordon kicked the victim
Jeremiah Fry unprovoked, leaving “a red mark to the right of
61
Fry’s sternum.” The Iowa Supreme Court considered the issue
of whether “a red mark or bruise constitute[s] a per se impair62
ment of physical condition.”
During the trial, prosecution and defense counsel argued
over the proper jury instruction on the bodily injury question.
58. I focus here on the issue of bodily versus non-bodily injury, and do not
reach the related issue of what constitutes “serious” in “serious bodily injury.”
But to be sure, the issue of determining how “serious” a bodily injury has been
is of enormous interest, given that serious bodily injury is very often an aggravating factor in modern criminal codes. See, e.g., Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Sufficiency of Bodily Injury to Support Charge of Aggravated Assault, 5
A.L.R.5th 243 (1992) (consisting of a nearly 300-page compendium of cases relating to the question of how much injury is required to constitute serious bodily injury). Where to draw the line between serious and non-serious, or substantial and non-substantial, is a matter for the jury. People v. Cross, 45
Cal.4th 58, 64 (Cal. 2008) (“This court has long held that determining whether
a victim has suffered physical harm amounting to great bodily injury is not a
question of law for the court but a factual inquiry to be resolved by the jury. A
fine line can divide an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not quite meet the description. Where to draw that line is for
the jury to decide.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. 560 N.W.2d 4 (Iowa 1997).
60. Id. The issue has arisen in other criminal contexts in Iowa as well.
See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 136 (Iowa 2004) (finding that evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant's conduct of breaking
into vehicle and pulling victim out of vehicle caused victim, who was defendant’s wife, bodily injury); State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 494–95 (Iowa 1999)
(holding evidence that victim, who was struck in the chest with defendant’s
fist, had the wind knocked out of him and momentarily felt pain was sufficient
proof of bodily injury notwithstanding that victim had no visible injuries and
did not require medical treatment), vacated, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001).
61. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d at 5.
62. Id. at 4. The Iowa Supreme Court, in a later decision, found that a basis for bodily injury can be found when a victim suffered a sprained jaw, minor
concussion, and a probable broken nose. State v. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d 283,
287–88 (Iowa 2009).
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The following exchange occurred between defense counsel and
the judge:
THE COURT: Are you going to argue to the jury that a red mark on
the skin is not a bodily injury?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I may.
THE COURT: All right. Then I’ll tell the jury that a red mark on the
skin is a bodily injury because they have a right to know that, and if
63
there’s a dispute, then I’ll clear it up.

Then, with defense objecting, the court gave the following instruction to the jury:
A “bodily” injury means a bodily or physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. A red mark or bruise on the skin
would constitute an impairment of physical condition, and therefore
64
an injury.

The first part of the Gordon jury instruction is the definition of bodily injury as used in the Model Penal Code (MPC).
The court’s use of the MPC definition was upheld as constitutional because the Iowa Supreme Court had previously adopted
65
the MPC definition. But the second sentence of the jury instruction gave the Iowa Supreme Court pause.
At issue here is the ambiguity of the definition of bodily injury in the MPC. As the court observed, “[n]either the Model
Penal Code nor the Iowa Code defines impairment of physical
66
condition.” Because of this, judges cannot give instructions as
to what, specifically, constitutes impairment of physical condition. Rather, as the court held, these are questions of fact “peculiarly within the jury’s common experience and for them to
67
decide.”
Even though jurors’ common experience may not actually
lead to a shared understanding of the term, still some courts
refuse to offer instruction as to the definition of “bodily injury.”
For instance, when asked whether he would define “serious
bodily injury,” a Virginia judge said to the attorneys in the case
that:
I believe that Virginia is a state . . . [in which] words that don’t need
defining we don’t define, words like preponderance of the evidence we
do because it’s not an ordinary parlance meaning word. But constantly the jury comes back and asks about the meaning of words in our
instructions and we constantly tell them to their everlasting distress,
63. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d at 5.
64. Id.
65. State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1981) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE commentary § 210.0(2) (1980)).
66. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d at 6 (emphasis added).
67. Id.
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words are given their ordinary meaning in [E]nglish and we don’t de68
fine them.

The judge’s phrase—that we don’t define “words that don’t
need defining”—is indicative of other courts’ rulings as well.
For instance, more than one Pennsylvania court has found that
a failure to provide a bodily injury instruction is not prejudicial
because “while ‘bodily injury’ is a legal term, its meaning is
69
comprehensible to laymen without judicial guidance.”
Consider too the case of an inmate charged with third70
degree assault against a deputy jailer. At trial, the court did
not include a definition of physical injury in the jury instructions, and the defendant argued on appeal that “without the
statutory definition of ‘physical injury,’ the jury was unaware of
71
the proper standard to apply to the facts of the case.” The
court found that this was in error, and then moved to an analysis of whether the error was prejudicial.
The court’s analysis hinged on the court’s assessment of juror ability to understand and apply the physical injury element.
The government and defendant offered competing claims:
[T]he Commonwealth contends a reasonable jury could conclude
Palmer suffered a “physical injury,” even without the assistance of
the legal definition; hence, the error cannot be viewed as affecting the
verdict. In contrast, Claus characterizes [the deputy jailer’s] testimony as “vague,” and he contends he suffered prejudice from the error
because the jurors relied on their own opinions regarding the mean72
ing of physical injury and possibly applied an incorrect standard.

On the facts of the particular case—in which the deputy
jailer testified that the defendant hit him upon entering the defendant’s cell following an altercation—the court ruled that
there was no prejudice from the missing instruction because
“the verdict would have been the same even if the statutory definition of ‘physical injury’ had been included in the instruc-

68. Brewster v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 288, 289 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
The Judge in this case did not allow an extra jury instruction to define “serious bodily injury.” Id.
69. Commonwealth v. Mott, 539 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. 1988); see also Braley
v. State, 572 S.E.2d 583, 590 (Ga. 2002) (“‘Bodily injury’ is a term that is
‘commonly understood’” (quoting Ferguson v. State, 438 S.E.2d 682, 684 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1993))); Commonwealth v. Goins, 501 A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. 1985).
70. Claus v. Commonwealth, No. 2009 CA 000555 MR, 2010 WL 3717243,
at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2010) (“An individual confined to a detention facility is guilty of third-degree assault when he intentionally or wantonly causes,
or attempts to cause, physical injury to an employee of the facility.”).
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2.
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73

tions.” Here, as before, the justice system assumes that lay jurors share a common, correct understanding of bodily injury.
The assumption has also been on display in cases in which
defendants have challenged the constitutionality of bodily injury definitions on the grounds that they are too vague. While I
do not suggest that confusion over bodily injury necessarily rises to the level of unconstitutional vagueness, these cases are
nevertheless instructive because they reveal underlying judicial
attitudes.
For instance, the Supreme Court of Montana rejected the
vagueness contention, reasoning first that “‘physical pain’ is not
an ambiguous term, as any human being who has ever suffered
such pain is obviously aware,” and second that “words of com74
mon usage in the English language need not be defined.”
In Indiana, a court ruled that the term “bodily injury,”
when challenged for being unconstitutionally vague, was clearly understood by the common person: “We can think of no phenomenon of more common experience and understanding than
the concepts of ‘bodily injury’ and ‘physical pain.’ Likewise, we
do not find the concept of ‘impairment of physical condition’ to
be so esoteric as to avoid a consensus of meaning among per75
sons of common intelligence.”
Such pronouncements about a consensus of meaning rest,
to date, solely on judicial assessments of jurors’ ordinary and
common experience. These judicial assessments, of course, may
be accurate, especially in easy cases such as injuries to appendages. And I do not claim that it is only with bodily injury that
76
judges rely on their own views to determine ordinary usage.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the analysis above rests
on a narrow set of decisions mostly related to vagueness challenges. Were prosecutors to regularly advance bodily injury arguments of the type I explore in this paper, it could well be that
judges might offer more detailed instructions. But whether and
how they would craft such instructions would surely depend in
part on assumptions about how ordinary people would concep73. Id. at *3.
74. State v. Hart, No. 95-320, slip op. at 7 (Mont. Jan. 9, 1997).
75. Rogers v. State, 396 N.E.2d 348, 352 (Ind. 1979).
76. Indeed, as legal scholar Lawrence Solan has suggested, “During most
of American judicial history, the predominant methodology for discovering ordinary meaning has been introspection. Without fanfare, judges simply rely
upon their own sense of how common words are typically used.” Lawrence M.
Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2054 (2005).
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tualize the crime victim’s mental injuries, especially in light of
the emergence of a neuroscientific understanding of “mental”
illness and injury. I now turn to this emerging body of
neuroscientific knowledge.
II. BRAIN INJURY AS BODILY INJURY: THE VIEW FROM
NEUROSCIENCE
Bodily injury elements in criminal law have not yet been
challenged on the grounds of new neuroscientific findings. In
this Part, I explain why, at least theoretically, this may change
sometime in the future. I first discuss the general rise of
neurolaw, pointing out how the focus of most research has been
77
on the defendant’s and not the victim’s brain. I then discuss
the Michigan governmental immunity case of Allen v. Bloom78
field Hills as an example of the types of brain-based bodily injury arguments that might bleed into the criminal law. Appendix B provides an illustrative example of how a “mental” injury,
PTSD, can be understood and explained in biochemical and
brain-based language.
A. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE CRIMINAL VICTIM’S BRAIN
This sub-part briefly reviews the rise of neurolaw, discusses how neuroscientific research has led to increasing recognition of mental illness as a brain-based injury, and offers evidence suggesting that brain-based arguments in the context of
bodily injury are likely to increase in future years.

77. In this Article, the phrases “Law and Neuroscience,” “Neuroscience
and Law,” and “Neurolaw” will be used interchangeably to refer to the application of neuroscience findings to law. For general introductions to law and neuroscience, see OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE (forthcoming 2013); STEPHEN J. MORSE & ADINA L. ROSKIES, A
PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L.
Roskies eds., 2012); Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on
Neuroscience, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (Fed. Judicial
Ctr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and
Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 61 (2010); Owen D. Jones et al.,
Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 5 (2009); Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L. J. LEGAL INFO. 352 (2010);
Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions
for Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007). For additional resources,
see MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON LAW & NEUROSCIENCE,
www.lawneuro.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
78. 760 N.W.2d 811 (2008).
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1. The Emergence of Law and Neuroscience
Many indicators suggest that neuroscientific evidence is
rapidly becoming more prevalent and prominent in criminal
proceedings across the country. Although the absolute number
of neurolaw cases remains small, data collected by law professor Nita Farahany indicate a rapid rate of growth, with twice
as many reported cases involving neuroscientific evidence in
79
2009 than in 2006. The emerging intersection of neuroscience
and law follows the quite rapid and large growth of the field of
neuroscience more generally. In 1969 the Society for Neurosci80
ence (SfN) formed with 500 members. Today it numbers over
40,000 members and hosts an annual conference attended by
81
more than 31,000 members. The consistent and rapid growth
of the neuroscience field suggests that the field is continuing on
a trajectory to become even more important in the years to
come.
The potential implications of neuroscience, for many areas
82
of law and policy, are quite broad. For example, scholars have
debated both the theoretical and practical implications of neuroscience for law by addressing issues related to free will, de83
terminism, and compatabilism.
In addition to generating much theoretical debate,
neuroscientific evidence is rapidly becoming more prevalent
79. Nita A. Farahany, An Empirical Study of Brains and Genes in U.S.
Criminal Law (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
80. What We Do: History of SfN, SOC’Y FOR NEUROSCIENCE, http://www
.sfn.org/About/What-We-Do/History-of-SfN (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
81. Id.
82. See generally LAW AND THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough
eds., 2006) (discussing new opportunities for law resulting from the integration of law and neuroscience); Bruce A. Arrigo, Punishment, Freedom, and the
Culture of Control: The Case of Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. &
MED. 457 (2007) (examining the application of functional magnetic resonance
imaging brain-scanning technology to criminal justice); Nita A. Farahany &
James E. Coleman, Jr., Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal Responsibility,
in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 183 (Nita A.
Farahany ed., 2009); LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2010
(Michael Freeman ed., 2010); LAW, MIND AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009) (analyzing the intersection of law, justice, and
neuroscience).
83. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y
LONDON BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004); Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the
Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience,
9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2008); Michael S. Pardo, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211 (2010).
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and prominent in criminal proceedings across the country. For
instance, the federal courts have seen their first Daubert hearing on the admissibility of functional magnetic resonance imag84
ing (fMRI) lie-detection evidence; a jury in Florida was in part
persuaded by quantitative electroencephalography (QEEG)
brain evidence to give a defendant a life sentence instead of the
85
death penalty; and the United States Supreme Court has
made reference to the science of adolescent brain development
86
in multiple rulings regarding life without parole for juveniles.
In the courtroom, neuroimaging evidence has been offered in
criminal, constitutional, disability benefit, and contract cases,
87
among others. A growing number of conferences and symposia
around the country have been launched to introduce judges and
88
attorneys to these new developments.
84. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D.
Tenn. 2010).
85. State v. Nelson, F05-846 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2010).
86. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464–66 (2012); Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
87. Jones et al., supra note 77; Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law
and Neuroscience in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW 349
(Tade M. Spranger ed., 2011).
88. For example, in 2007, the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral
Research ran a conference titled Law, Biology and the Brain. In 2008, the
Berkman Center for Internet and Society and the Petrie-Flom Center for
Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics of Harvard Law School cohosted a roundtable panel titled Should Criminal Law Be Reconsidered in
Light of Advances in Neuroscience?; the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law at
Baylor College of Medicine hosted an event the Neuroscience and Law Conference; the University of California Riverside Extension Law & Science Program
and the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research hosted Seminar on
Law and Neuroscience. In 2009, the University of Akron School of Law hosted
a law review symposium titled Neuroscience, Law, and Government; the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project sponsored a symposium titled Psychopathy and the Law; the Stanford Technology Law Review hosted a
symposium titled Neuroscience and the Courts: The Implications of Advances
in Neurotechnology; and the Vermont Law Review published a special issue
about the intersection of emotions and legal institutions. Symposium, Emotions in Context: Exploring the Interaction Between Emotions and Legal Institutions, 33 VT. L. REV. 3 (2009). In 2010, the American Enterprise Institute
hosted an event titled Understanding Humans Through Neuroscience; Mercer
Law Review hosted a conference titled The Brain Sciences in the Courtroom.
In 2011, the Denver University Law Review hosted a symposium entitled
Guilty Minds: Neuroscience and Criminal Law Symposium; and the Dana
Foundation hosted a meeting titled Neuroscience and the Law in New York.
Also in 2011, the National Academy of Sciences and the U.K. Royal Society cosponsored a forum titled Neuroscience and the Law. The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience continues to run such events
See Education and Outreach, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON LAW &
NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.lawneuro.org/outreach.php (last visited Apr. 21,
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Legislators are also already proposing new laws based on
neuroscience findings. New York Assemblyman Michael Benjamin introduced legislation to “ban the use of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scans in a criminal proceedings”
where a defendant’s or witness’s truthfulness or knowledge of a
89
specific event is at issue” during the 2009 legislative session.
In 2009 Alabama State Representative Arthur Payne proposed House Bill 785, providing that “a person commits the
crime of assault in the second degree if the person, with intent
to cause any physical injury to another person, causes serious
90
physical injury to the brain of the other person.” Representative Payne’s bill, which died in committee, proposed a definition
of “serious physical injury to the brain” as “impairment of a
person’s brain which creates a substantial risk of death, or
which causes death or protracted impairment of health or pro91
tracted loss or impairment of the function of the brain.”
Despite the increased attention to neuroscience and criminal law, comparatively little scholarship has examined the possible effects of neuroscientific evidence on our understanding of
92
the crime victim’s brain. This Article thus turns next to a brief
review of the psychology and neuroscience of crime victim
trauma.
2013).
89. H.R. A9154, 232d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A09154&term=2009&Summ
ary=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Yhttp://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09154http://ass
embly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09154.
90. H.R. 785, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2009).
91. Id.
92. There are exceptions; for example, in a short essay on the possible applications of law and neuroscience for prosecutors, I speculated that “one future possibility is that neuroscience offers us more effective ways to communicate the long-lasting and often devastating effects of crime on the brains of
crime ‘victims.’” Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience: Possibilities for Prosecutors, 33 CAL. DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N PROSECUTOR’S BRIEF 17, 23 n.41 (2011).
To be sure, examination of the victim’s brain has been carried out in some
neuroscience and tort law scholarship. See, e.g., Howard Fields, Can Neuroscience Identify Pain?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO NEUROSCIENCE 32 (2010); Betsy J.
Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 203 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010); Betsy J.
Grey, Neuroscience, Emotional Harm, and Emotional Distress Tort Claims, 7
AM. J. BIOETHICS 65 (2007); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the
Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011); Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007); Shen, Monetizing
Memory Science, supra note 4; Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages
and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. 553 (2010).
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2. Brain-Based Explanations for Crime Victims’ Mental
Injuries
Although assessment of the psychological costs of crime
has not been a central concern of emerging law and neuroscience scholarship, there is an extensive research literature on
93
these costs. This research base finds that there is much variation in how individual crime victims will react psychologically
to their victimization experience, but it is well established that
common disorders arising from criminal assault include de94
pression, anxiety, and PTSD.
Contemporary research on the cost of crime victimization
95
has focused on crime’s effect on victims’ quality of life. A recent review of the research concludes: “findings from the wellestablished literature on general trauma and the emerging research on crime victimization indicate significant functional
96
impact on the quality of life for victims.” Victimology research
93. See, e.g., LAURENCE MILLER, COUNSELING CRIME VICTIMS: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (2008); MARLENE A.
YOUNG, Psychological Trauma of Crime Victimization, in VICTIM ASSISTANCE:
FRONTIERS AND FUNDAMENTALS 1 (1993); Irene Hanson Frieze, Sharon
Hymer & Martin S. Greenberg, Describing the Crime Victim: Psychological
Reactions to Victimization, 18 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOL.: RESEARCH & PRAC.
299 (1987); Patricia A. Resick, Psychological Effects of Victimization: Implications for the Criminal Justice System, 33 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 468 (1987);
Philip W. Wirtz & Adele V. Harrell, Assaultive Versus Nonassaultive Victimization: A Profile Analysis of Psychological Response, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 264 (1987). For discussion of victimology more generally, see ANDREW
KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY (7th ed. 2010).
94. Ted R. Miller et al., Victim Costs of Violent Crime and Resulting Injuries, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS 186, 196 (1993). For discussion in the context of rape,
see Francis X. Shen, How We Still Fail Rape Victims: Reflecting on Responsibility and Legal Reform, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2011); Shen, Monetizing
Memory Science, supra note 4; Francis X. Shen, Assessing the Harms of Rape,
Dissertation Chapter, Harvard University (2008) (on file with author).
95. See, e.g., Rochelle F. Hanson, Genelle K. Sawyer, Angela M. Begle &
Grace S. Hubel, The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality of Life, 23 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 189 (2010). One way of conceptualizing the costs is by focusing on different domains such as: “(a) role functioning [i.e., difficulties in
social, occupational, and interpersonal functioning], (b) life satisfaction and
well-being, and (c) social–material conditions” (i.e., health costs, health care
utilization, and employer costs). Id. at 190 (citing Madeline M. Gladis et al.,
Quality of Life: Expanding the Scope of Clinical Significance, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 320 (1999)).
96. Id. at 194. Additional psychological externalities include the possible
negative psychological consequences for those who must regularly observe violence in their communities. Naomi Breslau & Glenn C. Davis, Migraine, Major
Depression and Panic Disorder: A Prospective Epidemiologic Study of Young
Adults, 12 CEPHALALGIA 85, 85 (1992); Naomi Breslau et al., Traumatic
Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in an Urban Population of Young
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has established that a large percentage of the costs of crime for
97
victims is psychological.
We can look to other policy domains to see momentum for
recognizing these psychological injuries as bodily. Echoing the
quote at the outset of this paper from Speaker Pelosi, in 2009
on the floor of the United States House of Representatives,
Congressman Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) argued that insurance
companies must “acknowledge that the brain is part of the
98
body.”
As neuroscience discovers more about the biochemical processes that correlate with mental phenomena, the distinction
between “physical” and “mental” injury is being revisited in
99
many legal and policy contexts. In health law, for instance,
there has been a sustained effort to enact mental health parity
100
laws that recognize “biologically based mental illness.” Mark
Anderson, who served as the late Senator Paul Wellstone’s senior mental health policy advisor in the Senate, describes the
emerging policy position this way:
There is an increased understanding that the mind/body split that
18th century philosophers detailed is a fiction. The brain is a real
part of the body and the brain and other organs of the body interact

Adults, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSCYCHOL. 216, 216 (1991).
97. Mark A. Cohen & Roger Bowles, Estimating Costs of Crime, in HANDBOOK OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 143 (Alex R. Piquero & David Weisburd
eds., 2010); Miller et al., supra note 94, at 196.
98. 155 CONG. REC. H8188 (daily ed. July 16, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Patrick Kennedy).
99. See Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick, Too—The Case for Equal
Insurance Coverage for Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 365 (1993);
Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42
AKRON L. REV. 469, 489–97 (2009); see also Martha Chamallas, Removing
Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751, 752 (2001)
(arguing that “[i]n the hierarchy of torts, emotional and relational harms are
not as fully protected as physical injury and property damage”); Martha
Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 463 (1998); John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for
Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789 (2007); State Laws Mandating or
Regulating Mental Health Benefits, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14352 (last updated Dec. 2012). In the area
of mental health, due to both interest group pressure and new scientific research, many states have redefined mental illness as “biologically based.”
Marcia C. Peck & Richard M. Scheffler, An Analysis of the Definitions of Mental Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1089, 1091–
93 (2002). There is evidence that this is happening in the United Kingdom as
well. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 6.
100. Shannon, supra note 99; Tovino, supra note 99; see also NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 99.
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in numerous ways so that a health care system that does not treat the
101
brain with the body is outmoded.

Survey data finds that there is widespread support for
mental health parity. When respondents in a nationally representative sample were asked, “Is mental health care just as important to cover as physical health care?,” an overwhelming
102
78% said yes. In a different national poll, 82% of U.S. citizens
agreed with the statement that “[t]reatment for mental illness
should be included in the President’s proposal to the same ex103
tent as treatment for physical illnesses.” Additional data find
that in the period from 1996 to 2006 the percentage of citizens
viewing depression as a neurobiological disease increased from
104
54% to 67%.
This shift toward a neurobiological understanding of mental illness is due in part to the concerted efforts of mental
health advocacy organizations to educate the public. For instance, the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) sponsors a number of educational programs, including a program
created in 1999 called “Breaking the Silence: Teaching the Next
105
Generation About Mental Illness.”
Campaigns to end stigmatization of mental illness have relied in large part on brain evidence, and have argued that there
is no neuroscientific basis for differentiating insurance cover106
age for mental (as opposed to physical) illness. And these
101. Mark Anderson & Lynda Cannova, 50 Years of Mental Health Hope
and Struggle: 1957–2007, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://www
.crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=54 (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
102. Kristina W. Hanson, Public Opinion and the Mental Health Parity Debate: Lessons from the Survey Literature, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1059
(1998) (citing NATIONAL SURVEY OF 800 REGISTERED VOTERS CONDUCTED FOR
THE BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MELLMAN-LAZARUS-LAKE,
INC. (1994)).
103. Id. at tbl. 1 (citing NATIONAL TELEPHONE SURVEY OF 1,006 ADULTS
CONDUCTED FOR NBC NEWS AND THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, HART & TEETER RESEARCH CO. (1993)).
104. Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., “A Disease Like Any Other”? A Decade of
Change in Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol Dependence, 167 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1321 (2010).
105. Breaking the Silence: Teaching School Kids About Mental Illness,
NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://tinyurl.com/3kcwpxv (last visited
Mar. 3, 2013).
106. Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 63, 65–70 (1997); see also Pescosolido et al., supra note 104, at 1327
(“[n]euroscientific advances are fundamentally transforming the landscape of
mental illness and psychiatry”). New neuroscientific evidence may further
erode the physical/mental barrier. For instance, in one functional magnetic
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campaigns have been ongoing since the 1990s. For instance, in
1996 in testimony before Congress, Dr. Steven Hyman—a Harvard neuroscientist, and then director of the National Institute
of Mental Health—said:
I can state without reservation that research shows no biomedical
justification for differentiating serious mental illness from other serious and potentially chronic disorders of the nervous system such as
stroke, brain tumor, or paralysis. There is absolutely no biomedical
justification for policies that judge mental disorders as being in any
107
way less real or less deserving of treatment . . . .

While many policymakers have now embraced Dr. Hyman’s position in the context of mental health parity policies,
the criminal justice system still relies in critical ways on dis108
tinctions between a victim’s mental and physical injuries. To
be clear, and as I will argue later in the Article, there are good
arguments for and against maintaining these distinctions, even
as they dissolve in other legal arenas. But before turning to
those arguments, we must understand how the distinctions
matter.
An illustrative example can be seen in how one California
law firm (specializing in criminal defense) explains the state’s
resonance imaging (fMRI) study from 2011, a team of neuroscientists led by
Ethan Kross found that the brain activation patterns of social rejection (having subjects view the photo of an ex-partner who recently rejected them) were
similar to the brain activation patterns of physical pain (putting painful heat
on subjects’ forearms). Ethan Kross, Marc G. Berman, Walter Mischel, Edward E. Smith & Tor D. Wager, Social Rejection Shares Somatosensory Representations with Physical Pain, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. OF AMERICA
6270, 6270 (2011); see also Naomi I. Eisenberger, Matthew D. Lieberman &
Kipling D. Williams, Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion,
302 SCI. 290 (2003) (examining the neural correlates of social exclusion and
testing the hypothesis that the brain bases of social pain are similar to brain
bases of physical pain).
107. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Appropriations, 104th CONG. 377 (1996) (statement of Steven Hyman, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health) [hereinafter Hearings].
108. In tort law, there is a longer history of recognizing and evaluating
non-physical harm. It had already been said in 1955 that “the literature on the
subject [of distinguishing mental from physical harm] is voluminous, if not exhaustive.” Kaufman v. W. Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 1955). As
far back as 1993, the Iowa Supreme Court observed that “the medical community now knows that ‘every emotional disturbance has a physical aspect and
every physical disturbance has an emotional aspect.’” Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hugh,
501 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Comment, Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241
n.24 (1971) (citation omitted)). The court concluded that an insurance policy’s
definition of “bodily injury” provided coverage for emotional distress. Id.
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109

domestic violence law to its potential clients. The firm poses
the following question on its web site: “How does the prosecutor
prove that I am guilty of a Penal Code 273.5 [domestic violence]
110
violation?” The firm tells its clients that amongst the elements the State must prove are that the defendant “inflicted
corporal (bodily) injury upon (a) your current or former spouse,
(b) your current or former cohabitant (that is, someone with
whom you share or shared a residence), or (c) the mother or father of your child.”
In defining the term bodily injury for its clients, the law
firm writes on its web site that “a ‘bodily’ injury is just that . . .
a physical injury to the body. . . . [C]ommon examples . . . include: hitting, punching, kicking, slapping, biting, and push111
ing.” The firm specifically notes that “[s]ince a corporal injury
is a bodily injury, causing emotional and/or mental abuse alone
112
will not subject one to liability.”
This example illustrates
nicely the way in which the definition of bodily injury is communicated by attorneys to their potential clients. In this context, it is made clear that physical injury to the victim is required in order to trigger criminal liability for domestic
violence; you can mentally abuse your spouse and you won’t be
held criminally liable.
3. The Future of Brain-Based Bodily Injury Claims
The rise of neuroscience and law generally, and the increasing willingness of society and different bodies of law to
recognize mental injury as brain-based, suggests that future
litigation over bodily injury will increasingly involve
neuroscientific evidence. To gain some additional purchase on
this prediction, I conducted a search in Westlaw for cases that
included both the word “brain” and the phrase “bodily injury.”
This is, at best, a rough proxy for the actual number of such
cases. But the results, presented in Figure 1, are nonetheless
suggestive.

109. See California Penal Code 273.5 PC: Corporal Injury on a Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent, SHOUSE L. GROUP, http://www.shouselaw.com/
domestic_violence273-5.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The firm does also note, however, that “instances of emotional
and/or mental abuse may sometimes be prosecuted under Penal Code 422, California's criminal threats law or under Penal Code 646.9, California's stalking
law.” Id.
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Since the 1980s, and especially since the late 1990s, the
113
number of these cases seems to be rising dramatically. Such
growth, if indeed the chart is accurate in measuring it, would
be similar to the growth being seen in neurolaw cases more
114
generally.
At a minimum, it suggests that preparing for
brain-based bodily injury claims is a wise strategy for courts
and legislatures to adopt.
Figure 1
Results of “Brain” & “Bodily Injury” Search in
115
Westlaw’s ALLCASES Database:
Number of Criminal and Civil Case Hits, by Year

B. THE CASE OF ALLEN V. BLOOMFIELD HILLS
We do not know what a brain-based bodily injury case
would look like in criminal law, but there is at least one noncriminal case in which an analogous argument persuaded a
113. See infra Figure 1.
114. See supra text accompanying note 79.
115. This database “contains documents from the U.S. Supreme Court,
courts of appeals, former circuit courts, district courts, bankruptcy courts,
former Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims, Tax Court, related federal
and territorial courts, military courts, the state courts of all 50 states and the
local courts of the District of Columbia.” Scope ALLCASES, WESTLAW CLASSIC,
rootURL (follow “Scope” hyperlink next to the ALLCASES hyperlink in “Cases”
source box on main page) (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). Analysis of randomly
selected hits suggests that the volume of these results is largely due to criminal cases centering on violence to the brain (either to victim or defendant).
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court. In 2010, a case before the Michigan Supreme Court
would have dealt with precisely the question of whether PTSD
constitutes a “bodily” harm had the parties not settled out of
116
court. The case was brought by plaintiff Charles Allen, who
was conducting a train when he hit a school bus (with only a
driver inside) that had moved around the railroad barriers and
117
onto the train tracks. Allen hit the bus at a speed at sixty-five
118
miles per hour, and the bus driver was seriously injured. Allen brought his suit against the owner of the school bus, the
119
Bloomfield Hills School District.
By making the school district the target of the suit, Allen
was aiming to take advantage of Michigan’s motor vehicle ex120
ception to government immunity. Michigan law states that
“[g]overnmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and
property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any
officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a mo121
tor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner.” The
operative words—and the reason this case is of great interest
for this Article—are “liable for bodily injury.” Since Allen’s
damages were primarily those from PTSD, and not more traditional “bodily” injury, his recovery would be barred by statute
unless he could convince the court that the Michigan legislature intended to include PTSD as a “bodily” injury for purposes
122
of the statute.
Dr. Joseph C. Wu presented an affidavit on Allen’s behalf,
stating that a PET scan of Allen “depicted ‘decreases in frontal
and subcortical activity consistent with depression and post
traumatic stress disorder.’” He further opined “that ‘the abnormalities in Mr. Allen’s brain as depicted on the September
8, 2006, PET scan are quite pronounced and are clearly different in brain pattern from any of the normal controls. They are
123
also consistent with an injury to Mr. Allen’s brain.’” Allen also submitted a report by Dr. Gerald A. Shiener noting that
116. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 815–16
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing expert testimony on the relationship between PTSD and the brain), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 779 N.W.2d 793
(Mich. 2010).
117. Id. at 812.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1405 (2000).
122. See Allen, 760 N.W.2d at 814–15.
123. Id. at 815.
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PTSD “causes significant changes in brain chemistry, brain
124
function, and brain structure.”
The trial court sided with the defense, which argued that
proper statutory interpretation did not include PTSD as bodi125
ly, but an appeal was made and the appellate court ruled in
favor of Allen, reasoning that:
The brain is a part of the human body, so “harm or damage done
or sustained” is injury to the brain and within the common meaning
of “bodily injury” in MCL 691.1405, as elucidated in Wesche. The
question on appeal then becomes, for purposes of reviewing the trial
court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant, whether plaintiff
produced sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact that
he suffered a “bodily injury” as so defined. In doing so, we must still
adhere to the court rules and follow the law. We must review any evidence of a claimed “bodily injury” in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Also, we must conduct our review with common
sense, and with cognizance of modern medical science and the human
body. Here, plaintiff presented objective medical evidence that a mental or emotional trauma can indeed result in physical changes to the
brain.
Although the brain is the organ responsible for our thoughts and
emotions, it is also the organ that controls all our physical functions.
The fact that it serves more than one function hardly detracts from
the fact that it is one of our major organs. It can be injured. It can be
injured directly and indirectly. It can be injured by direct and indirect
trauma. What matters for a legal analysis is the existence of a manifest, objectively measured injury to the brain. Consequently, to survive a motion for summary disposition, we must determine whether
plaintiff produced sufficient evidence that Allen suffered from an ob126
jectively manifested physical injury to his brain.

This ruling led to a further appeal, this time by the school
district, to the Michigan Supreme Court, where again both
sides made their case through briefs. The briefs submitted to
the Michigan Supreme Court sparred over statutory interpreta127
tion of the phrase “bodily injury.” Allen’s legal team cited
multiple scientific sources, including the U.S. Surgeon General’s 1999 report on mental health, which argued that
“[p]eople continue to see mental and physical as separate func-

124. Id.
125. See id. at 812.
126. Id. at 815.
127. See, e.g., Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Opposing Brief to Defendant-Appellant’s
Application for Leave to Appeal at 14–20, Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist.,
779 N.W.2d 793 (Mich. 2010) (No. 137607), 2008 WL 7165010, at *14–20; Defendant-Appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal at 10–19, Allen, 779
N.W.2d 793 (No. 137607), 2008 WL 7165008, at *10–19.
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tions when, in fact, mental functions (e.g., memory) are physical
128
as well.”
The defense pointed to legislative intent and past case
129
law.
Regarding legislative intent, the Michigan Attorney
General filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the defense
arguing that “[n]othing in the statutory language of the motor
vehicle exception reflects intent by the Legislature to apply the
motor vehicle exception to mental, emotional, or psychiatric
disorders, even if the secondary effect of such disorders is a
130
change in the brain or any other part of the body.” Relying on
an earlier case, the Attorney’s General’s brief argued in several
ways that “damages of a spiritual or mental nature are not encompassed within the plain language of the motor vehicle ex131
ception.” The defense also made a slippery-slope policy argument, warning that swinging open the doors in this case would
ultimately force the school district to allocate less money to
students.
Recognizing the potential magnitude of the decision for tort
recovery, the Court allowed supplemental briefs to be filed, as
well as amicus briefs from the Michigan Association for Justice,
the Michigan Attorney General, the Insurance Institute of
132
133
Michigan, and the Brain Injury Association of Michigan.
That so many third parties took a large interest in the case
speaks to the significant implications of (re)defining bodily injury to include PTSD without additional “physical” manifestations.
128. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Supplemental Brief at 5, Allen, 779 N.W.2d 793
(No. 137607), 2009 WL 4227403, at *5 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 6 (1999)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/
access/NNBBHS.pdf). It was also noted in the Surgeon General’s Report that
“[t]he brain is the organ of mental function; psychological phenomena have
their origin in that complex organ. Psychological and sociocultural phenomena
are represented in the brain through memories and learning, which involve
structural changes in the neurons and neuronal circuits.” U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra, at 50.
129. See e.g., Defendant-Appellant’s Reply to Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposing
Brief to Defendant-Appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal at 2–3, Allen,
779 N.W.2d 793 (No. 137607), 2008 WL 7165009, at *2–3.
130. Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General in Support of DefendantAppellee Bloomfield Hills School District’s Application for Leave to Appeal at
3, Allen, 779 N.W.2d 793 (No. 137607), 2009 WL 4227401, at *3.
131. Id. at 3 (citing Wesche v. Mecosta Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 746 N.W.2d 847,
853–54 (Mich. 2008)).
132. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 764 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. 2009).
133. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 772 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. 2009).

2068

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:2036

Because the case settled, we do not know how the Michigan
Supreme Court would have ruled. Nor do we know how such an
argument would have fared in a criminal context. But we can
begin to explore the possibility of such an argument appearing
in criminal courts through experimental research. I turn now to
those experiments.
III. BODILY INJURY EXPERIMENTS
This Part discusses original experiments that test lay understanding of bodily injury in criminal contexts. Because this
is the first empirical assessment of lay understandings of the
term “bodily injury,” the following strategy was employed as
proof of concept. First, data was collected in the Common Understanding Experiment (Experiment One) to see if lay people
share similar intuitions about what constitutes bodily injury.
Second, the Jury Instructions Experiment (Experiment Two)
was designed to test whether there are any conditions (even if
stylized) under which mental trauma is considered by experi134
mental subjects as bodily injury. This Part is organized into
five sub-Parts: (A) Context and Related Empirical Work; (B)
Design of Common Understanding Experiment; (C) Results of
Common Understanding Experiment; (D) Design Of Jury Instructions Experiment; and (E) Results of Jury Instructions
Experiment.
A. CONTEXT AND RELATED EMPIRICAL WORK
Over the past two decades, scholars have increasingly employed quantitative empirical methods to assess the efficacy,
135
fairness, and operation of law. In the criminal law, social sci134. Given the cost of running experiments with nationally representative
samples (costs which can rise over $10 per subject), establishing the most (or
least) promising avenues for future research is especially important. See Adam
J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 353–54 (2012)
(presenting evidence comparing traditional and online methods of conducting
survey experiments). Additional inquiry, now warranted given the proof of
concept, can help to determine with much more specificity under what conditions lay people are more/less likely to label a crime victim’s injury as bodily
injury.
135. See Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741, 1742 (2004) (citing evidence of growth of empirical
legal scholarship); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 144–47 (2006) (providing
an intellectual history of the rise of empirical legal scholarship); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 904–10 (2011) (dis-
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ence tools have been used to inform criminal law theory (and
136
vice versa). Empirically assessing the effects of criminal justice reform in the real world is hard because it is difficult to ad137
equately control for a number of confounding variables. In
real-world legal settings (as in most real-world policy settings),
138
true random assignment is not feasible or ethical. One way
that scholars have addressed this issue of causation is to develop experimental studies, where the causal effect of manipula139
tions can be more readily ascertained.
There are also empirical literatures examining the effects
140
of many types of jury instructions on juror outcomes, examin141
ing the effects of victim impact statements, and exploring jucussing the trend toward more empirical legal scholars on law school faculties).
136. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal
Law Theory, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 416–18 (1998).
137. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the
MPCS, 61 FLA. L. REV. 797, 811–13 (2009) (discussing how statistical evaluations of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing (MPCS) are difficult due in large
part to an inability to show causation).
138. David S. Goldman, Legal Construct Validation: Expanding Empirical
Legal Scholarship to Unobservable Concepts, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 116–17
(2007) (discussing the use of quasi-experimental methods in legal scholarship
to avoid practical and ethical concerns associated with traditional randomized
experiments).
139. For a general discussion of the rise of the empirical, including experimental, approach in law, see Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Introduction to the Symposium on Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791 (2002). As legal theorist Paul Robinson and psychologist John Darley (pioneers in this research tradition) wrote fifteen years ago:
“[W]e seek to demonstrate to criminal law theorists and code drafters
. . . [that] experimentation[] can be brought to bear on their issues of debate.”
Robinson & Darley, supra note 136, at 417. With the exception of randomized
field trials, laboratory experiments are thought to trade better internal validity for worse external validity. See Gregory Mitchell, Revisiting Truth or Triviality: The External Validity of Research in the Psychological Laboratory, 7
PERSP. ON PSYCH. SCI. 109, 109 (2012) (reviewing research on the conventional
wisdom that “highly controlled experiments produce internally valid findings
with suspect external validity”). In the experiments reported in this Article,
caution is warranted in making generalizations to other subject populations
and to real-world conditions.
140. See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges' Cautionary Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 31 (1996).
141. Findings in the literature are mixed, but there is evidence that the
severity of emotional harm described in victim impact statements affects punishment levels. For a review, see Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419
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142

ry decision making generally. Related, though not directly on
point, is empirical research on subject response to non-bodily
(or “emotional”) harms. Empirical research has shown, for instance, that punitive damage awards vary significantly between bodily and non-bodily injuries (with punitive damages
being awarded by judges less frequently than juries for non143
bodily injuries). At the same time, however, subjects respond
with harsher punishments when they are told in victim impact
statements about greater emotional harm experienced by the
144
victim.
In the realm of neurolaw, a small number of behavioral experiments have been conducted to test the effect of
145
neuroscientific evidence on juror and judge decision making.
While some early empirical work suggested that the “seductive
146
allure” of brain images would unduly persuade jurors, a more
recent and much more robust set of studies suggests just the
opposite: relative to other scientific evidence that would be admitted in its place, there is no significant relationship between

(2003). See also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting and Capital Sentencing: Reducing the Effect of Victim Impact Statements, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
107 (2009) (reporting the results of two experiments suggesting that victim
impact statements increase the imposition of capital sentences because of a
perception of prolonged emotional harm); Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim
Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 634–36 (2009) (presenting empirical evidence that victim impact statements do not affect sentence severity
in either capital or non-capital cases); Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the
Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME &
JUST. 347, 373–75 (2009) (concluding that there is no aggregate effect on sentencing from victim impact statements).
142. See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making:
Implications for and from Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI.
63 (2011); Jessica M. Salerno & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Promise of a
Cognitive Perspective on Jury Deliberation, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV.
174 (2010).
143. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996,
and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 285–87 (2006).
144. See Blumenthal, supra note 141, at 114.
145. Lisa G. Aspinwall et al., The Double-Edged Sword: Does
Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges' Sentencing of Psychopaths?, 337
SCIENCE 846 (2012); David P. McCabe et al., The Influence of fMRI Lie Detection Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 566 (2011); N.J.
Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No Impact,
17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357 (2011); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The
Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470 (2008).
146. Weisberg et al., supra note 145, at 475–76.
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the introduction of brain imaging evidence, per se, and pun147
ishment or blame outcomes.
While these and other related studies are of interest, they
are not instructive on the central questions of this Article:
whether there is consensus on what constitutes “bodily injury,”
whether the definition of the term provided in jury instructions
matters, and whether appeals to brain-based arguments and
evidence affect bodily injury determination.
Two previous experiments that I have conducted on bodily
injury in the context of tort provide some preliminary expecta148
tions about what we might find in the criminal context. In
Tort Experiment One, I randomly assigned subjects to read one
of three case summaries. Each summary was based on the Allen case described in Part II.B. Group One, the “Baseline”
group, was exposed to only the summary, which made no mention of neuroscience. Group Two, the “Plaintiff” group, was exposed to only the plaintiff’s expert providing neuroscience information to support the plaintiff’s case that PTSD is a bodily
injury. Group Three, the “Both” group, was exposed to both the
plaintiff and the defendant experts’ testimony.
After reading the vignette, subjects were then asked: “Imagine for a moment that you were deciding this case, and you
had to rule one way or the other. How would you rule?” Subjects were offered two choices: (a) John’s experience of PostTraumatic Stress Disorder IS a “bodily” injury, and he should
be able to collect on his insurance policy; (b) John’s experience
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is NOT a “bodily” injury, and
149
he should NOT be able to collect on his insurance policy.
Subjects in Tort Experiment Two were also randomly assigned to a Baseline, Plaintiff, or Both group. Subjects were
asked to read a short case summary. The case summary in Experiment Two was based on an actual reported PTSD civil liti150
gation case, Sapirman v. Walmart Stores East, L.P. The case
was chosen because it was a relatively straightforward case of
premises liability and because the actual settlement amount

147. Schweitzer et al., supra note 145, at 387–88.
148. See Shen, supra note 4.
149. The experiment did not, nor did it intend to, present subjects with a
realistic trial experience. It does, however, provide us with a first step in that
direction and with insights into the dynamics of public support for legislative
policymaking in this arena.
150. No. 07-44531 32D, 2009 WL 4731140 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2009).
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151

was known: $207,500. The facts reported were that the plaintiff was attacked in a Walmart parking lot one night in 2006,
and he then sued Walmart to seek damages both for a shoulder
152
injury and for PTSD. The plaintiff reported that he “sought
counseling and report[ed] a heightened level of anxiousness in
153
busy areas and in parking lots.” He sought only $6000 in
medical costs, leaving the rest—roughly $200,000—for pain
and suffering from PTSD and loss of consortium to the victim’s
154
wife, who was also a plaintiff in the case. The defense argued
that the plaintiff was “not suffering from PTSD, noting that he
was able to gain a promotion at work and had a child with his
155
wife.”
In the experiment (not in the real case), the plaintiff’s expert claimed he could confirm the plaintiff’s PTSD via a brain
scan. The “Both” group, however, learned that upon crossexamination of the plaintiff’s expert, the case for biomarking
156
PTSD was not as strong. In this way, the vignette provided a
glimpse into how individuals might respond both to the unchecked promise and the more realistic complexity of
neuroscientific research on PTSD biomarkers.
After reading the vignette, all three groups in Experiment
Two were asked: “Imagine for a moment that you were deciding
this case, and you had to award some damage amount to [the
victim]. How much would you award for the bad memories from
PTSD?” Subjects then used a slider bar to choose an amount
from $0 to $1,000,000.
The results from these two tort experiments suggested (a)
that at baseline, a strong majority of subjects (72%) believe that
PTSD constitutes a bodily injury; (b) that if subjects are exposed only to neuroscientific information that is favorable to
the plaintiff, they are more likely (88%) to feel this way; but (c)
if exposed both to the plaintiff’s scientific expert and a critique

151. As reported, the amount was reached via mediation with mediator
Cindy Hanna. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. A biological marker, or “biomarker” for short, is a physiological indicator of a disease. Christoph W. Turck et al., Proteomic Strategies for Biomarker
Discovery: From Differential Expression to Isofroms to Pathways, in BIOMARKERS FOR PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 57, 60 fig.3.1 (2009).
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from a defense expert, support for the bodily claim drops (to
157
62%).
B. DESIGN OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING EXPERIMENT
Against this backdrop of experimental findings in the tort
context, Experiment One was designed to offer more general
findings on how lay people assess bodily injury. The primary
goal was to establish—as a baseline—how subjects apply the
bodily injury label to a range of different injuries. The experiment also set out to identify the possible effect (on bodily injury
determination) of exposure to mental health parity arguments.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The
control group was simply told: “Sometimes courts have to determine what injuries constitute ‘bodily’ injury. For each of the
following injuries, please determine whether the injury constitutes a bodily injury.” Ten injuries, which vary in their severity, were presented for rating: Broken Leg, Broken Ribs, Concussion, Sprained Wrist, Scratch on Forearm, Torn Lung
Tissue, Memory Loss, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Recurring Headaches, and Depression. Subjects were asked to rate
each injury on a 1–5 scale as follows: 1 = This injury is definitely not bodily injury; 2 = This injury is probably not bodily injury; 3 = This injury might be bodily injury; 4 = This injury is
probably bodily injury; and 5 = This injury is definitely bodily
injury.
Before rating the ten injuries, the treatment group was
presented with the following paragraph: “Since the 1990s,
many have argued for ‘mental health parity’—treating mental
illness in the same way that we treat physical illness. For instance, in 1996 the director of the National Institute of Mental
Health testified to Congress that: ‘I can state without reservation that research shows no biomedical justification for differentiating serious mental illness from other serious and potentially chronic disorders of the nervous system such as stroke,
brain tumor, or paralysis. There is absolutely no biomedical
justification for policies that judge mental disorders as being in
158
any way less real or less deserving of treatment . . . .’”
To gain additional purchase on how subjects conceptualize
bodily injury, all subjects were asked after the rating exercise
to provide their own definition of bodily injury: “Now, in your
157. Shen, supra note 4, at 345.
158. Hearings, supra note 107.
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own words, how would you describe or define the term ‘bodily
injury’?” Subjects were required to provide an answer of at
least fifty characters.
1. Experimental Subjects
To carry out both Experiment One and Experiment Two, I
utilized a web-based experimental platform, Qualtrics, to host
159
the experiment. Research using Qualtrics-based experiments
has been published and presented in a number of academic
fields, suggesting that it meets scholarly expectations for quali160
ty online web-based experiments.
All subjects were recruited via modest payments made
available through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk payment service.
No personally identifying information was collected. Studies
assessing the quality of Turk subjects have found them to be
engaged in the online experimental stimuli and to be significantly more representative than the convenience samples that
161
would otherwise be used. While certainly not the gold standard of a truly nationally representative (but prohibitively costly) sample, Mechanical Turk nonetheless provides high-quality,
162
low-cost subjects. As discussed in more detail in Appendix C,
filtering questions were used to ensure that subjects were carefully reading through the experiment.
The total number of subjects was 180 for Experiment One
and 425 for Experiment Two. This number provided enough
159. Researchers in psychology have increasingly turned to web-based experiments because they offer a “large number of participants” and “high statistical power.” Ulf-Dietrich Reips, Standards for Internet-Based Experimenting,
49 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 243, 244 (2002) (quoting Jochen Musch & UlfDietrich Reips, A Brief History of Web Experimenting, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS ON THE INTERNET 61, 70 (Michael H. Birnbaum ed., 2000)).
160. Studies relying on Qualtrics experiments include Jonathan S.
Abramowitz et al., Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms: The Contribution of Obsessional Beliefs and Experiential Avoidance, 23 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 160
(2009); Yany Grégoire et al., When Customer Love Turns into Lasting Hate:
The Effects of Relationship Strength and Time on Customer Revenge and
Avoidance, 73 J. MARKETING (2009); Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of
Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010).
161. Berinsky et al., supra note 134, at 366; Michael Buhrmester et al.,
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, yet High-Quality,
Data?, 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 4 (2011); John J. Horton et al., The Online
Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399, 402 (2011).
162. In order to better approximate a jury-eligible subject pool, I took the
additional step of filtering out, via an initial screening question, subjects who
indicated that they had been convicted of a felony.

2013]

MIND, BODY, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

2075

statistical power in each experiment to test the Article’s central
hypotheses. At the end of each experiment, I collected demographic information from each of the subjects (summarized in
Table 1). While not a truly nationally representative sample,
the 605 subjects who participated in the experiments came
163
from forty-eight states and the District of Columbia.
My
sample was skewed in terms of gender, with 64% subjects female and only 36% male. My sample was 81% white, higher
than the national average. In terms of education, my subjects
are skewed toward having more education, but in terms of income, my subjects reported less income than the population
164
distribution as a whole. Taken as a whole, it can be said that
while not nationally representative, the sample is surely more
demographically diverse than traditional psychology experi165
ments relying solely on college students.

163. Only Alaska and Idaho, which collectively make up less than 1% of the
nation’s population, were not represented in the pool of subjects.
164. It should be noted that the Census estimates do not take into account
the most recent economic downturns, which may account for some of the discrepancy.
165. The issue is discussed in Francis X. Shen, et al., Sorting Guilty Minds,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1324–26 (2011). Over-reliance on undergraduates has
generated the term “science of the sophomore” and led to long-standing debates over the validity of studies relying solely on students. See, e.g., Michael
E. Gordon et al., The “Science of the Sophomore” Revisited: From Conjecture to
Empiricism, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 191 (1986). For one critique of the representativeness of experimental samples in the social sciences, see Steven Levitt
& John A. List, What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 154 (2007) (suggesting that “great caution is required when attempting to generalize lab results out of sample”). For reviews of the literature, see generally Jerald
Greenberg, The College Sophomore as Guinea Pig: Setting the Record Straight,
12 ACAD. MGMT REV. 157 (1987) (recognizing value in the role of college students in experimental research); Marc Hooghe et al., Why Can’t a Student Be
More Like an Average Person?: Sampling and Attrition Effects in Social Science Field and Laboratory Experiments, 628 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 85 (2010) (discussing the limitations of experimental samples that only
include students); Robert A. Peterson, On the Use of College Students in Social
Science Research: Insights from a Second-Order Meta-Analysis, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 450 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of including non-student
samples before attempting to generalize experimental results). The discussion
stretches back over half a century. See, e.g., Maurice L. Farber, The College
Student as Laboratory Animal, 7 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102 (1952).
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Table 1
Demographics of Experimental Subjects (N = 605)
Education

Subjects

U.S. Census

Less than HS

2%

18%

High school / GED

11%

30%

Some college

29%

20%

Assoc. degree

10%

7%

Bachelor’s

34%

17%

Graduate Degree

14%

10%

Income

Subjects

U.S. Census

< $20,000

30%

$1–$24,999: 22%

$20,000–$40,000

31%

$25,000–$34,999: 19%

$40,000–$60,000

21%

$35,000–$49,999: 21%

$60,000–$80,000

10%

$50,000–$64,999: 14%

$80,000–$100,000

2%

$65,000–$74,999: 6%

> $100,000

6%

$75,000–$99,999: 8%

Gender

Subjects

U.S. Census

Male

38%

49%

Female

62%

51%

Race

Subjects

U.S. Census

White

81%

74%

Non-White

19%

26%

C. RESULTS OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING EXPERIMENT
The results of Experiment One—both subjects’ rating of
bodily injury and the definitions they provided in their own
words—suggest that there is tremendous variation in whether
mental injuries are considered by lay people as “bodily.” The
results are presented graphically in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, and
summarized in Table 2.
1. Baseline Variation in Bodily Injury Rating
We can begin with the most straightforward data point:
how do subjects determine bodily injury when you ask them
(absent any other information) to do so? The answer to this
question, presented in Figure 2.1, is revealing. If all subjects
held a common, clear understanding of bodily injury, then we
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would expect to see solid black bars (definitely bodily injury)
and solid light gray bars (definitely not bodily injury). If, however, there is more uncertainty in bodily injury determinations,
then we should see more of the middle gray colors for the intermediate categories.
Even a quick glance at Figure 2.1 reveals that—with the
notable and important exceptions of injuries such as a broken
leg, broken rib, and concussion—we see much more uncertainty
about bodily injury than would be expected in a world of complete common understanding. For instance, the number of subjects who chose the “Maybe” option was as follows: one out of
five for torn lung tissue and depression; one out of four for
PTSD; one out of three for memory loss; and nearly one out of
two for recurring headaches.
That said, there is also a clear clustering pattern, most evident in Figure 2.2. Four injuries—depression, PTSD, memory
loss, and recurring headaches—are bunched to the left and receive the lowest bodily injury ratings. Two injuries—torn lung
tissue and scratch on the forearm—are in the middle. Four injuries—sprained wrist, concussion, broken ribs, and broken
leg—are clustered to the right, and receive the highest bodily
injury ratings. In this sense, then, one might infer some common understanding of relative “bodily-ness.” But two points are
warranted. First, the variation around these averages is significant, suggesting that there is sizeable disagreement masked
by the group averages. Second, and more important, even the
group clustered toward the left is not clustered near the definitely not bodily injury pole.
In other words, there seems to be an inclusion-consensus:
some injuries (e.g., broken bones) are definitely bodily injury.
But there is no clear exclusion-consensus: subjects cannot readily determine what injuries are definitely not bodily injury.
2. Introduction of Mental Health Parity Arguments
Experiment One also examined the effect of exposure to a
mental health parity argument (as made by Dr. Steven Hyman
166
in congressional testimony in 1996). The results—presented
graphically in Figure 2.2, summarized in Table 2, and explored
more in depth in Appendix C—suggest that reading about mental health parity had only a small effect on bodily injury determinations. After controlling for subject demographic character166. See Hearings, supra note 107.
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167

istics, the introduction of the brain information only had a
significant effect on the sprained-wrist, lung-tissue, and recurring-headaches injuries.
3. Bodily Injury in Subjects’ Own Words
Each of the 180 subjects in Experiment One provided, in
their own words, a definition of “bodily injury.” Here I examine
only those responses from the control group—subjects who
were given no information about mental health parity or brainbased explanations of mental disease. Analysis of these responses reveals that—even at baseline—subjects vary in the
degree to which they include mental injuries.
Many respondents supplied definitions of bodily injury that
excluded mental injuries. For example:
• “[I]njury to the physical self whether it be the muscles, bones or
joints.”
• “Any sort of bone, muscle, or tissue damage would normally be
counted as a bodily injury.”
• “An injury to one’s physical body, not one’s mental faculties.”
• “Any physical injury that is a result from some kind of accident or
collision.”
• “Bodily injury would be any physical damage done to a person or
any injury resulting from a physical assault.”

But many other subjects explicitly mentioned psychological or
mental harms. For example:
• “Any injury that leaves either physical or psychological trauma and
can be observed by a medical professional.”
• “I believe bodily injury to be defined as a physical or mental injury
to a person which causes impairment.”
• “Bodily injury is harm caused by some event or series of events.
The harm is typically physical, but could also include psychological
damage or microscopic damage to bodily organs such as lungs,
heart, or brain. Injury means damage, breakage, or impairment
which causes the recipient to function in a more negative way.”
• “Bodily injury to me is any kind of trauma or injury that affects a
person’s life functions of any organ or body part including the brain
and causes pain, distress or impaired ability to live and function in
the same way that was possible before the trauma occurred.”
• “Injury which impairs day-to-day functioning, primarily in a physical sense, but also may include injuries to the brain or to mental
capacities and/or functioning. PTSD is as great (if not greater) a
disruption to a person’s normal functioning abilities as broken
bones or other, more strictly ‘physical’ injuries might be.”

In addition to confusion over the inclusion of mental
167. See supra Table 1.
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harms, subjects were at odds about whether there was an implicit requirement of severity. One subject raised the implicit
issue of injury severity:
Bodily injury to me is something more major than a scratch on the
[]arm or recurring headaches. . . . Bodily injury in my opinions are
broken bones, fractures, sprains in the neck, brain damage, slipped
discs, . . . Bodily injury is more than a sprained wrist or ankle, to me
that is just not severe enough to be called bodily injury.

Another subject honed in on severity in a different way:
“Harm to one’s physical body that is measurable by a doctor,
requires medication or therapy to heal and does not heal completely within 30 days.” The 30-days requirement reads into the
term bodily injury an implicit requirement of substantial or
long-lasting injury.
For other subjects, however, bodily injury implied no a priori requirement of magnitude. As one subject wrote, “Bodily injury can cover a very wide variety of magnitudes from a sprain
or bruise or some other relatively temporary injury up to paralysis or death; therefore there is a definite need to consider the
magnitude of the bodily injury when using the term.” And another wrote that “even minor issues like scratches or cuts could
count too.” In short, there were many different opinions about
whether bodily injury should be taken at face value, or whether
it really should be understood as implying a sufficiently bad
168
bodily injury.
Also telling was subjects’ emphasis on documentation and
measurement. One subject wrote that bodily injury is “an injury to your physical body that can be diagnosed with a clinical
test (x-ray, blood test). I wouldn’t count any mental health issues because I don’t think there is an accurate clinical test [for]
diagnosis.” Another emphasized visibility: “You must be able to
see the visible mark or sign of injury for it to be considered to
be bodily. A headache would not be considered a bodily injury
168. Judges too have argued about this issue. In an Indiana case, where
the issue was whether the victim experienced a bodily injury, one judge equated physical pain with bodily injury. Lewis v. State, 898 N.E.2d 429, 434–35
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, 915 N.E.2d 986 (2009). But another judge
wrote a concurring opinion to “respectfully disagree . . . to the extent [the majority opinion] suggests that any degree of pain, no matter how slight, is sufficient to constitute an ‘impairment of physical condition’ and therefore constitute ‘bodily injury’ for purposes of Indiana Code Section 35–41–1–4. I believe
that something more than the mere sensation of pain is required; to hold otherwise is to read ‘impairment’ out of the statute.” Id. at 436 (Crone, J., concurring); see also Bailey v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), for discussion of the severity issue.
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because it is not able to [be seen].” Another subject went even
further and said that bodily injury is “something that can phys169
ically be seen by the human eye.”
Finally, one subject actually speculated in his/her answer
that his/her conception of bodily injury might be at odds with
the law: “Harm to a person that causes injury, be it physical,
mental, or emotional. This does not agree with current law, I
think.” It is not possible to know from the data presently collected how widespread this disconnect is, but it is ripe for further investigation.
This brief review of the definitions provided by subjects
suggests that confusion arises from at least three questions: (1)
does bodily injury include mental injury? (2) is there an implicit
severity requirement for bodily injury? and (3) must the injury
170
Subjects answer these questions in different
be “visible”?
ways, leading to a lack of common understanding of the term.
I have suggested that the confusion is driven in large part
by the “bodily” part of bodily injury, but it’s also plausible that
the confusion is being generated in part by the word “injury.”
For instance, is depression an injury, disorder, disease, condition, some combination of these, or something else altogether?
And is a scratch a minor injury, a harm, just a de minimus
change, or something else? My experiments, which did not randomly assign subjects to these different variants (e.g., bodily
disorder, bodily condition, and the like) cannot speak directly to
the question. But surely the language matters, and future research would do well to consider its effects.

169. Because so many subjects emphasized visibility and measurement, it
raises the interesting possibility of how they would react to new technology
(e.g. fMRI) that—at least theoretically—might measure and make “visible” the
brain’s functioning.
170. In many ways, subjects are echoing the concerns that William Prosser
raised in his classic article on mental suffering in tort law: “There are in reality two problems: to distinguish true claims from false ones, and to distinguish
the trifling insult or annoyance from the serious wrong.” William L. Prosser,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874,
877 (1939).
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Figure 2.1
At Baseline: Number of Subjects Determining
Whether a Selected Injury Is: Definitely Not; Probably
Not; Maybe; Probably; or Definitely Not “Bodily Injury”

What to Notice in Figure 2.1: If subjects fully shared a clear and
common understanding of the term, we should expect to see a
series of nearly all black, or all very light gray bars (because all
subjects are definitely sure whether each injury is bodily or
not). But this is not what the data show. With the exception of
broken legs, broken ribs, concussions, and sprained wrists,
there is considerable uncertainty in the bodily injury determination. This is seen in: (1) the size of the medium gray line
(representing the “Maybe” bodily injury choice), (2) subjects’
hesitance to label the mental injuries as definitely not bodily
injury, and (3) the extent to which many subjects—even without any prompting about brain-based understanding of mental
illness—identified PTSD as probably or definitely bodily injury.
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Figure 2.2
Subject Determination of Bodily Injury, Average Response by Injury and by Presentation of Brain-Based
Explanation for Mental Illness

What to Notice in Figure 2.2: In Experiment One, half of the
subjects were randomly assigned to read a short paragraph explaining mental illness as a brain-based disease. This Figure
illustrates the differences in bodily injury rating between the
“Baseline” group (who received no additional information) and
the “Brain” group (who read about mental health parity). It
should be noticed that the injuries group into roughly three
categories: (1) injuries that are clearly bodily injury: broken leg,
broken rib, concussion, and sprained wrist; (2) injuries that are
probably bodily injury: torn lung tissue and scratch on forearm;
and (3) injuries that may be bodily injury: recurring headaches,
PTSD, memory loss, and depression (to a lesser degree). Introduction of the brain information in this context has only limited
effect on the bodily injury determination.
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Table 2
Percentage of Subjects in Experiment One Determining Whether a Selected Injury Is: Definitely Not,
Probably Not, Maybe, Probably, or Definitely Bodily Injury
Baseline: Subjects Simply Asked to Determine Bodily Injury (N = 91)
DefiProbaDefinitely
bly
nitely
ProbaIS
IS
NOT
bly NOT MAYBE
Broken Leg

0%

1%

0%

5%

93%

Broken Ribs

0%

1%

9%

16%

74%

Concussion

1%

1%

10%

19%

69%

Sprained Wrist
Scratch On Forearm

1%

4%

7%

25%

63%

9%

9%

15%

23%

44%

Torn Lung Tissue

1%

15%

22%

20%

42%

Memory Loss

12%

23%

36%

15%

13%

PTSD
Recurring Headaches

22%

25%

25%

15%

12%

10%

20%

44%

21%

5%

Depression
35%
25%
22%
10%
8%
Before Determining Bodily Injury, Subjects Presented with Short Paragraph
of Congressional Testimony on Mental Health Parity (N = 89)
DefiProbaDefinitely
bly
nitely
ProbaIS
IS
NOT
bly NOT MAYBE
Broken Leg

0%

0%

0%

4%

93%

Broken Ribs

0%

0%

2%

14%

81%

Concussion

0%

1%

5%

15%

76%

Sprained Wrist
Scratch On Forearm

0%

1%

4%

12%

80%

7%

8%

10%

15%

58%

Torn Lung Tissue

1%

5%

19%

18%

55%

Memory Loss

15%

13%

42%

20%

8%

PTSD
Recurring Headaches

20%

20%

24%

18%

16%

9%

12%

40%

23%

14%

Depression

27%

27%

23%

10%

10%
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Notes: Confirming the visual presentation in Figure 2.1 and
Figure 2.2, this table shows that subjects—even in the baseline
condition—are ambivalent about determining bodily injury for
injuries such as memory loss, PTSD, recurring headaches, and
depression. While there is clear consensus that injuries such as
broken legs, broken ribs, concussions, and sprained wrists are
bodily injury, the consensus does not extend to all of the other
injuries.
D. DESIGN OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS EXPERIMENT
Having established the baseline finding that there is variation in subject understanding of the bodily injury concept, the
Jury Instructions Experiment (Experiment Two) begins to uncover how subjects make bodily injury determinations in criminal contexts. As discussed in Part I, there are many crimes for
which bodily injury matters. I chose, for the initial proof of concept, two frequently occurring crimes: assault and burglary.
For each crime, I created fact patterns that (save for the description of the victim’s injuries) would not likely constitute
171
bodily injury in most traditional views of the term.
Both aggravated burglary and assault are often defined, in
part, by a requirement that the defendant intend to and/or ac172
tually inflict bodily (or great bodily) harm. Aggravated burglary requires that the “actor purposely, knowingly, or reckless173
ly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.” In
assault and battery, the result of conduct must typically in174
clude bodily injury. The traditional view is that this bodily injury includes hitting, even when there is no permanent wound
171. These crimes also differ significantly in the ease of justification for
criminalization of the act. As described by criminal theorist Joel Feinberg,
“typical hard cases for the legislator involve conflicts between the active interests . . . of some persons . . . to say what they wish . . . and the passive interests
of other persons in being unassailed . . . .” The hard case selected was verbal
assault, and the easy case was burglary of a house. 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 203–04 (1984).
172. The definition of both crimes varies, of course, by jurisdiction. See infra Table A2.
173. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (1981). Second degree burglary can also be found if it is “perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night” or with a
deadly weapon. Id.
174. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof, in 2
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 550, 553–54 (2d ed. 2003). At common law, assault was defined as attempted battery. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
114 (2d ed. 1969). I use the term “assault and battery” since in some states assault is defined to include what other states classify as battery. See LAFAVE,
supra, at 551 n.2.
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or bruise, as well as offensive touching (such as fondling or
175
spitting in another’s face).
The Model Penal Code’s approach—and the approach used in most states—limits battery
176
to “physical” or “bodily” injury. State criminal code definitions of simple assault provided in the Appendix make clear
177
how prevalent the element of bodily (or physical) injury is.
Having identified the crimes of interest, I next constructed
two short fact patterns (reprinted in full in Appendix C), one for
burglary and one for assault. In the burglary fact pattern, the
protagonist John breaks into a private home to steal a television. Subjects were told that John knows someone is at home,
and that John yells at the homeowner. Subjects were told that
the homeowner has recurring nightmares about the break-in,
178
and that she has been diagnosed with PTSD due to the event.
Subjects were also told that an expert medical witness testified
during the trial that the homeowner suffered from PTSD related to the break-in. The defendant John does not contest the
facts of the case, and does not challenge the intent or causation
issues, but argues that he is guilty only of the lesser charge of
burglary because the homeowner’s injuries do not constitute
“bodily injury.”
In the assault fact pattern, the protagonist John begins
yelling at a fellow subway passenger, humiliating him in front
of the others riding on the train. Subjects were told that since
175. LAFAVE, supra note 174, at 553.
176. Id. LaFave notes that “this is the prevailing view in those jurisdictions
with new criminal codes, as reflected in the use of such statutory terms as
‘physical injury,’ ‘bodily injury,’ ‘bodily harm,’ ‘physical harm,’ ‘force or violence
upon the person,’ or, occasionally, ‘serious bodily injury.’” Id. A minority of
these codes follow a much broader view, sometimes extending the crime to any
touching or physical contact, but more often requiring that the contact be ‘offensive,’ ‘insulting or provoking,’ or done ‘in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.’” Id. at 553–54.
177. It is worth noting that historically even the least touching, as well as
actions that do not involve body-to-body touching, often qualify as simple assault and battery. For instance, a finding of battery may result from spitting
in another’s face. See R v. Cotesworth, (1705) 87 Eng.Rep. 928 (K.B.). A finding of battery may also result from throwing a cup of urine in another’s face.
See People v. Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 961 (1992).
178. I am not aware of research specifically on the development of PTSD
after such home burglaries. Stress disorder has been found to be produced by
bank robberies and armed robberies. See Maj Hansen & Ask Elklit, Predictors
of Acute Stress Disorder in Response to Bank Robbery, 2 EUR. J.
PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 5864 (2011); André Marchand et al., A Randomized
Controlled Trial of an Adapted Form of Individual Critical Incident Stress Debriefing for Victims of an Armed Robbery, 6 BRIEF TREATMENT & CRISIS INTERVENTION 122 (2006).
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the incident, the victim has had recurring nightmares and
traumatic memories about the experience. The victim now finds
it difficult to ride the subway because of these bad memories.
Once again, John does not contest the facts, and does not raise
intent or causation issues, but argues solely that he cannot be
found guilty of assault because the victim experienced no “bodily injury.”
Both scenarios were highly stylized, and facts stipulated,
so as to remove the intent element, eliminate the causation issue, and focus squarely on whether the victim’s harm constitutes bodily injury. Future research can, of course, address these additional issues. But in the first instance, it is important to
179
establish a baseline with these basic fact patterns.
Table 3 lists the three different prosecution arguments,
and five types of jury instructions, that I employ in this experiment. The 3 x 5 design gives me fifteen unique variations of
each crime scenario. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of
the fifteen versions of each scenario. After reading through the
crime scenario, subjects were prompted to determine whether
the crime victim experienced bodily injury or not. Presentation
of the burglary and assault cases was counter-balanced to account for ordering effects.
Because courts have routinely asserted (without empirical
validation) that common understanding of the term “bodily in180
jury” is clear, I explicitly asked subjects, “On a scale from 0–
9—with 0 being not well understood and very confusing, and 9
being very well understood and not at all confusing—how well
did you understand the term ‘bodily injury’?”
For a given subject, the prosecution argument and jury instructions in the assault scenario were identical to the burglary
scenario. For example, a subject who was in the baseline condition for burglary (i.e., no prosecution mention of the brain, and
no bodily injury definition provided in the jury instructions)
was also in the baseline condition for the assault scenario.
179. As discussed in Part IV, future experiments can begin to unpack the
intent element as it relates to different conceptions of bodily injury. In California’s penal code, for instance, the introduction of the infliction of the great
bodily harm aggravator brought with it a debate over what type of intent—
general or specific—was required. See Michael M. Blazina, “With the Intent to
Inflict Such Injury”: The Courts and the Legislature Create Confusion in California Penal Code Section 12022.7, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 963 (1991).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1246 (9th Cir.
1980) (claiming that “bodily injury” is amenable to a “common sense” understanding).
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Table 3
Illustration: Constructing Fifteen Unique Burglary
Scenarios from a Common Fact Pattern
All Subjects Were Provided with the Basic
Fact Pattern for Burglary Scenario:

[All Subjects] Defendant (John) is charged
with aggravated burglary. John admits to
breaking into a private
home and stealing the
TV, knowing that someone was in the home
when he broke in. John
yells at the homeowner.
The homeowner later
experiences recurring
nightmares about the
break-in and is diagnosed with PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) due to the
event. An expert medical witness testifies
during the trial that the
homeowner suffered
from PTSD related to
the break-in.

Subjects Were Randomly Assigned to One of
Three Types of Prosecution Argument:

Subjects Were Also
Randomly Assigned to
One of Five Definitions
of Bodily Injury Provided in Jury Instruction:

[A] (Baseline: Subjects
given no information
about the prosecution’s
argument.)

A1. (Baseline) No definition provided
A2. Black’s (1990) definition
A3. Black’s (Current)
definition
A4. Federal definition
A5. Brain-inclusive federal definition

[B] The prosecution argues that the brain is a
part of the body, that
the homeowner’s PTSD
and nightmares are the
result of biochemical
changes in her brain
cells, and therefore that
she has experienced bodily injury.

B1. (Baseline) No definition provided
B2. Black’s (1990) definition
B3. Black’s (Current)
definition
B4. Federal definition
B5. Brain-inclusive federal definition

[C] To support the argument (B) above, an
expert witness, in support of the diagnosis of
PTSD, testifies that the
homeowner’s brain activity was abnormal. A
brain scan showing abnormal activity was admitted into evidence.

C1. (Baseline) No definition provided
C2. Black’s (1990) definition
C3. Black’s (Current)
definition
C4. Federal definition
C5. Brain-inclusive federal definition
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Note: For both the burglary and the assault crimes, I constructed fifteen (3 prosecution arguments x 5 jury instructions)
unique scenarios. Full text of the scenarios is presented in Appendix C.3. Notice that each scenario uses an identical fact pattern. The only difference between treatments is the type of argument made (and evidence used) by the prosecution, and the
definition of bodily injury provided to subjects in the jury instructions.
E. RESULTS OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS EXPERIMENT
In this sub-Part, I summarize the results of Experiment
Two. Appendix C.4 provides additional discussion of the details
of the statistical analysis.
1. Do Jury Instructions Matter for Assessment of Bodily
Injury in Burglary and Assault Contexts?
If jurors hold a robust common understanding of bodily injury, then different definitions should have only minimal impact compared to the baseline (because the instructions would
simply be confirming what subjects already know). Experiment
Two allows us to test the validity of such logic.
The results in the top panes of Figure 3 (burglary) and
Figure 4 (assault) strongly suggest that—even without introduction of brain evidence—subject assessment of bodily injury
is contingent on the way in which it is defined. To begin with,
in the baseline burglary case, with no definition of bodily injury
provided, fully one in five subjects still found that the victim’s
PTSD constituted bodily injury.
In both the burglary and the assault scenarios, subjects receiving the federal definition of bodily injury (with its more inclusive listing) were significantly more likely to find that John
inflicted bodily injury. In the assault case, the numbers are
striking: 28% of subjects receiving the federal definition found
bodily injury, compared to only 7% of those receiving no definition. In both scenarios, Black’s 1990 definition (which included
the phrase “not mental, but corporeal”) produced the lowest
percentage of subjects finding bodily injury (only 4% in the assault case, and 11% in the burglary case).
2. Do Brain-Based Definitions and Evidence Affect Juror
Assessment of Bodily Injury?
In both the burglary and assault cases, the prosecution’s
introduction of brain-based arguments and evidence has a sig-
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nificant, positive effect on the likelihood of subjects finding that
John inflicted bodily injury on the victim. Notably, even without the prosecution making mention of a brain argument, simply modifying the federal-rules definition to be brain inclusive—
by adding to the itemized list “impairment of the brain’s normal functioning”—leads to a significant increase in finding of
bodily injury. This is true even in the condition where no extra
brain information is provided by the prosecution. Thus, even
when PTSD was not described as a brain-based disease, subjects understood it as such, and placed it within the bodily injury category, when applying the modified federal definition.
When the prosecution’s brain-based arguments are added
to the mix, we see the expected increase in bodily injury determinations (rising up to 71% in the burglary case, when brain
evidence is presented and a brain argument is made). Importantly, though, the restrictive Black’s 1990 dictionary definition significantly constrains bodily injury findings even when
brain scan evidence is presented. This suggests that subjects
are quite sensitive to the instructions received, and moreover
that the effect of the brain evidence cannot be divorced from the
jury instructions. Of note, and deserving of further study, is the
finding that when given no definition of bodily injury, but presented with brain scan evidence, fully 50% of subjects find that
the verbal assault victim has experienced bodily injury. When
the Black’s dictionary definitions are introduced, this plummets
to 6–7%.
There are, however, some findings that are not as readily
explained. For instance, in the Burglary scenario, the prosecution’s introduction of a brain scan (compared to just making the
brain argument with the scan) actually reduces the percentage
of subjects finding PTSD to be a bodily injury. By contrast, in
the assault scenario, introducing the brain scan (again compared to the condition where the prosecution makes the brainbased argument, but without the scan) raises the percentage
finding bodily injury from 3% to 50%. These and other anomalies suggest that, although there are discernible patterns in the
data, there is also tremendous variance in subject response.
Additional research is needed to better understand in what
contexts bodily injury is more, or less, confusing to the lay public.
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Figure 3
Burglary: Percentage of Subjects Finding that the
Victim Experienced Bodily Injury

What to notice in Figure 3: The figure presents the percentage
of subjects, in each of the 15 conditions, finding that the crime
victim experienced bodily injury. The bars are shaded according
to the type of bodily injury definition provided, and results are
grouped according to the type of prosecution argument. The results shown in this figure suggest that: (1) even without brainbased arguments, differing definitions of bodily injury in jury
instructions affect juror decisions; (2) when brain-based arguments are introduced by the prosecution, jurors are more persuaded that PTSD is a bodily injury; and (3) the combination of
a brain-based argument and a (purportedly) confirming brain
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scan is very successful in convincing jurors that PTSD is a bodily injury.
Figure 4
Assault: Percentage of Subjects Finding That the Victim
Experienced Bodily Injury

What to notice in Figure 4: The figure presents the percentage
of subjects, in each of the 15 conditions, finding that the crime
victim experienced bodily injury. The bars are shaded according
to the type of bodily injury definition provided, and results are
grouped according to the type of prosecution argument. The results shown in this figure show that: (1) even without brainbased arguments, the federal definition of bodily injury operates quite differently than the Black’s Law definition; (2) in the
assault context, brain-based arguments and brain scan evi-
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dence affect juror outcomes, but are not as persuasive as in the
burglary context.
IV. DISCUSSION
In first-year criminal law, law students learn that “[t]he
181
harm is the body—the linchpin—of the crime.” On closer examination, for many crimes against the person, it may be further said that harm in the form of bodily injury is the linchpin.
Thus, how legislatures define, and how courts and jurors understand and apply, definitions of bodily injury affects the operation of the criminal law. The previous Part presented results
about how subjects understand bodily injury. In this Part, I
discuss the implications of the results for the conceptualization
of crime victim harms in the criminal law.
A. CAUTIONS
In a separate empirical assessment of key provisions in the
Model Penal Code, my co-authors and I wrote that “we must
suggest caution” for the MPC study was “but one set of experiments in a young—indeed almost non-existent—empirical literature. Future studies may point in different and unanticipat182
ed directions.” The same caution must be made at the outset
here. The results just presented are from only two experiments,
with highly stylized fact patterns, and additional work is certainly required to better understand what actual juror assessments would look like in different contexts.
As discussed in Part III, the scenarios utilized in Experiment Two are intended to serve as a proof of concept. To this
end, the results clearly suggest that additional experiments are
183
worthwhile to pursue.
These additional experiments can
more carefully address the complicated issues of intent of the
accused, and causation between the actions of the accused and
the mental/brain harm caused to the alleged victim.
Future work should include scenarios with a more robust
defense. Prosecutors must prove every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus the burden of persuasion
is high. It remains to be seen whether the prosecution, even
when using a brain-based argument, can successfully persuade
181. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 112 (6th ed.
2012).
182. Shen, supra note 165, at 1344.
183. See supra Part III.E.2.
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subjects in the face of defense challenges on the grounds of intent, causation, or scientific validity (e.g., through the testimony of a competing expert or cross-examination of the prosecution expert). Perhaps with these procedural safeguards in
place, subjects will not be so moved by the brain evidence.
Additional crime scenarios should also be considered. Varying the criminal charges, the extent of trauma experienced by
the victim, and the extent of the defendant’s violence toward
the victim may all affect juror outcomes. One set of scenarios
will explore the lower bounds of “bodily” injury for subjects. For
instance, would a mere scratch constitute “bodily injury”?
There are also a host of related conceptual questions to work
out. For instance, is the definition of bodily injury embedded in
the criminal code an objective standard (requiring us to ask
whether the reasonable person views PTSD as a bodily injury),
or a subjective standard (requiring us instead to ask whether
the defendant viewed PTSD as a bodily injury)? Additional
studies are required to answer such questions.
B. IMPLICATIONS
The caveats just discussed notwithstanding, the results of
this study suggest that rather than sharing a common understanding of bodily injury, ordinary people display much variety
in how they understand the concept. Experiment One showed
that the bodily injury classification is not straightforward for
184
injuries such as PTSD, memory loss, and depression. In addition, Experiment One found that lay subjects define and de185
scribe bodily injury in many different ways.
Experiment Two showed how this variation in understanding bodily injury can play out in criminal contexts. Subjects assess bodily injury in context, based on the evidence presented
and arguments made at trial, and the definition they receive in
186
jury instructions.
1. PTSD at the OK Boys Ranch
I stated earlier that there are no cases of the type I constructed in my experiments. There is, however, at least one
case in which it would have made a material difference to learn

184. See supra Table 2.
185. See supra Figure 2.1.
186. See supra Part III.E.
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that common understanding may include PTSD as a bodily in187
jury. The case is State v. Van Woerden, and I review it here.
The OK Boys Ranch was a group home for boys that closed
in the late 1990s after allegations of sexual and physical
188
abuse. Three defendants were charged with criminal mistreatment in the second degree, and the State’s “theory was
that, as a result of the defendants’ failure to protect them from
abuse, 10 boys developed Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder
189
(PTSD).” In order to convict, the State had to prove “that
PTSD constitutes either ‘great bodily harm’ or ‘substantial bod190
ily harm.’” Both the trial court and the appellate court reject191
ed this argument, and the courts’ reasoning is telling.
The State made exactly the argument that I have explored
here, that “PTSD meets either definition because it is either a
bodily injury, i.e., an illness, or a physical condition that causes
192
an impairment of the function of an organ, i.e., the brain.”
Specifically, the State argued that PTSD affects “way the brain
193
tells the body to react physically to various stimuli[.]” The
State, much like the scenario presented in the experiment, had
an expert testify to the following:
Although generally understood as a psychological disorder, PTSD also
may be viewed from a biologic perspective. There is now accumulating
evidence to suggest that severe psychological trauma can cause alterations in the organism’s neurobiologic response to stress even years
after the original insult.” PTSD alters brain chemistry leading to
“hypervigilance, increased startle, affective lability, anxiety,
dysphoria,
and
increased
autonomic
nervous
system
194
hyperreactivity.

In assessing this argument, the Court went through many
of steps discussed thus far. It recognized that “[u]ndefined
statutory terms are given their usual and ordinary meaning”
195
and looked to both Webster’s and Black’s Law Dictionary.
The Court was ultimately guided by rules of statutory construction and the rule of lenity to rule that bodily injury includes on196
ly physical illnesses.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

State v. Van Woerden, 967 P.2d 14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
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Addressing the question of whether PTSD was an impairment of physical condition, the Court in my view strained to
distinguish it in the following way:
[U]nder the statute, the State must prove that PTSD is an impairment of physical condition that causes an impairment of the functioning of the brain, not merely that PTSD impairs the functioning of the
brain. Based on the evidence submitted by the State, PTSD is a psychological disorder that alters the functioning of the brain. Therefore,
even though PTSD has measurable and perhaps “deleterious physiological impacts on the brain’s functioning,” it does not meet the definition of bodily injury because it is foremost the impairment of a men197
tal, as opposed to a physical, condition.

The logic of the Court’s reasoning here is, as best I can tell, as
follows:
(1) PTSD is a “psychological disorder.”
(2) PTSD alters the function of the brain (in fact it may
have deleterious physiological impacts)
(3) BUT (and this is the crucial point), because it is a “psychological disorder” it is “foremost the impairment of a men198
tal . . . condition.
If this is an accurate reading of the case, then it suggests
that psychology (or “mind”) is somehow antecedent to the
199
brain. And this logic is antithetical to the standard cognitive
neuroscience understanding that “the brain is what the mind
200
does.”
The Court, of course, is well within its rights to reject that
neuroscientific view. And as I suggest later, drawing this dualist line in the legal sand might well be good policy. But the
Court had to strain to hold that PTSD is not an impairment of
physical condition, and I think it likely that such strain will only increase in the years to come as we increasingly see PTSD as
a biologically-based disorder.
2. Much Ado About Nothing?
Two of the possible negative outcomes from an ill-defined
concept of bodily injury are: (1) over-criminalization because
197. Id. at 19.
198. Id.
199. Even if the Court meant that the behavioral manifestations of PTSD
affect the brain (which certainly they do, as the brain is always interacting
with its environment), it would still be odd to claim that those behavioral manifestations were originating from someplace other than the mind-brain.
200. See, e.g., Weisberg et al., supra note 145, at 476 (“For instance, neuroscience may illustrate a connection between the mind and the brain that people implicitly believe not to exist, or not to exist in such a strong way . . . .”).
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defendants are made liable for inflicting, or attempting to inflict, injuries that are “bodily” but not sufficiently bad; and (2)
under-criminalization because individuals who commit acts
that inflict substantial, but purely mental, harm are not held
liable.
But is there really need for such concern? Several counterarguments present themselves. First, one might argue that the
subset of non de minimus purely mental harms is negligible.
This would be the case if substantial emotional or mental harm
is always (or almost always) accompanied by physical harm (attempted or actual). But it is not hard to think of many typical
situations in which mental harm is experienced, but not physical harm (as traditionally defined). A good example is the
spousal verbal abuse example mentioned earlier. We can imagine that the spouse being repeatedly verbally abused (even if
there was no touching) might experience a range of negative
emotions, and depending on the facts, that the behavioral effects could be quite substantial (perhaps even substantial
201
enough for someone to leave the relationship). Again, this is
not to say that such conduct should be criminalized; it is simply
to make the point that such conduct—which causes mental but
not physical injury—is not hard to imagine.
Moreover, the well-established tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress highlights many instances where an individual causes (and intends to cause) only mental anguish. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts lists a number of examples, that
would invite civil liability, including:
As a practical joke, A falsely tells B that her husband has been badly
injured in an accident, and is in the hospital with both legs broken. B
suffers severe emotional distress. A is subject to liability to B for her
emotional distress. If it causes nervous shock and resulting illness, A
202
is subject to liability to B for her illness.

201. Of course, even if there were touching, it might fall into a category of
not sufficient to produce bodily injury, but sufficient to produce mental injury.
Consider the domestic case of a daughter and father in California, who according to the police report, “each touched the other in an angry manner, but without sufficient force to cause bodily injury.” Deborah Demander, Six Face Misdemeanor Arraignments in Circuit Court, UINTA COUNTY HERALD (Nov. 25,
2011), http://www.uintacountyherald.com/v2_news_articles.php?heading=0&
page=72&story_id=5085. While in that case, the facts were such that both pled
guilty to a battery charge, one can imagine a case in where there are regular
angry exchanges, and even though the victim knows he/she is not in physical
danger, nevertheless it takes a mental toll.
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
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Should such a defendant in this situation face criminal liability as well? Again, there are reasonable arguments for and
against. On one hand, if we wish to impose criminal liability
(whether to deter or to express moral disapproval) on those individuals who intentionally inflict great, demonstrable harm,
then we might wish to impose liability just as we would if the
203
defendant had hit the victim on the arm. Expanding liability
in this context would be more consistent with the American
Psychological Association’s observation that “millions of Americans know that suffering from a mental health disorder can be
as frightening and debilitating as any major physical health
204
disorder.”
On the other hand, there are many good reasons to distinguish the two, and to avoid such expansion of the concept of
bodily injury. Perhaps most importantly, such expansion of liability might lead to a slippery slope of liability for mental injuries. This has been a longstanding concern in tort law, and
Prosser addressed it eloquently in his classic statement on the
new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress:
The most valid objection to the protection of “mental” interests lies in
the “wide door” which might be opened, not only to fictitious and
fraudulent claims, but to litigation in the field of trivialities and mere
bad manners.” It is easy to lie about what goes on inside the plaintiff’s
own head. It would be an absurd thing for the law to seek to secure
universal peace of mind, and there are many interferences with it
203. For those advocates of empirical desert, there might also be value in
better aligning criminal statutes with citizen preferences (preferences that
might demand more liability for purely mental harms). To be sure, there is
currently an ongoing debate within criminal law scholarship about whether
the principles of “justice” for the criminal defendant should be grounded in
moral philosophy or (an empirical assessment of) a community’s norms. See,
e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 10 (2008) (arguing that “one could adopt a
distributive principle of ‘desert’ based upon the community’s shared intuitions
of justice rather than based upon philosophical notions of desert.”); Paul H.
Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological,
and Empirical, 67 CAMB. L.J. 145, 154 (2008) (arguing that [t]he networks of
interpersonal relationships in which people find themselves, the social norms
and prohibitions shared among those relationships and transmitted through
those social networks, and the internalised representations of those norms and
moral precepts control people’s conduct.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care
What the Lay Person Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus. Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1838 (2000); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
204. Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/parity-law.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
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which must of necessity be left to other agencies of social control. If
the plaintiff is to recover every time that her feelings are hurt, we
should all be in court twice a week. . . . But this is a poor reason for
denying recovery for any genuine, serious mental injury. It is the
business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the ex205
pense of a “flood of litigation . . . .”

While one way to address the slippery slope concern is to
set the bar quite high for the severity of emotional harm required to trigger criminal liability, still concerns remain about
proof and the causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the crime victim. The criminal law might do well to
206
avoid such thorny issues.
So too can the rationale behind the existing mind-body dichotomy be clarified. Although the legal outcome (no liability) is
the same, it is normatively quite different to say of a person
who inflicts mental injury on another: “We’re not holding this
person liable because of seemingly intractable evidentiary concerns” versus “We’re not holding this person liable because we
don’t think such mental injuries are as bad as physical inju207
208
ries.” Neuroscience, as I have argued elsewhere, can provide lawmakers with additional information but it cannot dictate policymaking. Even if the neuroscience and medical
communities come to view all mental phenomena as instantiated in the brain, it does not mean that the law must follow. Law
might also be flexible and choose to adopt the neuroscience
view in some, but not all, contexts. For instance, the goals of
tort law may demand a different definition of bodily injury than
does the criminal justice system. Yet at present state statutes
209
typically provide just one, general definition of bodily injury.
However legislatures wish to weigh the competing policy
considerations, the emerging neuroscience research and the requirements of justice, my view is that the law should, clearly
and carefully, state its reasons for the bodily injury concept(s)
205. Prosser, supra note 170, at 877.
206. Indeed, tort law has wrestled with this issue mightily and developed
what has been called a patchwork of liability rules to handle emotional distress. Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1197 (2009).
207. A discussion of rationales necessarily raises a question about which
behaviors we wish to deter, and how deterrence would work in the near and
long term. For instance, how would we judge whether temporary mental harm
would generate long term gain?
208. Francis X. Shen, Neurolegislation and Juvenile Justice, 59 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
209. See infra Table A2.
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it adopts. I turn now the options legislatures can pursue to
achieve this end.
C. OPTIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM
Legislatures have six primary options: (1) do nothing
(which would then require potentially difficult statutory interpretation by courts); (2) explicitly include mental injuries within the bodily injury category (as they often already do in the
case of child and elder abuse); (3) explicitly exclude mental injuries from the bodily injury category (as many insurance policies now do); (4) eliminate the category of “bodily” altogether
and focus solely on severity of injury (as the Iowa code does); (5)
develop crime-specific criteria for bodily injury (as the federal
sentencing guidelines do in the case of forcible rape); or (6)
eliminate the bodily injury element from particular crimes
against the person to focus solely on offender behavior (as in
stalking or harassment).
Option 1. Do Nothing (i.e., Judicial Interpretation of Current
Statutes)
If legislatures choose not to address definitions of bodily injury, then the onus falls to courts’ statutory interpretation. If
ordinary people label (at least certain types of) diagnosed mental trauma as bodily injury, will it and should it affect courts’
statutory interpretation of the term “bodily injury”? Such reinterpretation in the criminal context could, even without legislative action, change the scope of offenses against the person.
For the reasons I now lay out, however, such statutory interpretation is unlikely to be persuasive at least in the short
run, and may even be unconstitutional in the criminal context.
Judicial pronouncements on bodily injury in the criminal law
frequently rely on the (asserted) common understanding that
lay people have about the term. Common understanding (or
“plain meaning”) requires an analysis of the author and audi210
ence of the statute in question. The experiments just discussed provide evidence that the audience does not hold a consistent understanding of bodily injury, but rather is quite
211
malleable in its views.
210. POPKIN, supra note 48, at 38.
211. See infra Table 2. A full-blown analysis of each state’s legislative history is beyond the scope of this Article, but there is at least circumstantial evidence that in other contexts (e.g., mental health law) legislators have shown a
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But this malleability emerged under experimental conditions in which subjects were forced to think about the issue,
and it doesn’t mean that the public is regularly thinking about
PTSD or anxiety as bodily injury. It certainly doesn’t mean—
and this is the legally relevant point—that would-be criminals
(i.e., those who cause the mental injury) are on notice that such
behavior is criminal. Clearly due process concerns would be
212
implicated.
Whether the term should be interpreted in a light most favorable to the accused (the common-law rule), or primarily in
furtherance of the general purposes of the code, depends on the
state. While many states have jettisoned the favorable to the
213
accused rule, others such as Florida still state that “[t]he provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall
be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the
214
accused.” Applying the rule of lenity would almost certainly
lead courts to exclude from the bodily injury category harms
such as PSTD, which have been traditionally “mental” injuries.
In those states where the general purpose of the criminal
code is relevant to statutory interpretation of bodily injury, one
can see at least a small possibility for justifying a broader bodily injury interpretation because states refer generally to harm
215
(not specifically to bodily harm). For instance, in Colorado,
the criminal code “shall be construed in such manner as to
promote maximum fulfillment of its general purposes, namely:
. . . (c) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious
clear willingness to view the brain as a part of the body. See, e.g., State Alcohol, Drug Abuse, Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health Act, WIS.
STAT. §§ 51.01–51.95 (2012). Thus, it might be argued that legislators do indeed intend for bodily injury to cover more expansive behavior than it presently does.
212. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (“Due process requires
that all ‘be informed as to what the State Commands or forbids . . . and that
‘men of common intelligence’ not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law.” (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)); Connally
v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
213. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 265–66 (1982). See, e.g., 11 DEL. CODE § 203 (2012) (“The
general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to
this Criminal Code . . . .”).
214. FLA. STAT. § 775.021 (2012).
215. For instance, in Arizona the criminal statutes are intended “[t]o proscribe conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-101(1)
(2012).
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and minor offenses, and prescribe penalties which are propor216
tionate to the seriousness of offenses . . . .” The language of
the statute requires us to ask: is it reasonable to distinguish
between degrees of culpability based on categorization of “bodily” and “mental” injury? Perhaps. But it’s also possible, even if
not overly compelling, to argue that the distinctions should rest
on severity of injury alone and not type of injury.
Thus, in the short term the path of statutory
(re)interpretation is one that likely leads to exclusion of purely
mental injuries. Most striking are concerns about legality, the
basic principle that one cannot be criminally liable for conduct
217
unless that conduct was defined as criminal before the act. In
this context, defendants are not likely to know that judges had
reinterpreted statutes so that assault includes injuries to the
brain, i.e., purely “mental” injuries of some sufficient degree.
Even absent issues of notice, another important limitation arises if it remains unclear whether—for the specialized purpose of
the criminal code—the term “bodily injury” has a specialized
meaning. The classic case of Nix v. Hedden, in which the Supreme Court had to determine whether a “tomato” was a fruit
218
or a vegetable, is instructive. In Nix the court reasoned that
because “tomato” had not received special meaning in trade or
219
commerce, its ordinary meaning should apply. But in the
criminal context, where “bodily injury” has been used for many
years in a certain way, there seems a very strong case that it
has acquired a special meaning—a special meaning that need
not change even if (with the advent of neuroscientific evidence)
popular uses of the term change.
If this view is correct—that statutory interpretation of existing law to include mental harms within the definition of bodily injury will not be persuasive—then we are left with a situation in which courts will continue to assert a definition of bodily
220
injury that doesn’t comport with lay understanding. And, to
the extent that the mind-body dichotomy continues to dissolve
in other legal and policy contexts, the criminal law’s traditional
definition will become increasingly archaic. Perhaps this is a
tenable situation. But if we desire the lines of criminal liability
to be more clearly demarcated, and if other areas of law contin216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

COL. REV. STAT. § 18-1-102(1)(c) (2012).
See DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 39.
Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
Id. at 306.
See supra Part III.
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ue to close the mind-body gap, then it is both timely and important for legislatures to revisit this question in one of the following five ways.
Moreover, while the analysis above may hold for the short
term, in the long term it’s not clear that the public will continue to view mental illness and mental injuries in the same way
as they do today. For instance, a non-profit organization in
Maine called Fearless Nation PTSD Support ran an event in
March 2012 to raise awareness of PTSD as a real, physical in221
jury. The founder of the nonprofit, Colleen Crary, commented
that “[n]ew medical imaging makes it very clear now that
PTSD severely alters the shape and function of the human
brain, making it a brain injury. This presentation is created for
the layperson to understand, with examples of brain changes
222
that occur after trauma.” In a similar vein, former Congressman Patrick Kennedy told a group of students at Syracuse
University in 2012 that, “[t]he brain is part of the body last
time I checked. It is not OK to marginalize people just because
their illness is a part of the brain and not in any other part of
223
the body.” Efforts such as these—aimed at changing public
attitudes about PTSD and mental illnesses—could one day take
hold and lead to societal changes (and thus notice) in ordinary
224
usage of the terms mental illness and mental injury.
Option 2. Explicitly Include Purely Mental and Emotional
Injury
Legislatures that seek to include purely mental and emotional harms in the category of bodily injury can write this directly into the code. To see how this can be done, legislatures
need only look at their child abuse and elder abuse statutes.
221. John Platt, Presentations on the Neurobiology of PTSD This Week,
PTSD NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://ptsd-news.blogspot.com/2012/03/
presentations-on-neurobiology-of-ptsd.html.
222. Id.
223. Alexandra Hitzler, Kennedy Speaks on Research, Mental Health, DAILY ORANGE, Oct. 11, 2012, http://dailyorange.com/2012/10/kennedy-speaks-onresearch-mental-health/.
224. Of course, finding “ordinary meaning” is difficult for courts to do. See
Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027,
2053 (2005) (arguing that courts have no principled way to “actually decide
just what makes ordinary meaning ordinary. The argument more resembles a
food fight in a school for children with disciplinary problems than a serious
argument among distinguished jurists.”).
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For instance, in Florida, child abuse is defined as
“[i]ntentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a
225
child.” where mental injury is defined as “injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a
discernible and substantial impairment in the ability of the
child to function within the normal range of performance and
226
behavior as supported by expert testimony.”
As a bookend to these protections given to our youngest citizens, elder abuse laws typically include liability for neglect,
which is said to occur when a caregiver’s fails “to endeavor to
secure or maintain adequate care, services, or supervision for
an individual, including food, clothing, shelter, or physical or
mental health care, and creating significant risk or danger to
227
the invidual’s physical or mental health.”
For society’s most vulnerable, then, the modern criminal
code provides additional protections by explicitly criminalizing
acts which lead to mental, as well as physical, injury. These
statutes provide useful guidance for the ways in which mental
injury or mental health language might be added to an expanded definition of bodily injury. So too might aspects of tort and
insurance law provide useful guidance for interpreting the
bodily injury concept. For instance, as discussed in the Appendix, one option is to adopt a “physical manifestation” require228
ment for mental injury liability.
There are, however, good reasons not to go down these
paths. Chief amongst the concerns are the evidentiary concerns
and the issue of causation. The evidentiary concern is: how
could a court verify, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim
experienced a mental injury? And, relatedly, what types of injuries or harms would count for purposes of criminal liability?
At present, there are no reliable biomarkers for mental disor225. FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). Abuse also includes: “An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or active encouragement of any person to
commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child.” FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)(b)(2)–(3). Definitions in
other states similarly include mental abuse. See Definitions of Child Abuse
and Neglect, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2011), http://www
.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.cfm/.
226. FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)(d) (2012).
227. This is language from Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. § 46.90 (2012) (emphasis
added). Other states typically have similar language.
228. See infra Appendix A. A related requirement might be “visibility,”
though with scientific tools that increasingly allow one to “see” the microscopic, visibility and physicality might be very similar to one another.
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ders, and none will be included in the forthcoming Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of the American Psychological Associa229
tion. Thus, the court would have to evaluate the testimony of
competing expert witnesses; not an easy task, especially when
230
it’s difficult and costly to identify malingering. In addition,
it’s not hard to see the potential moral hazard this creates, as a
non-victim could fake a mental injury much easier than faking
a broken wrist.
Even if it could be established that there was an actual
mental injury (however defined), the causation issue would still
be difficult to resolve. In a typical physical battery, there is a
fairly non-controversial causal connection between the actus
reus of the perpetrator and the harm experienced by the victim.
If John hits David with a baseball bat, and David’s arm breaks,
John’s actions are not only necessary but sufficient for the onset of the injury. The picture is likely not as clear in many instances of mental injury.
Option 3. Explicitly Exclude Purely Mental and Emotional
Injury
For legislatures that seek to ensure that the concept of bodily injury does not expand, the results in this Article suggest
that a simple and effective solution is to add a negating clause
in the definition of bodily injury. The language used in the 1990
231
Black’s Law Dictionary—“not mental, but corporeal” —could
be even further strengthened. My results suggest that such a
definition might generate the common understanding that remains elusive at present. Legislatures seeking guidance for
232
limiting language can look to private insurance contracts.
In addition, the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act
233
(PLRA) can be instructive. The PLRA requires that in order
to recover damages, a plaintiff must suffer physical injury. The
statute clearly states: “No Federal civil action may be brought
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
229. Steven E. Hyman, Can Neuroscience Be Integrated into the DSM-V? 8
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 725, 725 (2007).
230. See generally Mary A. Conroy & Phylissa P. Kwartner, Malingering, 2
APPLIED PSYCH. CRIM. JUST. 29 (2006).
231. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 52.
232. See infra Appendix A.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006).
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234

without a prior showing of physical injury.”
Legislatures
could be equally clear about excluding purely mental and emotional injuries. Legislatures would also have the option, following case law in the civil context, to require some sort of physical
“manifestation” or require a combination of mental and (traditional) physical injury in order for the element to be satisfied.
Of course, such line drawing would be difficult and would still
require legislatures to think carefully about the relationship
between mind and brain.
Option 4. Focus Only on Severity, Not Type of Injury
Slicing injury into the two categories of bodily and nonbodily, and criminalizing only the former, leads to a regime in
which there is no criminal sanction even for extremely bad nonbodily harms. This possibility can be avoided if the criminal
code focuses solely on the severity of injury, and drops its inquiry into the type of injury.
One way to operationalize this approach is to adopt a modified version of the current Iowa statutory definition of serious
235
injury. The relevant Iowa statute reads:
1. “Serious injury” means any of the following:
a. Disabling mental illness.
b. Bodily injury which does any of the following:
(1) Creates a substantial risk of death.
(2) Causes serious permanent disfigurement.
(3) Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ.
c. Any injury to a child that requires surgical repair and necessitates
the administration of general anesthesia.
2. “Serious injury” includes but is not limited to skull fractures, rib
fractures, and metaphyseal fractures of the long bones of children un236
der the age of four years.

Notable in this statutory construction is the legislature’s
use of “serious injury” as an umbrella term, without the word
bodily. This allows for inclusion of both “disabling mental ill234. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193
(5th Cir.1997).
235. IOWA CODE § 702.18 (2012). A review of Iowa case law, however, suggests that prosecutors have not used this statute to impose criminal liability
purely for infliction of a disabling mental illness. It is unclear why this is the
case, and legislative history provides little guidance on the origins of the statute’s phrasing.
236. Id.
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ness” and bodily injury items. This approach allows for parity
in crime victim injury: criminal liability attaches when a defendant causes either sufficiently bad mental injury or sufficiently bad physical injury. Determination of sufficiently bad
injuries is accomplished through the adjectives in the statute,
e.g., disabling mental illness, serious permanent disfigurement,
237
and so forth.
The issue of severity in the context of mental injury has
been the subject of debate in the context of torture. The United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines torture as
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a con238
fession.” The operative word is “severe”—how should it be defined? In 2002, the Department of Justice defined severe pain
as that which reaches “to the level of death, organ failure, or
239
the permanent impairment of a significant body function.”
They went on to define mental pain or suffering as “significant
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for
months or even years,” and also required it to be the interroga240
tor’s “precise objective.” This definition has been criticized as
241
under-inclusive.
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to enter the debate about how to define torture, and in particular how to draw
the line distinguishing really bad (but not “severe”) mental
harm from that mental harm that is truly “severe.” But the torture discussion becomes more relevant when we look at state
242
statutes defining torture.
Connecticut, for instance, finds
cruelty to persons when someone “intentionally tortures, tor243
ments or cruelly or unlawfully punishes another person . . . .”
237. Id.
238. Ronald L. Nelson, Torture in the Law of the Fifty American States:
Searching for Definition, 4 WAR CRIMES, GENOCIDE & CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1, 5 (2010).
239. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President 1 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf.
240. Id.
241. Vincent Iacopino, Scott A. Allen & Allen S. Keller, Bad Science Used to
Support Torture and Human Experimentation, 331 SCI. 34 (2011).
242. See Nelson, supra note 238, at 25 (finding five states that have a statutory definition of torture).
243. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-20(a)(1) (2012).
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There is no distinction here between mental and physical—
ought we to read one into the definition? And if we do (or do
not) do so here, would we do the same in the criminal context?
Such questions are ripe for further investigation.
Option 5. Develop Crime-Specific Criteria for Bodily Injury
A fifth option is to develop crime-specific criteria for bodily
injury. This is the path that the states and the federal sentencing guidelines have taken with regard to sexual assault crimes.
Courts have been faced with this question: has a rape victim,
whose body is functioning normally, experienced serious bodily
(or physical) injury?
In an Arizona case in which a female college student was
raped, the court found that the convicted assailant could not be
charged with aggravated assault because an element of aggravated assault is “serious physical injury” and “the plain meaning of the statute does not include injuries which are solely
244
mental or emotional.”
Similarly, in United States v. Rivera, a case that ultimately
led to congressional action, a twenty-four-year-old mother was
245
carjacked and raped at gunpoint. A question on appeal, after
a sentencing enhancement, was whether the victim had experi246
enced serious bodily injury. A three-judge panel—reasoning
that there was only evidence of “protracted . . . impairment
of . . . mental faculty” and—citing the rule of lenity—found that
247
the answer was no. The dissent argued forcefully that this
outcome could not have been intended by Congress, as it would
create a sentencing enhancement for the loss of a finger, but
248
not a rape at gunpoint.

244. State v. Garcia, 673 P.2d 955, 958 (1983). Other state courts also arrived at the same conclusion in similar cases in this earlier era. See, e.g., State
v. Rossier, 397 A.2d 110 (1978).
245. United States v. Rivera, 83 F.3d 542, 544 (1st Cir. 1996).
246. Id. The carjacking statute defines “serious bodily injury” as bodily injury that involves either: “(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical
pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty . . . .” Id.
at 547 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(3)).
247. Id. at 548 (emphasis added).
248. See Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L.
REV. 511, 576–77 (2001) (detailing the unpublished dissent in U.S. v. Rivera).

2108

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:2036

In response to this case, Congress amended the carjacking
statute to include sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse
249
under the definition of bodily injury.
This approach—in which the legislature explicitly deems a
particular criminal act to cause a type of injury—could be used
in other places throughout the criminal code, should a legislature wish to be more precise in determining where infliction of
250
mental injury will be criminalized. Indeed, there are examples of legislators doing precisely this in the context of bodily
injury.
In Wisconsin in 2011, State Senator Joe Leibham proposed
251
SB 109, the Law Enforcement Injury Bill. The Bill would “allow suspects who, while knowingly resisting or obstructing arrest, cause an officer to suffer a soft tissue injury to be charged
252
with a Class H felony.” The State Senator introduced the Bill
to directly amend the bodily injury definition by adding a new
253
category in order to expand liability.
Option 6. Focus Solely on Offender Conduct
Finally, legislatures can address the bodily injury definitional challenge by avoiding it altogether through construction
of crimes without a bodily injury element. Although I have emphasized in this Article that many crimes against the person
249. See Carjacking Correction Act of 1996, H.R. 3676 (1996) (amending 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (2006)).
250. If legislatures sought to attempt such precision for more than a handful of crimes, such an enumeration might lead, as has been observed in the
context of judicial use of dictionaries, to infinite regress: “Requiring terms to
be defined, like requiring all premises to be proven, leads to infinite regression. It replaces a short story with an infinitely long one.” A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 78 (1994).
251. WIS. LEGISLATURE, http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/proposals/
SB109 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
252. Constituent Ideas Turn into New Laws, WEBSITE OF JOE LEIBHAM,
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/leibham/PressReleases/Pages/pa-show.aspx?
id=Constituent+Ideas+Turn+Into+New+Laws (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
253. The Senator’s websites explains:
SB 109 adds soft tissue injuries as defined as “an injury that requires
medical attention to a tissue that connects, supports, or surrounds
other structures and organs of the body and includes tendons, ligaments, fascia, skin, fibrous tissues, fat, synovial membranes, muscles,
nerves and blood vessels” to the list of injuries that would result in
the commission of a felony.
Id.
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include an injury element, this is not always (and of course
need not be) the case.
A useful example of a crime against the person that does
include an injury element—bodily or otherwise—is the so called
“Peeping Tom” law. The Nevada peeping law, to illustrate,
states that “A person shall not knowingly enter upon the property or premises of another . . . with the intent to surreptitiously conceal himself . . . and peer, peep or spy through a window,
door or other opening of a building or structure that is used as
254
a dwelling on the property or premises.” Written in this way,
the legal inquiry focuses entirely on the offender’s actions and
the law does not need to reach the question of the actual effects
on the victim. Other crimes could similarly be defined without
requiring evidence of infliction of an actual harm or injury.
D. ACCORDANCE WITH HARM THEORY
The options just enumerated include several paths by
which infliction of mental injury could serve as a potential trigger for criminal liability and punishment. Given that this trigger would fundamentally expand liability, it is important to
ask: is such an expansion consistent with leading criminal law
theory on harm? In this sub-Part, I argue that it is.
Although criminal law theorists disagree about whether
the harm must be realized in order to justify punishment, both
retributivists and utilitarians agree that the criminal law is
centrally concerned about harms that are intended and/or in255
flicted by defendants. The basic harm principle, first laid out
by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, states “that the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
256
others.” While Mill’s claim has been modified much over the
years in the enactment of criminal statutes, the spirit of the
254. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.603 (2011).
255. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 171–96 (2009) (discussing the debate in
criminal law theory over the salience of resulting harm). This Article takes no
side in the debate over moral luck and resulting harm, as the present inquiry
is concerned only with those acts that clearly result in a (possibly “bodily injury”) harm.
256. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., 2003) (1859). The harm principle has of course been analyzed and reanalyzed over the centuries, for instance in how to best regulate speech. See,
e.g., Freedom of Speech, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/freedom-speech/#JohStuMilHarPri (last updated July 1, 2012).
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257

harm principle still lives on. The philosopher Joel Feinberg
put forth, in a four-volume treatise, the most systematic treat258
ment of harm in the modern criminal context. It is thus instructive to review Feinberg’s work in order to answer the
question: does a mental/physical divide necessarily emerge
from the harm principle?
Feinberg takes as his starting point the harm principle,
and recognizes that “the harm principle must be made sufficiently precise to permit the formulation of a criterion of ‘seriousness,’ and also, if possible, some way of grading types of
259
harms in terms of their seriousness.”
Feinberg’s technical discussion of harms, hurts, and offenses recognizes that “[n]ot everything that we dislike or re260
sent, and wish to avoid, is harmful to us.” In listing examples
of such unpleasant, but not “harmful” experiences, Feinberg includes “unhappy mental states” such as “disappointment[] . . .
261
hurt feelings . . . and shame.” But he also includes physical
pain “at a readily tolerable level” and “bodily discomfort,”
262
amongst others. Thus, Feinberg’s principle for line drawing is
263
in one sense not coterminous with a physical/mental divide.
That said, Feinberg writes at times with a mental/physical
distinction in mind. He recognizes that “mental pains” are

257. For instance, in laying out their proposed culpability-based criminal
code, Alexander and Ferzan note that the starting point is to determine which
harmful impositions should be made criminal. The authors follow Mill and
Feinberg in identifying “preventing harm to others” as the “clearest justification for state interference,” and then specifically flag “fear and other emotional
injuries” as a difficult harm category to assess. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra
note 255, at 269–70.
258. 1 FEINBERG, supra note 171; 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986); 4 JOEL FEINBERG,
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988).
Feinberg’s treatment of Mill’s harm principle has been described as the “most
extensive and influential analysis.” Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L.
REV. 571, 574 n.15 (2011). For a critique of Feinberg’s harm principle, see R.A.
Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 13 (2001).
259. 1 Feinberg, supra note 171, at 12.
260. Id. at 45.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Feinberg goes on to distinguish between harms and offense, noting
that some mental states can be “lumped together with physical pains as forms
of physical discomfort,” while others are best thought of as “forms of
offendedness.” Id. at 46.
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“hurts” but “only by courtesy of metaphor.” Feinberg later
addresses the question head on: whether, “in applying the
harm principle, we should permit coercion designed to prevent
mental stress merely, when the distress is not likely to be fol265
lowed by hurt or harm of any other kind?” Feinberg’s answer
is that “the hurt is serious enough if and only if it is either a
symptom of a prior or concurrent harm of another order (as a
pain in the arm may be the result and sign of a broken bone) or
else it is in itself the cause of a consequential harm (e.g., men266
tal breakdown) of another order.” Notably, Feinberg’s answer
emphasizes the order (i.e., severity) of the harm, not necessarily the type of harm. The legislative challenge is where to draw
the line of seriousness, not the (non-coterminous) lines between
bodily and non-bodily injury.
Feinberg later emphasizes that there are legally protected
interests, and that we can think of criminal law as prohibiting
certain types of impairments of interest. He gives, as an illustrative example, the case of a child who was kidnapped but
soon rescued. Feinberg notes that we might say at that time,
“‘X was found unharmed,’ the implication being that he suf267
fered no bodily harm.” We might also later say that “‘X was
not harmed by the experience,’ by which it is at least implied
268
that X has suffered no psychological harm.” Feinberg goes on
to note how—even in this case where no “harm” may have occurred (at least as defined a certain way)—there has been an
impairment of the child’s ability to pursue his welfare inter269
ests. For our purposes here, the important point is that the
notion of “interest” is even less constrained than the categories
“bodily” and “psychological.” It would seem that one could consistently adhere to Feinberg’s rule that criminal law prohibit
only impairments of interest, while modifying the construction
of bodily injury. Whether we in fact make this modification depends on whether and when we view purely mental injuries as
significant impairments to interest. And answering that question in future years may be increasingly informed by our growing understanding of how the mind works.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 48.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 52 (quoting John Kleinig, Crime and the Concept of Harm, 15
AM. PHIL. Q. 27, 32 (1978)).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 53.
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V. CONCLUSION
How “bodily injury” is defined and interpreted has important implications in a variety of criminal law contexts. Although courts routinely write that bodily injury is a concept
commonly understood, this Article has been the first to empirically test that assertion. The results of the studies reported in
this Article suggest three empirical conclusions.
First individuals do not hold a common understanding of
whether mental injuries such as PTSD should be considered
bodily. Rather than uniform responses, subjects demonstrated
rich and varied understandings of the concept of bodily injury.
The variation in the data does not allow it to be neatly packaged as a robust “common understanding” of the concept of bodily injury.
Second, and even without an explicit brain-based argument
made by the prosecution, jury instructions (communicating different definitions of bodily injury) are effective at channeling
the fluid bodily injury concept. Subjects given a definition of
bodily injury that enumerates a series of injuries were significantly more likely to find PTSD as bodily injury. Exposure to
the definitions found in Black’s Law Dictionary, by contrast,
dampened the likelihood of subjects finding PTSD to be bodily.
Third, brain-based definitions and evidence of bodily injury
was persuasive to subjects—but not when a restrictive definition was also provided. On one hand, when the brain-inclusive
instructions were combined with the prosecution’s argument
and a brain scan to support it, over 70% of subjects found that
PTSD in the burglary scenario constituted bodily injury. But
this percentage dropped precipitously when subjects were instructed with the restrictive Black’s Law Dictionary definition.
Taken together, these three findings cast new light on the
current and possible future interpretation of bodily injury in
criminal law. Conventional wisdom is that the bodily injury result element does not include pure “mental” injury. But society
may, spurred in part by exposure to neuroscience research, increasingly recognize that “bodily” injury is not a priori more serious or more devastating than “non-bodily” injury. And if this
shift occurs, the fundamental separation of mind and body in
the criminal law might similarly change.
As emphasized throughout the Article, the initial proof-ofconcept experiments presented here are a beginning, not an
end. Additional empirical study is required to validate the findings to date, and the implications that flow from them. In par-
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ticular, it is important to see whether the results hold when
subjects are presented with different fact patterns, and when
they receive more information about the case and the relevant
science. It also remains to be seen how the issue of intent will
play out in a legal world in which bodily injury increasingly is
determined by employing the technology and expertise of neuroscience. It is not too early, however, for legislatures to carefully revisit and debate the role of bodily injury in determining
criminal culpability and punishment.
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APPENDIX A. BODILY INJURY IN NON-CRIMINAL
CONTEXTS
This Appendix provides additional discussion of bodily injury in non-criminal legal contexts. Litigation over the definition of bodily injury arises occasionally in the context of injuries
resulting from car accidents, either through claims against a
driver’s insurance policy or claims for uninsured motorist bene270
fits. The plaintiffs in these cases typically assert that they
have suffered mental harm as a result of being involved in or
witnessing a car accident. Another context where this issue
arises is real estate; for example, in Alabama the buyers of
apartment complexes asserted claims of bodily injury, alleging
that they suffered mental harm as a result of misrepresenta271
tions by the seller.
Other cases involve claims on an individual’s homeowners’
insurance that provides coverage for bodily injury inflicted by
the insured. In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Cowan, the
Texas Supreme Court heard a claim for mental distress against
a photo lab clerk’s insurer after the clerk publicly distributed
272
provocative pictures of the plaintiff. A New Jersey case involved a teacher’s claim against a parent for the parent’s allegedly false and misleading public statements about the teacher’s
273
competency.
A related issue arises with regard to the 2010 BP oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico. The Louisiana health commissioner reports that there is an increase in anxiety, depression, stress,
grief, substance abuse, and suicide ideation in the affected are270. E.g., Haralson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 616,
619 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Angel v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2007-CA001521-MR, 2008 WL 2468873, at *2–3 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Garvis v. Emp’rs
Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 256–57 (Minn. 1993); Derousse v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); Tucker v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 215 P.3d 1, 5–6 (Mont. 2009); Allstate Ins. Co. v. WagnerEllsworth, 188 P.3d 1042, 1046 (Mont. 2008); see Bell, supra note 6 (illustrating the massive recent increase in insurance claims for bodily injury in the
United Kingdom); M. Jane Goode, Bodily Injury and Personal Injury, in 1 LAW
AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 6:11 (2011) (explaining
the evolution of the definition of the term “bodily injury” in the insurance law
context).
271. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 518 So. 2d 708, 708–09 (Ala. 1987). In
another case, residents asserted bodily injury claims for their mental distress
from their landlord’s negligence in the demolition and renovation of the
brownstones in which they lived. Lavanant v. General Accident Ins. Co. of
Am., 561 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
272. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. 1997).
273. Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1261 (N.J. 1992).

2013]

MIND, BODY, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

2115

274

as since the disaster. The American Psychiatric Association
has stated that BP should compensate those affected people for
their mental health claims, explaining in a news release that
“an entire way of life has been destroyed,” and this is causing
275
the increase in mental health issues, including PTSD. Nonetheless, the BP claims administrator, Kenneth Feinberg, testified to a House Judiciary Committee that mental health claims
without accompanying physical injury probably will not be in276
cluded in the claims that BP will pay.
Much litigation has arisen under the Warsaw Convention,
an international instrument that provides liability for the in277
ternational carriage of persons, luggage, and goods. The Supreme Court has ruled that purely emotional harm does not
meet the bodily injury requirement of Article 17 of the Conven278
tion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that physical manifestations of emotional harm are
not sufficient to prove the bodily injury requirement under the
279
Convention. Although a district court found that a passen280
ger’s PTSD should be covered, the decision was later vacated.
Tort determinations of what counts as bodily injury often
turn on whether the court first finds that the term “bodily injury” is ambiguous. The majority of courts find that the term is
not ambiguous, and follow the rule of contractual interpretation
that undefined terms should be interpreted according to their
plain and ordinary meaning, if one is available. Ultimately,
these courts conclude that mental harm does not fall within the
plain and ordinary meaning of “bodily.” The courts primarily
use two lines of reasoning to reach this conclusion: looking to
dictionary definitions of the word “bodily,” and versions of a
reasonable lay person test. For example, the Texas Supreme
274. Sasha Chavkin, Mental Health Claims from Oil Spill Probably Won’t
Be Paid, PROPUBLICA (July 27, 2010, 10:53 AM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/mental-health-claims-from-oil-spill-probably-wont-be-paid.
275. Rosemary Black, Oil Spill Related Mental Health Claims: Should BP
Have to Pay Up?, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://articles
.nydailynews.com/2010-08-18/news/27072910_1_oil-spill-health-claims-gulf-ofmexico-oil.
276. Chavkin, supra note 274.
277. 49 U.S.C. § 40105 hist. n. (2006); Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929,
49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934).
278. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991).
279. Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).
280. Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1192 (D. Mont.
1999), vacated, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont. 2002) (mem.).
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Court utilized both lines of reasoning in Trinity Universal In281
surance Co. v. Cowan. First, the court concluded that excluding purely mental harm “comports with the commonly understood meaning of ‘bodily,’ which implies a physical, and not
282
purely mental, emotional, or spiritual harm.” The court further supported its conclusion with the definitions of “bodily”
from both Webster’s (“having a body or a material form: physical, corporeal”) and Black’s Law Dictionary (“pertaining to or
concerning the body; of or belonging to the body or the physical
283
constitution; not mental, but corporeal”).
A few courts, however, have held that “bodily injury” is
ambiguous, and that the term can encompass mental and emotional harm. Sometimes additional language in a policy or statute allows the court to make such a finding. The Missouri Supreme Court interpreted a statute that allowed the recovery of
damages from uninsured motorists for “bodily injury, sickness
284
or disease.” The court found this language to be ambiguous as
to whether “bodily” modified only “injury” or also “sickness or
285
disease.” The court relied on the comma following “bodily injury” to determine that the “bodily” modified only “injury” and
that the statute created three distinct categories of harm: (1)
286
bodily injury, (2) sickness, and (3) disease. The court looked
to the dictionary definitions of “sickness” and “disease” and ultimately concluded that emotional harm alone, even without
physical manifestations, was compensable under the “sickness
287
or disease” prong.

281. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 823–24 (Tex.
1997).
282. Id. at 823.
283. Id. at 824; see also Aim Ins. Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal. App. 3d 209, 219
(1991) (concluding from seven dictionary definitions that “bodily” does not reasonably encompass mental harm).
284. Derousse v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
285. Id. at 895.
286. Id.
287. Id. Other courts have made the same finding to allow coverage for
mental harm. In Morrison Assurance Co. v. North American Reinsurance
Corp., the court analyzed a policy definition of “bodily injury” that included
“sickness” and “disease.” 588 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff’d, 760
F.2d 279 (11th Cir. 1985). The court held that bodily injury, sickness, and disease were distinct categories and that mental anguish is necessarily included
in the terms “sickness” and “disease.” Id. Citing Morrison, the Alabama Supreme Court later also held that the language “sickness or disease” includes
mental anguish. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 518 So. 2d 708, 710 (Ala. 1987).
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Other courts have introduced a reasonable person test into
this analysis as well, finding that it is reasonable to conclude
288
that “bodily injury” or “sickness” includes mental anguish.
That courts can use the same mode of analysis, some version of
a reasonable/ordinary person standard, and arrive at different
outcomes is further indication that the standard itself is in
need of re-examination.
While few courts have found that mental harm alone is a
“bodily injury,” most seem to agree that mental harm accompanied by physical manifestations can be sufficient to trigger in289
surance coverage. Courts arrive at this conclusion in various
ways. In some cases, courts have found that the issue of physical manifestations of mental harm creates an ambiguity in contract or statutory language regarding bodily injuries. According
to these courts, while the definitions of bodily injury clearly exclude purely mental harm, it is unclear from the plain meaning
of the term whether physical manifestations of mental harm
should be included. For instance, physical manifestations of
PTSD may include weight loss, hair loss, stomach pains, and
290
muscle aches. The courts then rely on a well-established rule
that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured party,
in other words, in favor of extending coverage, to conclude that
mental harm accompanied by physical manifestations can con291
stitute “bodily injury.”
Other courts include mental harm with physical manifestations on policy grounds, making a comparison to tort law. The
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that it is appropriate to
include mental harm with physical manifestations because insurance policies are “designed to protect the insured against
tortious conduct” and “there is tort law recognizing infliction of
emotional distress as a viable cause of action if accompanied by
292
physical manifestations.” Some courts have used a reasonable
288. Hill v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 935 So. 2d 691, 694 (La. 2006); Lavanant
v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 561 N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
289. E.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. Hosler, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1114 (D. Colo.
2009); Haralson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622–
25 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Garvis v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257
(Minn. 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d 1042, 1051
(Mont. 2008); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1261 (N.J.
1992); Trinh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 37 P.3d 1259, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
290. Trinh, 37 P.3d at 1264.
291. Haralson, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 625; Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d at
1051; Voorhees, 607 A.2d at 1261.
292. Garvis, 497 N.W.2d at 257. On the other hand, the Texas Supreme
Court declined to make such a comparison to tort law when it would have af-
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lay person test, finding that such a reasonable person would
expect insurance coverage for bodily injury to include physical293
ly-manifested emotional harm.
A final, useful illustration comes from asbestos litigation in
the context of the comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy.
Insurers first developed the CGL in the 1960s, and in it they
defined bodily injury as “bodily injury, sickness or disease sus294
tained by any person.” In cases such as asbestos-induced
abestosis, insurance coverage under CGL policies is triggered
295
when an occurrence of the disease causes bodily injury. The
problem, which has been identified by commentators and litigated in courts, is that “the CGL policy does not define ‘bodily
injury’ in a way to make clear exactly (1) what counts as such
injury, i.e., what is the proper definition of the term ‘bodily in296
jury,’ and (2) when it occurs.”
How do courts resolve this issue? There are competing rationales to be found in the opinions. Based on public policy considerations, for example, “finding an administratively manageable interpretation, honoring the reasonable expectations of the
297
parties, and construing the policies to promote coverage,”
some courts have ruled that the microscopic tissue damage
298
caused by asbestos exposure constitutes bodily injury. Similarly, although coming to a different conclusion on the facts in
front of it, another court found that because the scientific evidence and contractual language were not definitive, public poli299
cy considerations should rule.
forded coverage for purely emotional harm. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. 1997) (citation omitted) (“That Texas tort law
allows for recovery of mental anguish damages unaccompanied by physical
manifestations in some circumstances does not mean that insurance coverage
for bodily injury necessarily encompasses purely emotional injuries.”); see also
Hosler, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1114 (“[T]ort cases are of limited value in guiding
consideration of the insurance law issues in the instant case. ‘Tort law and insurance law are not coextensive’” (quoting SL Indus. Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins.
Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1275 (1992)).
293. Voorhees, 607 A.2d at 1261; Trinh, 37 P.3d at 1264.
294. James E. Scheuermann, The Injury in Fact Theory as a Solution to the
Trigger of Coverage Issue, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 763, 767–68 (1989).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 768.
297. Id. at 774 n.53.
298. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212, 1217–18 (6th Cir. 1980).
299. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
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An alternative approach is that this type of microscopic tissue damage is not bodily injury because it does not fall under
“the common ordinary meaning” of the term, where such common ordinary meaning is defined as “an injury, sickness, or
disease when her sense of well-being is adversely affected or
300
impaired.”
In practice, courts in the asbestos context have tried to articulate a principle of severity, rather than type. In a leading
case in this area, American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the trial court ruled that to be covered by
the policy, the plaintiff’s injuries must be “diagnosable and
301
compensable.”
Analyzing this body of case law on injury in fact in tort
suits, attorney and philosopher James Scheuermann has argued “[t]here is no principle—metaphysical, linguistic, hermeneutical, or other—by which physical facts alone determine
302
meanings.” Thus, Scheuermann recognizes that there is a
reasonable person standard being applied to identify those in303
juries that a reasonable person would find non-trivial. The
problem is that “the definition of bodily injury in terms of the
counterfactual beliefs of a reasonable person . . . [is] an idea
which itself is little more than an ad hoc empirical generaliza304
tion.” This Article has attempted to move beyond ad hoc generalizations in the criminal context.

300. Scheuermann, supra note 294, at 774 n.56; see, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1982).
301. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485,
1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984). The appellate court affirmed the decision in general but rejected its interpretation of
“injury in fact” to mean that an injury was diagnosable and compensable. Id.
at 764.
302. Scheuermann, supra note 294, at 776. Scheuermann goes on to argue
that the bodily injury definitional question “is always to be solved by an appeal to criteria of meaning such as the intentions of the parties, their reasonable expectations, course of performance, or the like.” Id.
303. Scheuermann argues that “the law is not concerned with trivialities
and no one insures against them (i.e., trivialities such as the initial microscopic injuries to lungs that follow upon exposure to and inhalation of asbestos, but
which very often do not result in asbestosis), and no one seriously believes that
substantial injury in progressive disease cases occurs only upon manifestation.” Id. at 780.
304. Id. at 782.
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Table A1
Selected Definitions of Bodily Injury Used in Tort
and Insurance Law
Source
Warsaw Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna305
tional Transportation by Air)
Trinity Universal Insurance
Company standard homeown306
er’s insurance policy
State Farm uninsured motorist
307
policy
Morrison Assurance Company
basic liability insurance poli308
cy
American States Insurance
Company Comprehensive Gen309
eral Liability Coverage
Shelter Mutual Insurance
310
Company Policy
General Accident Insurance
311
Company multi-peril policy
Pekin Insurance Company un312
derinsured motorist policy
313
Allstate auto insurance policy
Employers Mutual Casualty
Company comprehensive gen-

Definition
Not defined (has led to much litigation, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 520
(1991).
Bodily harm, sickness or disease. This includes required care, loss of services and
death that results.
Bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it.
Bodily injury, sickness or disease . . . including death at anytime resulting therefrom.
Bodily injury, sickness or disease.
Bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it.
Bodily injury, sickness or disease.
Bodily harm, sickness or disease including
death that results.
Physical harm to the body, sickness, disease, or death.
Bodily injury, sickness, or Disease sustained by a person.

305. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, supra note 277.
306. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. 1997).
307. Derousse v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 298 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
308. Morrison Assurance Co. v. N. Am. Reinsurance Corp., 588 F. Supp.
1324, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
309. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 518 So. 2d 708, 710 (Ala. 1987).
310. Hill v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 935 So. 2d 691, 694 (La. 2006).
311. Lavanant v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 561 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
312. Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hugh, 501 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Iowa 1993).
313. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d 1042, 1051 (Mont.
2008).
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314

eral liability policy
Preferred Mutual Insurance
Company homeowner’s insur315
ance policy
Allstate uninsured motorist
316
policy
317
Farmers Insurance Exchange

Bodily harm, sickness or disease to a person
including required care, loss of services and
death resulting therefrom.
Bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.
Bodily injury to or sickness, disease or
death of any person.

Table A2
Definitions of Bodily Injury, Serious Bodily Injury,
and Assault, by State
State

Bodily
Injury

Alabama

Physical Injury. Impairment of physical
condition or substantial pain. ALA. CODE
§ 13A-1-2(12) (2012).

314.
315.
316.
317.

(or

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple
sault

As-

Serious Physical Injury. Physical injury
which creates a substantial risk of death,
or which causes serious
and protracted disfigurement, protracted
impairment of health,
or protracted loss or
impairment of the
function of any bodily
organ. ALA. CODE
§ 13A-1-2(14) (2012).

(a) A person
commits the
crime of assault in the
third degree
if: (1) With
intent to
cause physical injury to
another person, he causes physical
injury to any
person; or (2)
He recklessly
causes physical injury to
another person. ALA.
CODE § 13A6-22 (2012).

Garvis v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1993).
Vorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1258 (N.J. 1992).
Trinh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 37 P.3d 1259, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
Tucker v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 215 P.3d 1, 5 (Mont. 2009).
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Bodily (or Physical)
Injury
“[P]hysical injury”
means a physical pain
or an impairment of
physical condition.
ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.900(46) (2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
“[S]erious physical injury” means (A) physical injury caused by an
act performed under
circumstances that
create a substantial
risk of death; or (B)
physical injury that
causes serious and protracted disfigurement,
protracted impairment
of health, protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of a body
member or organ, or
that unlawfully terminates a pregnancy.
ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.900(56) (2012).

[97:2036
Simple Assault
Assault in
the Fourth
Degree. (a) A
person commits the
crime of assault in the
fourth degree if (1)
that person
recklessly
causes physical injury to
another person; (2) with
criminal negligence that
person causes physical
injury to another person
by means of
a dangerous
instrument;
or (3) by
words or
other conduct that
person recklessly places
another person in fear of
imminent
physical injury. (b) Assault in the
fourth degree is a
class A misdemeanor.
ALASKA
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Arizona

“Physical injury”
means the impairment
of physical condition.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13105(33) (2012).
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Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
STAT.
§ 11.41.230
(2012).

“Serious physical injury” includes physical
injury that creates a
reasonable risk of
death, or that causes
serious and permanent
disfigurement, serious
impairment of health
or loss or protracted
impairment of the
function of any bodily
organ or limb. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13105(39) (2012).

A person
commits assault by: 1.
Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
causing any
physical injury to another person;
or 2. Intentionally placing another
person in
reasonable
apprehension of imminent physical injury;
or 3. Knowingly touching another
person with
the intent to
injure, insult
or provoke
such person.
ARIZ. REV.
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(or
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State

Bodily
Injury

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
STAT. § 131203 (2012).

Arkansas

“Physical injury”
means the: (A) Impairment of physical
condition; (B) Infliction
of substantial pain; or
(C) Infliction of bruising, swelling, or a visible mark associated
with physical trauma.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1102 (14) (2010).

“Serious physical injury” means physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death
or that causes protracted disfigurement,
protracted impairment
of health, or loss or
protracted impairment
of the function of any
bodily member or organ. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-1-102 (21) (2010).

California

The term “bodily injury” shall include sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom. CAL. INS.
CODE § 11580.06(c)
(2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means a serious impairment of physical
condition, including,
but not limited to, the
following: loss of consciousness; concussion;
bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any
bodily member or organ; a wound requiring
extensive suturing; and

(a) A person
commits assault in the
third degree
if he or she
purposely
creates apprehension
of imminent
physical injury in another person.
ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-13318
207 (2010).
An assault is
an unlawful
attempt,
coupled with
a present
ability, to
commit a violent injury
on the person of another. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 240 (2012).

318. ARK. CODE § 5-13-203 (2010) (“A person commits battery in the third
degree if: (1) With the purpose of causing physical injury to another person,
the person causes physical injury to any person; (2) The person recklessly
causes physical injury to another person.”).
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State

Bodily
Injury

Colorado

Connecticut

(or

Physical)
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Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
serious disfigurement.
CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 243(f)(4) (2012).

Simple
sault

As-

“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, illness,
or any impairment of
physical or mental
condition. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-901(3)(c)
(2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
which, either at the
time of the actual injury or at a later time,
involves a substantial
risk of death, a substantial risk of serious
permanent disfigurement, a substantial
risk of protracted loss
or impairment of the
function of any part or
organ of the body, or
breaks, fractures, or
burns of the second or
third degree. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1901(3)(p) (2012).

“Physical injury”
means impairment of
physical condition or
pain. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-3(3) (2012).

“Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a
substantial risk of
death, or which causes
serious disfigurement,
serious impairment of
health or serious loss
or impairment of the
function of any bodily
organ. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-3(4) (2012).

(1) A person
commits the
crime of assault in the
third degree
if: (a) The
person knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury
to another
person or
with criminal negligence the
person causes bodily injury to another person
by means of
a deadly
weapon.
COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3204 (2012).
(a) A person
is guilty of
assault in
the third degree when:
(1) With intent to cause
physical injury to another person,
he causes
such injury
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Delaware

“Physical injury”
means impairment of
physical condition or
substantial pain. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 222(24) (2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

“Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a
substantial risk of
death, or which causes
serious and prolonged
disfigurement, prolonged impairment of
health or prolonged
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily organ, or which
causes the unlawful

[97:2036
Simple Assault
to such person or to a
third person;
or (2) he
recklessly
causes serious physical
injury to another person;
or (3) with
criminal negligence, he
causes physical injury to
another person by
means of a
deadly
weapon, a
dangerous
instrument
or an electronic defense weapon. CONN.
GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-61
(2012).
A person is
guilty of assault in the
third degree
when: (1)
The person
intentionally
or recklessly
causes physical injury to
another person; or (2)
With crimi-
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
termination of a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant
female. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 222(26)
(2012).

Florida

(1) “Bodily injury”
means: (a) A cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or
disfigurement; (b)
Physical pain; (c) Illness; (d) Impairment of
the function of a bodily
member, organ, or
mental faculty; or (e)
Any other injury to the
body, no matter how
temporary. FLA. STAT.
§ 914.21 (2012).

“Serious bodily injury’’
means a physical condition that creates a
substantial risk of
death, serious personal
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or
organ. FLA. STAT.
§ 790.155 (2012).
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Simple Assault
nal negligence the
person causes physical
injury to another person
by means of
a deadly
weapon or a
dangerous
instrument.
DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11,
§ 611 (2012).
(1) An “assault” is an
intentional,
unlawful
threat by
word or act
to do violence to the
person of another, coupled with an
apparent
ability to do
so, and doing
some act,
which creates a wellfounded fear
in such other
person that
such violence
is imminent.
FLA. STAT.
§ 784.011
319
(2012).

319. See also FLA. STAT. § 784.045 (2012) (“A person commits aggravated
battery who, in committing battery: 1. Intentionally or knowingly causes great
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State
Georgia

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Bodily (or
Injury
Not defined.

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
Not defined.

[97:2036
Simple Assault
(a) A person
commits the
offense of
battery when
he or she intentionally
causes substantial
physical
harm or visible bodily
harm to another. (b) As
used in this
Code section,
the term
“visible bodily harm”
means bodily
harm capable of being
perceived by
a person
other than
the victim
and may include, but is
not limited
to, substantially blackened eyes,
substantially
swollen lips
or other facial or body
parts, or
substantial
bruises to
body parts.

bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or 2. Uses a
deadly weapon.”).
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Hawaii

“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, illness,
or any impairment of
physical condition.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707700 (2012).
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Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-523.1 (2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death
or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily member or organ. HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-700 (2012).

(1) A person
commits the
offense of
assault in
the third degree if the
person: (a)
Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes
bodily injury
to another
person; or (b)
Negligently
causes bodily
injury to another person
with a dangerous instrument.
HAW. REV.
STAT. § 707712 (2012).
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State
Idaho

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Bodily (or Physical)
Injury
“Bodily injury” means
any bodily injury, sickness, disease or death
sustained by any person and caused by an
occurrence. IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 6-902
(2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
(2) As used in this section, “great bodily injury” means a significant
or substantial physical
injury. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-2520B(2)
(2012).

[97:2036
Simple Assault
An assault
is: (a) An unlawful attempt, coupled with
apparent
ability, to
commit a violent injury
on the person of another; or (b) An
intentional,
unlawful
threat by
word or act
to do violence to the
person of another, coupled with an
apparent
ability to do
so, and doing
some act
which creates a wellfounded fear
in such other
person that
such violence
is imminent.
IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18901 (2012).
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Illinois

Indiana
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Bodily (or
Injury
Not defined.

Physical)

“Bodily injury” means
any impairment of
physical condition, including physical pain.
IND. CODE § 35-31.5-229 (2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
§ 2.19a. “Serious physical injury” means a
physical injury that
creates a substantial
risk of death or that
causes death, serious
disfigurement, protracted impairment of
health, impairment of
the function of any
bodily organ, or plastic
surgery. 510 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5 / 2.19a
(2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
that creates a substantial risk of death or
that causes: (1) serious
permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain;
(4) permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
a bodily member or organ; or (5) loss of a fetus. IND. CODE § 3531.5-2-292 (2012).
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Simple Assault
(a) A person
commits an
assault
when, without lawful
authority, he
or she knowingly engages in conduct
which places
another in
reasonable
apprehension of receiving a
battery. 720
ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5 / 12320
1 (2012).
(a) A person
who knowingly or intentionally
touches another person
in a rude,
insolent, or
angry manner commits
battery, a
Class B misdemeanor.
However, the
offense is: (1)
a Class A
misdemeanor if: (A) it

320. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 12-3 (2012) (“(a) A person commits battery if
he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily
harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.”).
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Iowa

Not defined.

Physical)

[97:2036

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
results in
bodily injury
to any other
person; IND.
CODE § 3542-2-1
(2012).

“Serious injury” means
any of the following: a.
Disabling mental illness. b. Bodily injury
which does any of the
following: (1) Creates a
substantial risk of
death. (2) Causes serious permanent disfigurement. (3) Causes
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ. c.
Any injury to a child
that requires surgical
repair and necessitates
the administration of
general anesthesia. 2.
“Serious injury” includes but is not limited to skull fractures,
rib fractures, and
metaphyseal fractures
of the long bones of
children under the age
of four years. IOWA
CODE § 702.18 (2012).

An assault
as defined in
this section
is a general
intent crime.
A person
commits an
assault
when, without justification, the person does any
of the following: 1. Any
act which is
intended to
cause pain or
injury to, or
which is intended to
result in
physical contact which
will be insulting or
offensive to
another,
coupled with
the apparent
ability to execute the act.
2. Any act
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Kansas

Not defined.

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

(4) “[S]erious bodily
injury” means an injury as described in subsection (h)(3) of section
1365 of title 18 of the
United States Code.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72321
991a(g)(4) (2012).
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Simple Assault
which is intended to
place another in fear of
immediate
physical contact which
will be painful, injurious, insulting, or
offensive,
coupled with
the apparent
ability to execute the act.
IOWA CODE
§ 708.1
(2012).
Assault is
knowingly
placing another person
in reasonable apprehension of
immediate
bodily harm.
KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 215412 (2012).

321. See 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3) (2006) (“The term ‘serious bodily injury’
means bodily injury which involves: (A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty.”).
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State
Kentucky

Louisiana

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Bodily (or Physical)
Injury
“Physical injury”
means substantial
physical pain or any
impairment of physical
condition. KY. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 500.080(13) (West
2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
“Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a
substantial risk of
death, or which causes
serious and prolonged
disfigurement, prolonged impairment of
health, or prolonged
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily organ. KY. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 500.080(15) (West
2012).

Not defined.

B. For purposes of this
Section [Second Degree
Battery] . . . “Serious
bodily injury” means
bodily injury, which
involves unconsciousness, extreme physical
pain or protracted and
obvious disfigurement,
or protracted loss or
impairment of the
function of a bodily
member, organ, or
mental faculty, or a

[97:2036
Simple Assault
A person is
guilty of assault in the
fourth degree when:
(a) He intentionally or
wantonly
causes physical injury to
another person; or (b)
With recklessness he
causes physical injury to
another person by
means of a
deadly
weapon or a
dangerous
instrument.
KY. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 508.030
(West 2012).
Assault is an
attempt to
commit a
battery, or
the intentional placing of another in
reasonable
apprehension of receiving a
battery. LA.
REV. STAT.
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(or
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State

Bodily
Injury

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
substantial risk of
death. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:34.1 (2012).

Simple Assault
ANN. § 14:36
322
(2012).

Maine

“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, physical
illness or any impairment of physical condition. ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 17-A, § 2 (2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means a bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death
or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or loss or substantial impairment of
the function of any
bodily member or organ, or extended convalescence necessary
for recovery of physical
health. ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 17-A, § 2 (2012).

A person is
guilty of assault if: A.
The person
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury
or offensive
physical contact to another person.
Violation of
this paragraph is a
Class D
crime; or B.
The person
has attained
at least 18
years of age
and intentionally,
knowingly or
recklessly
causes bodily
injury to another person

322. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:33 (2012) (“Battery is the intentional use of force
or violence upon the person of another; or the intentional administration of a
poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another.”).
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State

Bodily
Injury

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
who is less
than 6 years
of age. Violation of this
paragraph is
a Class C
crime. ME.
REV. STAT.
tit. 17-A,
§ 207 (2012).

Maryland

“[P]hysical injury”
means any impairment
of physical condition,
excluding minor injuries.
MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW
§ 3-203(c)(1) (2012).

“Serious physical injury” means physical injury that: (1) creates a
substantial risk of
death; or (2) causes
permanent or protracted serious: (i) disfigurement; (ii) loss of the
function of any bodily
member or organ; or
(iii) impairment of the
function of any bodily
member or organ.
MD. CODE., CRIM. LAW
§ 3-201(d) (2012).

Massachusetts

Not defined.

“Serious bodily injury”
shall mean bodily injury that results in a
permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb or organ, or
a substantial risk of
death. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 13A(c)
(2012).

“Assault”
means the
crimes of assault, battery, and assault and
battery,
which retain
their judicially determined meanings. MD.
CODE, CRIM.
LAW § 3201(b)
(2012).
“[D]efinition
of assault is
an attempt
or threat to
do bodily
323
harm.”

323. Commonwealth v. Gorassi, 733 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Mass. 2000) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 885 (Mass. 1975)).
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Minnesota
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Bodily (or
Injury
Not defined.

Physical)

“Bodily harm” means
physical pain or injury,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition. MINN. STAT.
§ 609.02(7) (2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
(8) For purposes of
subsection (3), “serious
bodily injury” means
each of the following:
(a) Bodily injury that
involves a substantial
risk of death. (b) Unconsciousness. (c) Extreme physical pain.
(d) Protracted and obvious disfigurement. (e)
Protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 324.11151
(2012).
“Great bodily harm”
means bodily injury
which creates a high
probability of death, or
which causes serious
permanent disfigurement, or which causes
a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or
organ or other serious
bodily harm. MINN.
STAT. § 609.02(8)
(2012).
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Simple Assault
“[A] simple
criminal assault is made
out from either an attempt to
commit a
battery or an
unlawful act
which places
another in
reasonable
apprehension of receiving an
immediate
324
battery.
Whoever
does any of
the following
commits an
assault and
is guilty of a
misdemeanor: (1) commits an act
with intent
to cause fear
in another of
immediate
bodily harm
or death; or
(2) intentionally inflicts or attempts to
inflict bodily
harm upon

324. People v. Johnson, 284 N.W.2d 718, 718 (Mich. 1979) (quoting People
v. Sanford, 265 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 1978)).
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Mississippi

Not defined.

Physical)

325. From Child Neglect Section.
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Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
another.
MINN. STAT.
§ 609.224
(2012).

“Serious bodily harm,”
within the meaning of
the felony child abuse
statute, means bodily
injury which creates a
substantial risk of
death, or permanent or
temporary disfigurement, or impairment of
any function of any
bodily organ or function. MISS. CODE ANN.
325
§ 97-5-39 (2012).

(1)(a) A person is guilty
of simple assault if he (i)
attempts to
cause or
purposely,
knowingly or
recklessly
causes bodily
injury to another; (ii)
negligently
causes bodily
injury to another with a
deadly
weapon or
other means
likely to produce death
or serious
bodily harm;
or (iii) attempts by
physical
menace to
put another
in fear of
imminent
serious bodi-
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State

Bodily
Injury

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
ly harm.
MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-37 (2012).

Missouri

“Physical injury”
means physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition; MO. REV. STAT.
§ 556.061(20) (2012).

“Serious physical injury” means physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death
or that causes serious
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any part of the body.
MO. REV. STAT.
§ 565.002(6) (2012).

1. A person
commits the
crime of assault in the
third degree
if: (1) The
person attempts to
cause or
recklessly
causes physical injury to
another person; or (2)
With criminal negligence the
person causes physical
injury to another person
by means of
a deadly
weapon; or
(3) The person purposely places another person
in apprehension of immediate
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Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

[97:2036
Simple Assault
physical injury; or (4)
The person
recklessly
engages in
conduct
which creates a grave
risk of death
or serious
physical injury to another person;
or (5) The
person knowingly causes
physical contact with another person
knowing the
other person
will regard
the contact
as offensive
or provocative. MO.
REV. STAT.
§ 565.070
(2012).

2013]
State
Montana

MIND, BODY, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
Bodily (or Physical)
Injury
“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, illness,
or an impairment of
physical condition and
includes mental illness
or impairment. MON.
CODE ANN. § 45-2101(5) (2011).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
that: (i) creates a substantial risk of death;
(ii) causes serious permanent disfigurement
or protracted loss or
impairment of the
function or process of a
bodily member or organ; or (iii) at the time
of injury, can reasonably be expected to result in serious permanent disfigurement or
protracted loss or impairment of the function or process of a bodily member or organ.
(b) The term includes
serious mental illness
or impairment. MON.
CODE ANN. § 45-2101(66) (2011).
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Simple Assault
A person
commits the
offense of
assault if the
person: (a)
purposely or
knowingly
causes bodily
injury to another; (b)
negligently
causes bodily
injury to another with a
weapon; (c)
purposely or
knowingly
makes physical contact
of an insulting or provoking nature with
any individual; or (d)
purposely or
knowingly
causes reasonable apprehension
of bodily injury in another. MON.
CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-201(1)
(2011).

2142
State
Nebraska

Nevada
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Bodily (or Physical)
Injury
Bodily injury shall
mean physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-109(4) (2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
Serious bodily injury
shall mean bodily injury which involves a
substantial risk of
death, or which involves substantial risk
of serious permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any part or organ of
the body; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-109(20)
(2012).

“Physical injury” includes, without limitation: 1. A sprain or dislocation; 2. Damage to
cartilage; 3. A fracture
of a bone or the skull;
4. An intracranial
hemorrhage or injury
to another internal organ; 5. A burn or scalding; 6. A cut, laceration, puncture or bite;
7. Permanent or temporary disfigurement;
or 8. Permanent or
temporary loss or impairment of a part or
organ of the body. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 432B.090
(2011).

Unless the context otherwise requires, “substantial bodily harm”
means: 1. Bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death
or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily member or organ; or 2. Prolonged
physical pain.
NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 0.060 (2011).

[97:2036
Simple Assault
(1) A person
commits the
offense of
assault in
the third degree if he: (a)
Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes
bodily injury
to another
person; or (b)
Threatens
another in a
menacing
manner.
NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28310 (2012).
(a) “Assault”
means: (1)
Unlawfully
attempting
to use physical force
against another person;
or (2) Intentionally placing another
person in
reasonable
apprehension of immediate bodily harm.
NEV. REV.
STAT.
§ 200.471
(2011).

2013]
State
New
Hampshire

New Jersey

MIND, BODY, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
Bodily (or
Injury
Not defined.

Physical)

“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, illness
or any impairment of
physical condition; N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2C:11-1(a)
(2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
“Serious bodily injury”
means any harm to the
body which causes severe, permanent or
protracted loss of or
impairment to the
health or of the function of any part of the
body. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 625:11 (2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death
or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily member or organ. N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2C:11-1(b) (2012).
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Simple Assault
I. A person is
guilty of
simple assault if he:
(a) Purposely
or knowingly
causes bodily
injury or unprivileged
physical contact to another; or (b)
Recklessly
causes bodily
injury to another; or (c)
Negligently
causes bodily
injury to another by
means of a
deadly
weapon.
N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 631:2-a
(2012).
A person is
guilty of assault if he:
(1) Attempts
to cause or
purposely,
knowingly or
recklessly
causes bodily
injury to another; or (2)
Negligently
causes bodily
injury to an-
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

New
Mexico

A. “[B]odily injury”
means an injury to a
person that is not likely to cause death or
great bodily harm to
the person, but does
cause painful temporary disfigurement or
temporary loss or impairment of the functions of any member or
organ of the person’s
body;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6613-2 (2012).

“[G]reat bodily harm”
means an injury to the
person which creates a
high probability of
death; or which causes
serious disfigurement;
or which results in
permanent or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any
member or organ of the
body. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-1-12(A) (2012).
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Simple Assault
other with a
deadly
weapon; or
(3) Attempts
by physical
menace to
put another
in fear of
imminent
serious bodily injury.
N.J. REV.
STAT.
§ 2C:12-1
(2012).
Assault consists of either: A. an
attempt to
commit a
battery upon
the person of
another; B.
any unlawful
act, threat or
menacing
conduct
which causes
another person to reasonably believe that he
is in danger
of receiving
an immediate battery;
or C. the use
of insulting
language toward another impugn-
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

New York

“Physical injury”
means impairment of
physical condition or
substantial pain. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 10.00(9)
(McKinney 2012).

2145

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
ing his honor, delicacy
or reputation. N.M.
STAT. ANN.
§ 30-3-1
(2012).

“Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a
substantial risk of
death, or which causes
death or serious and
protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 10.00(10) (McKinney
2012).

A person is
guilty of assault in the
third degree
when: 1.
With intent
to cause
physical injury to another person,
he causes
such injury
to such person or to a
third person;
or 2. He
recklessly
causes physical injury to
another person; or 3.
With criminal negligence, he
causes physical injury to
another person by
means of a
deadly
weapon or a
dangerous
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

North
Carolina

Not defined.

North
Dakota

“Bodily injury” means
any impairment of
physical condition, including physical pain.
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-01-04 (2011).
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Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
instrument.
N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.00
(McKinney
2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
is defined as bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death,
or that causes serious
permanent disfigurement, coma, a permanent or protracted condition that causes
extreme pain, or permanent or protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily member or organ, or that results in
prolonged hospitalization. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-32.4 (2012).
“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
that creates a substantial risk of death or
which causes serious
permanent disfigurement, unconsciousness,
extreme pain, permanent loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or

“An assault
is an intentional attempt, by
violence, to
do injury to
the person of
326
another.”

A person is
guilty of an
offense if
that person:
a. Willfully
causes bodily
injury to another human
being; or b.
Negligently
causes bodily

326. State v. Britt, 154 S.E.2d 519, 521 (N.C. 1967) (citing State v. Davis,
23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 125, 127 (N.C. 1840)).
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Ohio

“Physical harm to persons” means any injury, illness, or other
physiological impairment, regardless of its
gravity or duration.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.01(3) (West
2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
organ, a bone fracture,
or impediment of air
flow or blood flow to
the brain or lungs.
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-01-04 (2011).

“Serious physical harm
to persons” means any
of the following: (a)
Any mental illness or
condition of such gravity as would normally
require hospitalization
or prolonged psychiatric treatment; (b) Any
physical harm that
carries a substantial
risk of death; (c) Any
physical harm that involves some permanent
incapacity, whether
partial or total, or that
involves some temporary, substantial incapacity; (d) Any physical
harm that involves
some permanent disfigurement or that involves some temporary,
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Simple Assault
injury to another human
being by
means of a
firearm, destructive device, or other
weapon, the
use of which
against a
human being
is likely to
cause death
or serious
bodily injury.
N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.117-01 (2011).
(A) No person shall
knowingly
cause or attempt to
cause physical harm to
another or to
another’s
unborn. (B)
No person
shall recklessly cause
serious physical harm to
another or to
another’s
unborn.
OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.
§ 2903.13
(West 2012).
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State

Bodily
Injury

Oklahoma

Oregon

(or

Physical)
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Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
serious disfigurement;
(e) Any physical harm
that involves acute
pain of such duration
as to result in substantial suffering or that
involves any degree of
prolonged or intractable pain. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.
§ 2901.01(5) (West
2012).

Simple
sault

As-

Not defined.

“[G]reat bodily injury”
means bone fracture,
protracted and obvious
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of
a body part, organ or
mental faculty, or substantial risk of death.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 646(B) (2012).

An assault is
any willful
and unlawful
attempt or
offer with
force or violence to do a
corporal hurt
to another.
OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 641
327
(2012).

“Physical injury”
means impairment of
physical condition or
substantial pain. OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.015(7)
(2012).

“Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a
substantial risk of
death or which causes
serious and protracted
disfigurement, protracted impairment of

A person
commits the
crime of assault in the
fourth degree if the
person: (a)
Intentional-

327. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 642 (2012) (“A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.”).
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Pennsylvania

“Bodily injury.” Impairment of physical
condition or substantial pain. 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2301 (2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
health or protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily organ. OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.015(8)
(2012).

“Serious bodily injury.”
Bodily injury which
creates a substantial
risk of death or which
causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ. 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2301
(2012).
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Simple Assault
ly, knowingly or recklessly causes
physical injury to another; or (b)
With criminal negligence causes
physical injury to another by
means of a
deadly
weapon. OR.
REV. STAT.
§ 163.160(1)
(2012).
(a) Offense
defined.—A
person is
guilty of assault if he:
(1) attempts
to cause or
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury
to another;
(2) negligently causes
bodily injury
to another
with a deadly weapon;
(3) attempts
by physical
menace to
put another
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State

Bodily
Injury

Rhode
Island

South
Carolina

(or

Physical)
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Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
in fear of
imminent
serious bodily injury. 18
PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2701
(2012).

Not defined.

“Serious bodily injury”
means physical injury
that: (1) Creates a substantial risk of death;
(2) Causes protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily part, member or
organ; or (3) Causes
serious permanent disfigurement or circumcises, excises or infibulates the whole or any
part of the labia
majora or labia minora
or clitoris of a person.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52(c) (2012).

“An assault,
as ordinarily
defined, is
any unlawful
attempt or
offer, with
force or violence, to do a
corporal hurt
to another,
whether
from malice
or wantonness. The
offence may
consist, also,
in putting
another in
fear of vio328
lence.”

“Physical injury”
means death or permanent or temporary
disfigurement or impairment of any bodily
organ or function. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 63-720(18) (2012).

“Great bodily injury”
means bodily injury
which causes a substantial risk of death
or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of a bodily
member or organ. S.C.

A person
commits the
offense of
assault and
battery in
the third degree if the
person unlawfully injures anoth-

328. State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183, 186 (R.I. 1988) (citing State v. Baker,
38 A. 653, 654 (R.I. 1897)).
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

South
Dakota

Not defined.

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
CODE ANN. § 16-3600(A)(1) (2012).

“Serious bodily injury,”
such injury as is grave
and not trivial, and
gives rise to apprehension of danger to life,
health, or limb. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-12(44A) (2012).
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Simple Assault
er person, or
offers or attempts to
injure another person
with the present ability
to do so. S.C.
CODE ANN.
§ 16-3600(E)(1)
(2012).
Any person
who: (1) Attempts to
cause bodily
injury to another and
has the actual ability
to cause the
injury; (2)
Recklessly
causes bodily
injury to another; (3)
Negligently
causes bodily
injury to another with a
dangerous
weapon; (4)
Attempts by
physical
menace or
credible
threat to put
another in
fear of imminent bodily harm,
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State

Bodily
Injury

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
with or without the actual ability to
harm the
other person.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-18-1
(2012).

Tennessee

“Bodily injury” includes a cut, abrasion,
bruise, burn or disfigurement, and physical
pain or temporary illness or impairment of
the function of a bodily
member, organ, or
mental faculty; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11106(2) (2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
that involves: (A) A
substantial risk of
death; (B) Protracted
unconsciousness; (C)
Extreme physical pain;
(D) Protracted or obvious disfigurement; (E)
Protracted loss or substantial impairment of
a function of a bodily
member, organ or mental faculty; or (F) A
broken bone of a child
who is eight (8) years
of age or less. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11106(34) (2012).

A person
commits assault who:
(1) Intentionally,
knowingly or
recklessly
causes bodily
injury to another; (2) Intentionally
or knowingly
causes another to reasonably fear
imminent
bodily injury;
or (3) Intentionally or
knowingly
causes physical contact
with another
and a reasonable person would
regard the
contact as
extremely
offensive or
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Texas

“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, illness,
or any impairment of
physical condition.
TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 1.07(8) (2011).
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Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
provocative.
TENN. CODE
ANN. § 3913-101(a)
(2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
that creates a substantial risk of death or
that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the
function of any bodily
member or organ. TEX.
PENAL CODE § 1.07(46)
(2011).

(a) A person
commits an
offense if the
person: (1)
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes
bodily injury
to another,
including the
person’s
spouse; (2)
intentionally
or knowingly
threatens
another with
imminent
bodily injury,
including the
person’s
spouse; or (3)
intentionally
or knowingly
causes physical contact
with another
when the
person
knows or
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Utah

“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, illness,
or any impairment of
physical condition.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 761-601(3) (West 2012).

Vermont

“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, illness
or any impairment of
physical condition.
VT. STAT. tit. 13,
§ 3251(5) (2012).

[97:2036

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Simple Assault
should reasonably believe that the
other will
regard the
contact as
offensive or
provocative.
TEX. PENAL
CODE § 22.01
(2011).

“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 761-601(11) (West 2012).
“Serious bodily injury”
means: (A) bodily injury which creates any of
the following: (i) a substantial risk of death;
(ii) a substantial loss or
impairment of the
function of any bodily
member or organ; (iii)
a substantial impairment of health; or (iv)
substantial disfigurement; or (B) strangulation by intentionally
impeding normal
breathing or circula-

Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with
unlawful
force or violence, to do
bodily injury
to another;
UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5102 (West
2012).
(a) A person
is guilty of
simple assault if he or
she: (1) attempts to
cause or
purposely,
knowingly or
recklessly
causes bodily
injury to another; or (2)
negligently
causes bodily
injury to an-
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Virginia

Not defined.

Physical)

2155

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
tion of the blood by applying pressure on the
throat or neck or by
blocking the nose or
mouth of another person. VT. STAT. tit. 13,
§ 1021(2) (2012).

Simple Assault
other with a
deadly
weapon; or
(3) attempts
by physical
menace to
put another
in fear of
imminent
serious bodily injury. VT.
STAT. tit. 13,
§ 1023
(2012).

Not defined.

“An assault
requires an
overt act or
an attempt,
or the unequivocal appearance of
an attempt,
with force
and violence,
to do physical injury to
the person of
another.
There is no
requirement
that a victim
be physically
touched to be
329
assaulted.”

329. Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 585 S.E.2d 538, 539 (Va. 2003) (citations omitted).
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Bodily (or Physical)
Injury
“Bodily injury,” “physical injury,” or “bodily
harm” means physical
pain or injury, illness,
or an impairment of
physical condition.
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.04.110(4a) (2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
“Great bodily harm”
means bodily injury
which creates a probability of death, or
which causes significant serious permanent disfigurement, or
which causes a significant permanent loss or
impairment of the
function of any bodily
part or organ. WASH.
REV. CODE
§ 9A.04.110(4c) (2012).

Simple Assault
“An assault
is an attempt, with
unlawful
force, to inflict bodily
injury upon
another, accompanied
with the apparent present ability
to give effect
to the attempt if not
prevent330
ed.”

“Bodily injury” means
substantial physical
pain, illness or any impairment of physical
condition. W. VA. CODE
331
§ 61-2-9a(f)(1) (2012).

“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death,
which causes serious or
prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or
prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. W. VA. CODE § 61332
8B-1(10) (2012).

Assault.—If
any person
unlawfully
attempts to
commit a violent injury
to the person
of another or
unlawfully
commits an
act which
places another in reasonable apprehension
of immediately receiving a violent
injury, he

330. State v. Sample, 757 P.2d 539, 540 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
331. Within the stalking statute; see also W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(9) (2012)
(within the Sexual Offenses section).
332. Within the Sexual Offenses section.
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State

Bodily
Injury

(or

Physical)

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury

Wisconsin

“Bodily harm” means
physical pain or injury,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition. WIS. STAT.
§ 939.22(4) (2012).

“Great bodily harm”
means bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death,
or which causes serious
permanent disfigurement, or which causes
a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or
organ or other serious
bodily injury. WIS.
STAT. § 939.22(14)
(2012).

2157

Simple Assault
shall be
guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon
conviction,
shall be confined in jail
for not more
than six
months, or
fined not
more than
one hundred
dollars, or
both such
fine and imprisonment.
W. VA. CODE
§ 61-2-9(b)
(2012).
Battery:
Whoever
causes bodily
harm to another by an
act done
with intent
to cause bodily harm to
that person
or another
without the
consent of
the person so
harmed is
guilty of a
Class A misdemeanor.
WIS. STAT.
§ 940.19(1)
(2012).
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State
Wyoming
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Bodily (or Physical)
Injury
“Bodily injury” means
physical pain, illness
or any impairment of
physical condition.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1104(a)(i) (2012).

Serious (or Great) Bodily Injury
“Serious bodily injury”
means bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death
or which causes miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted
loss or impairment of
the function of any
bodily member or organ. WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-104(x) (2012).

[97:2036
Simple Assault
A person is
guilty of
simple assault if, having the present ability
to do so, he
unlawfully
attempts to
cause bodily
injury to another. WYO.
STAT. ANN.
§ 6-2-501(a)
(2012).

APPENDIX B. POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AS A
BRAIN INJURY
In this Appendix, I present one way to understand PTSD
333
as a brain-based disorder. Since its official recognition in
1980 by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, PTSD has
become central to many types of personal injury litigation and
has spawned a cottage industry of lawyers and scientists work334
ing at this intersection.
The growth of PTSD civil litigation raised a number of
challenges, including whether PTSD exists to begin with, what
a valid PTSD diagnosis is, the causal link to the traumatic
event, and how to tell if an individual is “malingering” (i.e., de335
liberately faking one’s symptoms). These are just a few of the
333. There is ongoing research on the relationship between brain function
and PTSD, thus the discussion in this Appendix should not be viewed as a definitive statement on the relationship between brain function and PTSD. Rather, this is a non-technical summary of one view of that relationship. See
Landy F. Sparr & Roger K. Pitman, PTSD and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF
PTSD: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 449 (Matthew J. Friedman et al. eds., 2007) for
additional discussion.
334. Id. at 449.
335. Erin D. Bigler, Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: Causality Considerations from a Neuroimaging and Neuropathology Perspective, in PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN COURT: PTSD, PAIN, AND TBI 308, 324 (Gerald Young et
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336

many concerns that skeptics raise about PTSD. Indeed, some
argue that PTSD is actually prolonged by the litigation process,
stating that “ongoing litigation acts as an artificial reinforcing
factor for unpleasant memories and their accompanying af337
fect.”
Yet, despite the scientific concerns voiced since its inception, PTSD has only grown in terms of its practical legal importance. In 1993 Dr. Alan Stone, professor of law and psychiatry at Harvard Law School, observed “no diagnosis in the
history of American psychiatry has had a more dramatic and
338
pervasive impact on law and social justice than . . . PTSD.”
Stress-related mental injuries, especially those accrued due
to exposure to military combat, have long been scrutinized,
though PTSD was officially recognized by the APA for the first
time in 1980 in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statisti339
cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III). Due in large part
to concerns about veterans upon their return from the battlefield, since the 1980s PTSD has been and continues to be well
340
studied. The National Center for PTSD, established in 1989
within the Department of Veterans Affairs, has invested tens of
millions of dollars to improve PTSD research, clinical practice,
341
and awareness.
al. eds., 2006); Melissa A. Polusny & Paul A. Arbisi, Assessment of Psychological Distress and Disability After Sexual Assault in Adults, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE IN COURT, supra, at 97, 111.
336. See generally C. R. BREWIN, POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: MALADY OR MYTH? 11–15 (2003) (discussing the challenges to the PTSD diagnosis
since its formal recognition in 1980).
337. L.H. Field, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Reappraisal, 92 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 35, 36 (1999). But see Review of Veterans’ Disability Compensation: Expert Reports on PTSD and Other Issues: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 24 (2008) (statement of Dean G. Kilpatrick, Distinguished Univ. Professor & Director of Nat’l Crime Victims Research Ctr.,
Med. Univ. S.C.) (concluding that “compensation does not in general serve as a
disincentive to seeking treatment”).
338. Alan A. Stone, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law: Critical
Review of the New Frontier, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 23, 23
(1993).
339. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS-III 236 (3d ed. 1980).
340. Matthew J. Friedman et al., PTSD: Twenty-Five Years of Progress and
Challenges, in HANDBOOK OF PTSD, supra note 333, at 3.
341. See NAT’L CTR. PTSD, About Us, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS (2013),
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/about/index.asp. As the research base on PTSD has
grown, so too have criticisms. The controversies include debates about whether PTSD is a legitimate diagnosis, PTSD’s failure to account for cross-cultural
variation, and concerns about the reliability of verbal reports and traumatic
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PTSD is “a favored diagnosis in tort law because it is incident-specific, easy to understand, and tends to rule out other
342
factors potentially involved in causation.” PTSD is also defined and diagnosed exclusively through behavioral
343
measures. The diagnostic criteria for PTSD make no explicit
344
mention of the brain. Compensation is tied to deficits in behavioral outcomes, caused by the specific event at issue, both
345
for personal injury cases and for veterans’ PTSD claims. It is
not enough for a client’s brain to change from a traumatic
event; if those brain changes do not lead to the behavioral outcomes specified in the diagnostic criteria, then there is no
PTSD diagnosed and no successful claim to file.
If behavior is front-and-center in PTSD litigation, what
does neuroscience research add to the legal landscape?
Neuroscientific evidence may play a critical role in determining
whether PTSD is a “mental” or a “bodily” injury. To see how,
we can start by thinking of PTSD as an inability to properly
346
regulate fear response and memory formation.
The three
brain regions of most interest for understanding PTSD are the
347
amygdala, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus. Setting aside
for the moment a myriad of complexities and individual differences, one story emerging from neuroimaging research on
PTSD is one of “exaggerated responsivity in the amygdala, diminished responsivity in medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), and
an inverse relationship between these two brain regions” along
memories. See generally POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES (Gerald M. Rosen ed., 2004) (providing a compilation of debates
about PTSD as a diagnosis).
342. Sparr & Pitman, supra note 333, at 449.
343. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS-IV 463, 463–68 (4th ed. 2000) (providing the diagnostic
criteria for PTSD).
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., Shen, Monetizing Memory Science, supra note 4, at 333–40
(discussing PTSD, neuroscience, and the conceptualization of injury in tort
law, noting the difficulties with putting a price on mental and emotional
harms); Sparr & Pitman, supra note 333, at 460–61 (noting the legal system’s
traditional “hostility toward claims for mental distress damages”).
346. See, e.g., Steven M. Southwick et al., Neurobiological Alterations Associated with PTSD, in HANDBOOK OF PTSD, supra note 333, at 166, 180–81
(noting that “stress sensitization” that often occurs with PTSD can cause an
individual to “overreact to even minor stresses”).
347. Lisa M. Shin et al., Structural and Functional Anatomy of PTSD:
Findings from Neuroimaging Research, in NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF PTSD: BIOLOGICAL, COGNITIVE, AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 59 (Jennifer J. Vasterling
& Chris R. Brewin eds., 2005).
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with “diminished volumes, neuronal integrity, and functional
348
integrity of the hippocampus.”
Crime victims with PTSD will typically exhibit either hyperactive or disassociative fear reactions, correlating with distinct neural activation patterns in the prefrontal cortex, anteri349
or cingulated cortex (ACC), and amygdala. The amygdala has
an important role in fear responses, letting us know “when we
should genuinely be frightened and behave accordingly, and
350
when the coast is clear.” Activity in the amygdala, as in all
brain structures, is “mediated by neurotransmitters that carry
351
signals from one neuron to the next.”
Understood in this neurobiological way, we can see why,
from a neuroscience perspective, the processes would be readily
labeled “bodily” or “physical,” just as the biological processes
underlying the functioning of other organs in the body would be
similarly labeled.

348. Id. at 74.
349. R.A. Lanius et al., A Review of Neuroimaging Studies in PTSD: Heterogeneity of Response to Symptom Provocation, 40 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 709,
711–14 (2006). For those individuals experiencing hyperarousal, one interpretation is that reduced activity in the prefrontal cortex—a part of the brain responsible for much executive function—can be interpreted as a failure “to inhibit subcortical limbic, especially amygdala, reactivity.” James W. Hopper et
al., Neural Correlates of Reexperiencing, Avoidance, and Dissociation in PTSD:
Symptom Dimensions and Emotion Dysregulation in Responses to ScriptDriven Trauma Imagery, 20 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 713, 714 (2007). Lanius and
others note that activation patterns differ for those whose PTSD manifests itself in disassociation rather than hyperarousal. Lanius et al., supra at 714.
350. Shen, Monetizing Memory Science, supra note 4, at 331.
351. Id.
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Figure B.1
The Areas of the Brain Affected in Post-Traumatic
352
Stress Disorder

The CNSforum provides the following caption to this image: “Sensory input, memory formation and stress response
mechanisms are affected in patients with post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). The regions of the brain involved in memory
processing that are implicated in PTSD include the hippocampus, amygdala and frontal cortex. While the heightened stress
352. Image Bank: The Areas of the Brain Affected in Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, LUNDBECK INST., http://www.cnsforum.com/imagebank/item/Neuro_
biol_PTSD/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
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response is likely to involve the thalamus, hypothalamus and
locus coeruleus.”
At this cellular level, all mental states, for healthy and distressed individuals alike, are produced by “neurotransmitter/neuroendocrine systems . . . . characterized by complex interactions with one another and with multiple brain regions,
including the amygdala, [locus coeruleus], dorsal raphe nucle353
us, hippocampus and [prefrontal cortex].” In the case of a
crime victim with PTSD, these complex systems function abnormally, and the abnormal functioning of the brain’s biochemistry results in the victim’s inability to live life as they normally
would, e.g., experiencing fear at moments when (but for the
354
traumatic event) they normally would not.
Because of a victim’s preexisting vulnerabilities, the nature
of the traumatic event, and subsequent events, the victim’s
brain has been re-wired (through altered neuronal connections
and firing patterns). PTSD involves dysregulation of several
neurotransmitter/neurohormone systems: the noradrenergic
system, serotonergic system, and hypothalamic-pituitary355
adrenal (HPA) axis. Increased levels of catecholamine and
cortisol “enhance the functioning of the amygdala, promoting
fear conditioning and the consolidation of emotionally relevant
356
memories.” At the same time, the release of these hormones
357
“impair[s] the cognitive functioning of the PFC.” In short, the
neurochemical environment during a stressful moment sets the
stage for the encoding that may eventually lead to observed
PTSD behavioral outcomes.
The relationship between memory and trauma plays an
358
important role in PTSD as well. Experimental research on
memory for trauma-relevant and -irrelevant words, as well as
tests of autobiographical memory, have found that PTSD may
353. Steven M. Southwick et al., Neurobiological Alterations Associated
with PTSD, in HANDBOOK OF PTSD, supra note 346, at 166, 180.
354. Id. at 180–81.
355. Steven M. Southwick et al., Neurobiological and Neurocognitive Alterations in PTSD : A Focus on Norepinephrine, Serotonin, and the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis, in NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF PTSD, supra note 347,
at 27.
356. Id. at 30.
357. Id. at 31.
358. As discussed elsewhere, moderate and extreme stressors may have
different effects on memory systems affecting PTSD. The relationship between
arousal and performance takes on an inverted-U shape that psychologists
have long recognized in a number of performance areas. See, e.g., id. at 29.
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involve both “unwanted recall of the traumatic event” and
359
“mild impairments in recall of newly acquired information.”
To understand why some memories evoke this fear response, while others do not, we must review the critical role of
the hippocampus. The hippocampus is a part of the brain in360
volved in multiple memory systems. Relevant to this discussion of PTSD, “the hippocampus is essential for the acquisition
361
of episode memories with spatiotemporal content.” When a
memory is formed in the midst of a traumatic event, the brain’s
memory systems are not functioning normally because of the
stress. More specifically:
When memories are formed under intense stress, a critical component
of normal memory formation—the hippocampus—is disabled, and
memories without spatiotemporal content are created. At the same
time, another component of normal memory function—the amygdala—can be potentiated, leading to stronger-than-usual memory for
highly charged emotional events. When a person retrieves a traumatic event memory, the retrieved information is bereft of spatiotemporal
context. Instead of being bound firmly to the past, this “disembodied”
event memory is conflated with the ongoing spatio/temporal
frame. . . . The memory takes on a quality of the here and now so
362
strongly that the individual may literally re-experience the event.

Those who experience PTSD are less able to successfully
engage in “context discrimination”—discriminating between a
new context that is not threatening versus the old context that
363
was. This, in turn, may lead to an inability to resume the
364
normal course of life. By uncovering the neural mechanisms
that cause these behavioral outcomes, memory scientists allow
lawyers to speak of mental injuries in the brain-based terminology of the hippocampus, the amygdala, and the biochemical
processes by which the hippocampus and amygdala function
365
with each other and with the rest of the brain.
359. Joseph I. Constans, Information-Processing Biases in PTSD, in NEUnote 347, at 105, 116.
360. Lynn Nadel, Multiple Memory Systems: A New View, in 1 LEARNING
AND MEMORY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE 41, 43–44 (Randolf Menzel &
John H. Byrne eds., 2008).
361. Lynn Nadel & W.J. Jacobs, The Role of the Hippocampus in PTSD,
Panic and Phobia, in THE HIPPOCAMPUS FUNCTIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE 455, 457 (Nobumasa Kato ed., 1996).
362. Id. at 459.
363. See Shen, Monetizing Memory Science, supra note 4, at 331 (discussing
how individuals diagnosed with PTSD experience fear when they otherwise
would not).
364. See id.
365. See id. at 339–40 (suggesting neuroscientific possibilities for monetizing PTSD and how brain data may be used by lawyers to influence jurors’ de-

ROPSYCHOLOGY OF PTSD, supra
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APPENDIX C. TECHNICAL DETAILS
This Appendix provides additional detail on the research
design employed in the two Experiments, the statistical procedures used to analyze the data, and the results of the statistical
366
analyses.
A. SUBJECT COMPLIANCE
Concern about subjects’ compliance with task instructions
are of special interest with online experiments because subjects
cannot be monitored while engaged in the experimental
367
tasks. To address this issue, experimental psychologists have
developed “attention filters” designed to ascertain whether subjects are in fact following instructions and paying attention to
368
the material being presented to them online. In my experiments, I employed a modified version of the filter developed by
369
psychologist Daniel Oppenheimer and his colleagues. The design of the attention filter question was such that users who did
not read carefully would see, in large font, a headline reading
“Background Questions on Sources for News” as well as another large, bold question: “From which of these sources have you
received information in the past month?” A series of check-box
options were provided (e.g., local newspaper, local TV news).
Subjects reading carefully, however, were instructed not to
check any of the boxes, but instead to type “123” into the text
box provided. The results presented in this Article are based
only on the “good” subjects, i.e., those subjects who were paying
370
attention.
cisions).
366. Replication data is available by request from the author and online at
Harvard Dataverse Network, Harvard Univ., http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/
bodilyinjury (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).
367. Id. at 343. In addition, concerns may arise about individuals taking
the survey multiple times. To address this concern, a filter employed after data collection allowed for the experiment to exclude from the dataset subjects
with duplicate IP addresses. Seventeen observations were dropped to avoid
duplicate IP addresses in Experiment Two. Twenty observations were dropped
to avoid duplicate IP addresses in Experiment Two.
368. Id. at 343–44; see also Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Instructional
Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 867, 867–68 (2009).
369. See Oppenheimer et al., supra note 368, at 868 (describing a filter in
which subjects must carefully read instructions which, counter to the boldface
headline above the instructions, tell subjects not to actually click on an answer
to the question).
370. In the sample of subjects for Experiment One, 19 out of 200 (10%) did
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After filtering out the subjects who did not meet these criteria, I had an N of 180 subjects in Experiment One. In the
sample of subjects for Experiment Two, 68 out of 513 (13%) did
not complete the attention filter properly, and are excluded
from the analysis. This gave me a total N of 425 subjects in Experiment Two.
B. EXPERIMENT ONE: SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS AND THE
DETERMINATION OF BODILY INJURY
In the body of the Article, the figures presenting data from
Experiment One illustrated the variance in subject rating of
371
bodily injury. What explains that variance? To examine the
question in more depth, here I present additional statistical
analysis of the factors related to bodily injury rating. Because
the outcome variable is ordinal, ordered logic regression analysis was employed. In addition to exposure to the mental health
parity information, these expanded models also include the fol372
lowing measures: the education level of the respondent;
whether the respondent previously knew about mental health
373
parity; an index of the subject’s political ideology (with 1 being very liberal and 7 being very conservative); a dichotomous
variable measuring whether the respondent is female; and a dichotomous variable measuring whether the respondent is nonwhite.
The results of the regression analysis, reported in Table
C1, suggest that when these additional covariates are accounted for, the exposure to Dr. Hyman’s testimony significantly affected bodily injury rating only for the sprained wrist, lung tissue, and recurring headaches injuries. The regression results
also find that there is a relationship between education levels
and bodily injury rating. There is a positive, significant relationship between a respondent’s education level and their bodily injury rating for memory loss, recurring headaches, PTSD,
and depression. In addition, self-reported previous knowledge
of mental health parity was also significantly and positively related to bodily injury rating. The results suggest at least the
not complete the attention filter properly, and are excluded from the analysis.
371. See supra Figures 2.1–.2, Tables 1–2.
372. All subjects provided their education level: Less than High School;
High School/GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; or Doctoral Degree/Professional Degree.
373. All subjects were asked to respond, on a seven-point scale to the following question: Before taking this survey, how knowledgeable—if at all—
were you with the concept of mental health parity?
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possibility that if there is a “common” understanding of the
term, it is to be found within certain population sub-groups.
Table C1
Explaining Subject Likelihood to Identify Injuries as
“Bodily”: Results of Ordered Logistic
Regression Analysis

Brain
Info

Education

Previous
Knowled
ge

Conservative

NonWhite

Female

N

-0.03

Recurri
ng
Head
aches
0.56*
*

(0.27)
0.21*
*

(0.28)
0.29*
**

(0.27)

(0.27)

0.15

0.24**

0.24**

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.10)

0.10

0.33*
**

0.14

0.28*
**

0.13

0.28**
*

(0.10)

(0.09)

(0.10)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

-0.16

-0.05

0.00

-0.12

-0.05

-0.06

-0.18**

-0.13

(0.12)

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.10)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

-0.25

-0.33

0.13

-0.57

0.86**

(0.10)
0.87*
*

-0.56

0.63*

-0.66*

-0.61*

(0.84)

(0.45)

(0.44)

(0.41)

(0.36)

(0.36)

(0.6)

(0.37)

(0.35)

(0.36)

-0.49

0.68*

0.08

0.61*

0.57*

0.06

0.22

-0.28

-0.14

0.15

(0.72)

(0.37)

(0.35)

(0.34)

(0.29)

(0.29)

(0.28)

(0.28)

(0.27)

(0.28)

180

180

180

180

180

180

180

180

180

180

0.45

Torn
Lung
Tissue
0.67*
*

(0.35)

(0.29)

(0.29)

0.04

-0.13

Broken
Leg

Broken
Ribs

Concussion

0.47

0.58

0.50

Sprai
ned
Wrist
0.95*
**

(0.67)

(0.38)

(0.345)

0.21

-0.11

-0.18

(0.22)

(0.13)

(0.12)

(0.12)

0.09

-0.04

-0.15

-0.07

(0.22)

(0.12)

(0.11)

-0.28

-0.14

(0.22)

Scratc
h on
Forearm

(0.10)

Mem
ory
Loss

PTSD

Depressi
on

0.34

0.30

Notes: Significance is denoted as: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .0
C. EXPERIMENT TWO: FULL TEXT OF DEFINITIONS AND
SCENARIOS
The five definitions used in this Experiment were:
(1) No definition
(2) Black’s Law’s Dictionary: Physical damage to a person’s
374
body

374. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009).
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(3) Black’s Law Dictionary: “Bodily: pertaining to or concerning
the body; of or belonging to the body or the physical constitu375
tion; not mental, but corporeal”;
(4) Federal: “(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement;
(B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of the function of
a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (E) any other in376
jury to the body, no matter how temporary.”
(5) Brain-Inclusive: (A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; (B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; (E) impairment of the brain’s normal functioning; or (F) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary.
The text of the scenarios utilized was:
Text of Burglary Scenario
Facts: The facts of the case are as follows. The Defendant (John) is charged
with aggravated burglary. John admitted on the stand that he had broken into
a private home to steal an expensive TV. He had seen the TV through the
home's living room window. He knew that someone was in the home when he
broke in. Security cameras on the house confirmed that, at approximately
12:00 noon on a weekday, John broke the lock on the private residence and entered the house. He was not armed. The homeowner was startled by John's
entrance into the home, and John yelled “I'm taking the TV!” He quickly took
the TV, left the home, and drove off. John was later arrested and now faces
this charge at trial. The homeowner testified during the trial that she has recurring nightmares about the break-in, and that she has been diagnosed with
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) due to the event. An expert medical
witness testified during the trial that the homeowner suffered from PTSD related to the break-in.
Defense Argument: John does not contest the facts of the case just presented, nor does he challenge the issue of intent. But John argues that he is only
guilty of a reduced charge of burglary because the homeowner’s injuries do not
constitute “bodily injury” as required by the statute.
[ Variation 1 of 3] No additional information on prosecution argument provided.
[Variation 2 of 3] Prosecution Argument: The prosecution argues that the
brain is a part of the body, that the homeowner’s PTSD and nightmares are
the result of physical, biochemical changes in her brain, and therefore that she
has experienced bodily injury as a result of the break-in.
[Variation 3 of 3] Prosecution Argument: The prosecution argues that the
brain is a part of the body, that the homeowner’s PTSD and nightmares are
the result of physical, biochemical changes in her brain, and therefore that she
has experienced bodily injury as a result of the break-in. During the trial, an
expert witness, in support of the diagnosis of PTSD, testified that the home375. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (6th ed. 1990).
376. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(4) (2006).
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owner’s brain activity was abnormal. A brain scan showing abnormal activity
was admitted into evidence.

Text of Assault Scenario
Facts: The facts of the case are as follows. The Defendant (John) is charged
with assault. John was riding a subway train to work in the morning, sitting
down because he had recently broken his leg and was not able to stand without crutches. Another passenger (Peter) entered the train car, and stood across
from John. Peter was wearing a sports jersey of a rival team that John did not
like. John, upset that his team had lost to this rival the night before, began
insulting Peter loudly and profanely. John made fun of Peter’s weight and
growing bald spot, and completely humiliated Peter in front of the other train
passengers. Peter exited the train at the next stop and contacted the police.
John was later arrested and now faces this assault charge at trial. Peter testified that, seeing that John was on crutches, he was not fearful of being
punched. But Peter also testified that since the incident, he has had recurring
nightmares and traumatic memories about the experience. Peter now finds it
difficult to ride the subway because of these bad memories.
Defense Argument: John does not contest the facts of the case just presented, admits to making the insulting statements, and does not challenge the issue of intent. But John argues that he cannot be found guilty of assault because Peter did not experience any “bodily injury,” a required element of the
statute.
[Variation 1 of 3] No additional information on prosecution argument provided.
[Variation 2 of 3] Prosecution Argument: The prosecution argues that the
brain is a part of the body, that Peter's nightmares and traumatic memories
are the result of biochemical changes in his brain cells, and therefore that he
has experienced bodily injury as a result of John's insults.
[Variation 3 of 3] Prosecution Argument: The prosecution argues that the
brain is a part of the body, that Peter's nightmares and
traumatic memories are the result of biochemical changes in his brain cells,
and therefore that he has experienced bodily injury as a result of John's insults. During the trial, an expert witness testified that the Peter's brain activity was abnormal. A brain scan showing abnormal activity was admitted into
evidence.

D

EXPERIMENT TWO: CONFIRMATORY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

In the body of the Article, I presented a series of graphical
377
figures related to the experiments in Study Two. Here I present the statistical analysis which provides more detail than
can be offered in the graphical presentations. Logit regression
models were used to examine the effect of jury instructions on
the likelihood of a subject to label the crime victim’s harm as
377. See supra Figures 3–4.
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bodily injury. To account for a variety of potential subject-level
confounds, I ran models that included controls for: race, age,
education level, political ideology, knowledge of law, and
knowledge of neuroscience. Table C2 reports the regression re378
sults, in odds ratios.
Burglary Scenario. Responding to the burglary scenario,
within the context of no brain argument from the prosecution,
we see that even here there is some differentiation by definition. Post-estimation chi-squared tests find that there is a significant difference between Black’s definition and the federal
2
definition (χ (1) = 4.69, p < 0.05); between Black’s definition and
2
the brain-inclusive definition (χ (1) = 9.46, p < 0.01); and between Black’s 1990 definition and the brain-inclusive definition
2
(χ (1) = 6.71, p < 0.01). Subjects who received the braininclusive definition were thus significantly more likely than
those who received either of the Black’s definitions to view the
victim’s injury as a bodily injury.
Looking next at the condition in which the prosecution
makes a brain-based argument, subjects exposed to the federal
definition were significantly more likely to define the injury as
2
bodily than Black’s 1990 definition (χ (1) = 5.77, p < 0.05). Subjects exposed to the brain-inclusive definition were significantly
more likely to choose bodily injury than were those who were
2
exposed to Black’s 1990 definition (χ (1) = 4.18, p < 0.05).
When subjects are told that a brain scan is added to the
prosecution’s case, we again see a significant difference emerge
2
between Black’s 1990 definition and the federal definition (χ (1)
= 4.62, p < 0.05). We see an even stronger gap emerge between
2
Black’s 1990 definition and the brain-inclusive definition (χ (1)
= 13.23, p < 0.01). This finding supports the argument made in
the text that while brain-based definitions combined with proffered brain evidence can be an effective combination in promot379
ing an expansion of bodily injury, this expansion can be significantly limited with the introduction of the Black’s 1990
definition. In the brain scan scenarios, there was also a significant difference between the brain-inclusive definition and
2
Black’s current definition (χ (1) = 10.18, p < 0.01), as well as between the federal definition and the brain-inclusive definition
2
(χ (1) = 3.26, p < 0.10).
Assault Scenario. Similar, though not identical, patterns
378. Odds ratios in this context can be understood as the ratio of the odds
of choosing bodily injury to the odds of choosing not bodily injury.
379. See supra Part II.
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emerged from the assault scenarios. With no brain argument
from the prosecution, I find that there is a significant difference
2
between Black’s definition and the federal definition (χ (1) =
4.77, p < 0.05); and between Black’s definition and the brain2
inclusive definition (χ (1) = 5.88, p < 0.05). There is also a significant difference between Black’s 1990 definition and federal
2
definition (χ (1) = 3.52, p < 0.10), and between Black’s 1990 and
2
the brain-inclusive definition (χ (1) = 4.39, p < 0.05).
When the prosecution makes a brain-based argument, but
does not yet introduce a brain scan, subjects again diverge
based on the definition they are exposed to. There is a significant difference between Black’s definition and the federal defi2
nition (χ (1) = 2.71, p = 0.10); and between Black’s definition
2
and the brain-inclusive definition (χ (1) = 2.64, p < 0.10. There
is also a significant difference between Black’s 1990 definition
2
and federal definition (χ (1) = 5.52, p < 0.05), and between
2
Black’s 1990 and the brain-inclusive definition (χ (1) = 5.51, p <
0.05).
Finally, as with burglary, the patterns in bodily injury determination in the assault scenarios are even more pronounced
when the subjects are told that the prosecution introduced a
brain scan to support its argument. In this context, there is a
significant difference between Black’s definition and the federal
2
definition (χ (1) = 4.77, p < 0.05); and between Black’s definition
2
and the brain-inclusive definition (χ (1) = 5.88, p < 0.05. There
is also a significant difference between Black’s 1990 definition
2
and federal definition (χ (1) = 3.52, p < 0.10), and between
2
Black’s 1990 and the brain-inclusive definition (χ (1) = 4.39, p <
0.05).
Taken together, the results confirm the primary message
emphasized in the Article: definitions matter in shaping subject
responses to the bodily injury categorization question. Legislatures thus have a powerful tool at their disposal in shaping the
380
contours of the bodily injury category.

380. See supra Part IV.C.
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Table C2
Comparison of Distribution of Subjects in Experiment Two by State to Overall U.S. Distribution
State

% of U.S. Population

% Of Study Subjects

Alabama

1.5%

0.7%

Alaska

0.2%

0.0%

Arizona

2.0%

2.4%

Arkansas

0.9%

0.5%

California

11.9%

9.4%

Colorado

1.6%

1.2%

Connecticut

1.1%

0.2%

Delaware

0.3%

0.5%

Washington, DC

0.2%

0.2%

Florida

6.0%

5.9%

Georgia

3.1%

5.2%

Hawaii

0.4%

0.5%

Idaho

0.5%

0.0%

Illinois

4.1%

4.5%

Indiana

2.1%

1.6%

Iowa

1.0%

0.9%

Kansas

0.9%

1.4%

Kentucky

1.4%

1.2%

Louisiana

1.5%

0.7%

Maine

0.4%

0.7%

Maryland

1.8%

2.8%

Massachusetts

2.1%

1.4%

Michigan

3.2%

3.8%

Minnesota

1.7%

3.3%

Mississippi

0.9%

1.6%

Missouri

1.9%

1.9%

Montana

0.3%

0.5%

Nebraska

0.6%

0.7%

Nevada

0.9%

0.5%

New Hampshire

0.4%

0.5%

New Jersey

2.8%

1.9%

New Mexico

0.7%

0.5%

New York

6.2%

6.8%

North Carolina

3.1%

3.1%

North Dakota

0.2%

0.7%
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State

% of U.S. Population

% Of Study Subjects

Ohio

3.7%

4.7%

Oklahoma

1.2%

0.5%

Oregon

1.2%

1.9%

Pennsylvania

4.1%

4.7%

Rhode Island

0.3%

0.5%

South Carolina

1.5%

1.9%

South Dakota

0.3%

0.2%

Tennessee

2.0%

1.9%

Texas

8.0%

5.9%

Utah

0.9%

0.5%

Vermont

0.2%

0.2%

Virginia

2.6%

4.9%

Washington

2.2%

2.4%

West Virginia

0.6%

0.5%

Wisconsin

1.8%

1.6%

Wyoming

0.2%

0.2%

2173

Note: 2010 Census data was downloaded and analyzed from the
American Fact Finder Tool. See American FactFinder, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/ (last visited
Mar. 30, 2013).
Table C3
Explaining Subject Likelihood to Identify Injuries as
“Bodily” in Two Hypothetical Criminal Scenarios: Results of Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis

Blac
k's
(Cur
rent)
Def.
Blac
k's

Burglary Scenarios
Prosecutor
PreNo
sents
Brain
BrainInforBased
mation
ArguPrement
sented

Assault Scenarios

Prosecutor Also
Presents
Brain
Scan
Image

All
Variations

-1.30

0.46

-1.13*

(0.93)

(0.59)

(0.60)

-0.53

-0.22

-1.77**

No Brain
Information
Presented

Prosecutor Presents
BrainBased
Argument

Prosecutor Also
Presents
Brain
Scan Image

All Variations

-0.51

0.49

1.47

-2.70**

-0.71

(0.36)
0.91**

(1.05)

(1.19)

(0.86)

(0.46)

-0.34

0.01

-2.41**

-1.42**
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Burglary Scenarios
Prosecutor
PreNo
sents
Brain
BrainInforBased
mation
ArguPrement
sented

Assault Scenarios

Prosecutor Also
Presents
Brain
Scan
Image

All
Variations

(0.81)

(0.64)

(0.70)

0.78

1.30**

(0.74)

No Brain
Information
Presented

Prosecutor Presents
BrainBased
Argument

Prosecutor Also
Presents
Brain
Scan Image

All Variations

(0.39)

(1.30)

(1.47)

(0.86)

(0.60)

-0.25

0.55

2.10**

2.67**

-0.77

0.74*

(0.58)

(0.59)

(0.34)

(1.00)

(1.11)

(0.62)

(0.39)

1.40**

1.04*

0.86

1.05**

1.36

2.69**

-0.61

0.62

(0.67)

(0.56)

(0.61)

(0.33)

(0.95)

(1.12)

(0.60)

(0.38)

-0.21

-0.37

0.74

0.04

0.46

-0.11

0.20

0.28

(0.62)

(0.49)

(0.50)

(0.29)

(0.63)

(0.70)

(0.56)

(0.34)

0.76

0.09

0.19

0.22

0.50

0.26

0.35

0.36

(0.55)

(0.39)

(0.45)

(0.24)

(0.65)

(0.56)

(0.53)

(0.30)

-0.24

-0.12

0.16

-0.07

0.09

-0.41*
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